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I. INTRODUCTION  
An elementary principle of constitutional law is that a constitutional 
amendment nullifies, or at least alters, preexisting and conflicting 
constitutional provisions. Yet should all constitutional amendments have this 
effect? Can we imagine a scenario in which ratification of a new 
constitutional amendment would leave preexisting conflicting constitutional 
provisions fully intact, unaltered, and undisturbed? This Article argues that 
the best understanding of fundamental adjudicatory principles compels us to 
recognize just such a possibility.  
Consider, as an example, an amendment seeking to alter the contours of 
the First Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause.1 The contours of the Free 
Exercise Clause are quite broad, and may plausibly be read as providing 
anything from maximum to minimum protection from government action 
that burdens the exercise of religious practices.2 Currently, the Supreme 
Court maintains that the Free Exercise Clause prohibits only state action that 
is non-neutral with regard to religious practices.3 In contrast, facially neutral 
and generally applicable state action that substantially burdens the free 
exercise of religion is permitted, so long as the state action is rationally 
related to a legitimate government interest.4 Previously, however, the Court 
had read the Free Exercise Clause as prohibiting state action substantially 
burdening the free exercise of religion unless the government action satisfied 
 
 
 1. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 2. See infra  notes 3-5 and accompanying text. 
 3. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520 (1993) (striking 
down city ordinance as unconstitutional because it non-neutrally sanctioned the practices of a 
particular religious sect). 
 4. See id.; Employment Div. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) (upholding 
neutral and generally applicable state statute even though it substantially impinged the religious 
practices of a religious group); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW:  PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 1021 (1997) (construing Employment Div. v. Smith, 497 U.S. 872) (“The [Smith ] Court held 
that the free exercise clause cannot be used to challenge a neutral law of general applicability.”). In 
other words, neutral and generally applicable stat utes that have the effect of burdening religious 
practices comport with the Free Exercise Clause, even when they are not supported by a compelling 
government interest. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 514 (1997) (citing Employment Div. v. 
Smith, 494 U.S. 872), and stating that “Smith  held that neutral, generally applicable laws may be 
applied to religious practices even when not supported by a compelling government interest.” 
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a strict scrutiny test.5 Both the current rational basis and former strict scrutiny 
analyses constitute plausible readings of the Free Exercise Clause. Congress, 
fearing that the more recent rational basis test was insufficient to protect the 
free exercise of religion, passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act 
(RFRA), which sought to impose the strict scrutiny test onto the Free 
Exercise Clause.6 The Supreme Court, however, struck down RFRA as an 
unconstitutional effort to define the scope of Free Exercise Clause 
protections via passage of an ordinary statute, an action beyond the limits of 
Congress’s enumerated legislative powers.7  
If RFRA had been ratified pursuant to Article V8 as an amendment to the 
Constitution, would it have reshaped and narrowed the contours of the Free 
Exercise Clause?9 Would such an amendment, to be more precise, have 
truncated the otherwise broad range of plausible Free Exercise Clause 
meanings and eliminated the current rational basis reading as a permissible 
reading of the Free Exercise Clause? The conventional answer is that a 
 
 
 5. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (applying a strict scrutiny test to strike down facially 
neutral state law that denied unemployment benefits to a woman fired for refusing to work on the 
Sabbath); CHEMERINSKY, supra  note 3, at 1021 (observing that the Supreme Court applied a strict 
scrutiny analysis to Free Exercise Clause cases for twenty-seven years following its decision in 
Sherbert). 
 6. 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb (1994). Under the terms of RFRA, the “government may substantially 
burden a person’s exercise of religion only if it demonstrates that application of the burden to the 
person (1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest and (2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.” Id. § 2000bb-1(b).  
 7. Boerne, 521 U.S. at 516-19, 529-36 (holding that Congress’s power to enforce the Fourteenth 
Amendment does not include the power to alter the meaning of constitutional provisions such as the 
Free Exercise Clause, and that RFRA sought to expand Free Exercise Clause protections, rather than 
merely enforce Fourteenth Amendment protections).  
 8. U.S. CONST. art. V. Article V states: 
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose 
Amendments to this Constitution, or on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the 
several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be 
valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of 
three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the 
other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment 
which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner 
affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, 
without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate. 
Id. 
 9. Such an amendment is quite possible. The same eclectic political interest group that pushed 
RFRA through Congress could engineer the passage of such a constitutional amendment. See Thomas 
C. Berg, What Hath Congress Wrought? An Interpretive Guide to the Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act, 39 VILL. L. REV. 1, 13 & n.49 (1994). There may exist sufficient support in the state legislative 
bodies to ratify such an amendment. Alabama has ratified a similar amendment to its constitution. 
ALA.  CONST. amend. 622, § V; Thomas C. Berg & Frank Myers, The Alabama Religious Freedom 
Amendment: An Interpretive Guide, 31 CUMB. L. REV. 47 (2000). In addition, several states have 
passed statutes similar to RFRA. Id. at 47 n.2 (citations omitted).  
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constitutional amendment resembling RFRA would have had just that effect. 
In other words, a RFRA-like constitutional amendment would narrow the 
scope of constitutionally permissible government action substantially 
burdening religious practices to the few instances where government action 
is narrowly tailored to advance compelling government interests. This 
Article, however, argues that a RFRA-like amendment might not have such 
an effect. Instead, this Article argues that the contours of the Free Exercise 
Clause might remain completely undisturbed despite passage pursuant to 
Article V of a RFRA-like constitutional amendment.  
How could the contours of an existing constitutional provision remain 
undisturbed in the face of a conflicting constitutional amendment? The 
answer lies in (1) an understanding of the meta-norms that govern 
adjudication of cases in which legal norms conflict, and (2) the recognition 
that constitutional provisions emanate from two distinct sources, and 
therefore are of two distinct classes, with one class hierarchically superior to 
the other. Upon these twin pillars I trace an argument supporting the 
following thesis: Constitutional provisions emanating from “We the People,” 
the hierarchically superior source, should always and unconditionally trump 
irreconcilably conflicting constitutional provisions created by government 
institutions, the hierarchically inferior source. Thus, only a constitutional 
amendment emanating from We the People (but not a constitutional 
amendment produced by ordinary government institutions) ought to trump an 
irreconcilably conflicting popular sovereign-generated constitutional 
provision.  
In practical terms, whether the above hypothesized RFRA-like 
constitutional amendment would alter the contours of the Free Exercise 
Clause should depend upon whether the amendment in fact emanates from 
We the People, or instead from ordinary government institutions—ratifying 
state legislatures acting pursuant to Article V. Begin with the orthodox 
assumption that the Bill of Rights emanates from We the People.10 If the 
hypothetical constitutional amendment also emanates from We the People, 
 
 
 10. I do not necessarily adopt the position that the Bill of Rights emanates from We the People, 
but instead assume that it does for rhetorical purposes. Ultimately, whether the Bill of Rights or any 
constitutional provision emanates from the popular sovereign or instead from government institutions 
depends upon the criteria employed for distinguishing the two. The identification of such criteria is 
beyond the scope of this Article. Instead, in this Article I will argue (contrary to the extant orthodox 
view) that under any reasonable criteria, only some constitutional provisions can be honestly and 
accurately catalogued as emanating from the popular sovereign, while others must be described as 
emanating from ordinary government institutions. I leave for a later date the task of sifting through the 
universe of reasonable criteria that might be used to separate popular sovereign-generated norms from 
government-institution generated constitutional norms. 
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then the amendment, being of more recent vintage, should reshape the 
contours of the Free Exercise Clause. If emanating from ordinary 
government institutions, however, despite its more recent vintage, the 
amendment ought not alter in any way the popular sovereign-generated Free 
Exercise Clause.11 Such a government institution-generated amendment 
would be hierarchically inferior to the popular sovereign-generated Free 
Exercise Clause. In short, the paramount factor in resolving conflicts between 
constitutional provisions should be the sources of constitutional provisions 
and their corresponding positions in our extant hierarchy of legal norms, 
rather than the chronologic order of ratification.  
The steps leading to such an iconoclastic conclusion will take quite a bit 
of work to clarify.12 Perhaps the most crucial step in the argument will be to 
clarify what I mean by popular sovereign-ratified versus government 
institution-ratified constitutional provisions. Currently, the courts make no 
distinction between constitutional provisions generated by the popular 
sovereign and those generated by ordinary government institutions. Under 
the extant constitutional orthodoxy, all constitutional provisions emanate 
from a single source—We the People—either via Article VII,13 the 
Constitution’s ratification provision, or Article V,14 the Constitution’s 
amendment provision.15 Regarding amendments, any constitutional provision 
proposed by Congress and ratified by the requisite number of state legislative 
bodies satisfies Article V requirements and ipso facto counts as a 
constitutional provision emanating from, and ratified by, We the People. 
Stated differently, according to the orthodox view, Article V provides a 
complete and self-contained answer to the epistemic question of how we 
know that the popular sovereign has created a new constitutional textual 
norm.  
 
 
 11. Although a government institution-created constitutional amendment ought not alter the 
contours of a preexisting popular sovereign -created constitutional provision, I leave open the 
possibility that such a constitutional amendment may overrule a Supreme Court interpretation of a 
popular sovereign -created constitutional provision. Thus, although a RFRA-styled constitutional 
amendment not sourced in We the People should not trump or alter the contours of the Free Exercise 
Clause itself, such an amendment may trump or nullify the Supreme Court’s narrow doctrinal 
interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause expounded in Boerne, 521 U.S. 507, and Smith, 494 U.S. 
872. See infra text at notes 355-59. 
 12. Along the way, therefore, it will be necessary to make some simplifying assumptions and to 
narrow the scope of inquiry. Here, my purpose is to trace the outlines of an argument. In future work I 
will retur n to some of the knottier issues piece by piece and offer more comprehensive treatment.  
 13. U.S. CONST. art. VII (“The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient 
for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so rat ifying the Same.”). 
 14. See supra note 8 for the text of Article V. 
 15. See infra text at notes 108-34.  
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A major portion of this Article is dedicated to debunking the orthodox 
view that all constitutional provisions, particularly those ratified by state 
legislatures pursuant to Article V, emanate from We the People. On the 
contrary, an accurate description must admit that constitutional provisions 
emanate from two separate and distinct sources—We the People and 
ordinary government norm-generating institutions. I will refer to this crucial 
idea as the “dual-source thesis.”  
The seeds of the dual-source thesis lie in Article V’s amendment 
mechanism. Rather than directly consulting the popular sovereign, Article V 
bypasses We the People and instead employs ordinary government law 
making institutions—state legislative bodies—as agents through which We 
the People purportedly act to ratify new constitutional provisions. When 
Article V’s principal-agent mechanism operates well, Congress and state 
legislatures ratify amendments reflecting and embodying the popular 
sovereign’s deliberated consensus sanctioning the creation of new higher law 
principles. In such cases, passage via Article V signals and formalizes We the 
People’s act of constitutional textual norm generation. When Article V’s 
principal-agent mechanism breaks down, however, the state legislatures 
ratify amendments over which the popular sovereign has not reached a 
deliberated consensus, or even ratifies amendments contrary to a deliberated 
popular consensus. In such cases, the formal satisfaction of Article V 
requirements signals not an act of We the People, but instead the creation of 
a new constitutional provision by ordinary government norm-generating 
institutions, state legislatures, which malfunction as conduits through which 
We the People act. In short, not every constitutional amendment that 
overcomes Article V’s formal hurdles can honestly and accurately be 
characterized as ratified by We the People. In principal-agent relationships 
such false positive agency problems are bound to arise. Where agency 
problems arise, a new constitutional provision is created, but without a 
legitimate popular sovereignty pedigree.16 
 
 
 16. Article V also gives rise to false negative agency problems—instances where a state 
legislature fails to ratify a formal constitutional amendment even though We the People have reached a 
deliberated consensus sanctioning ratification. The failed Equal Rights Amendment may be one such 
false negative. See Sanford Levinson, Why It’s Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. 
ST. U. L. REV. 359, 373 (2000) (“[T]he Equal Rights Amendment, which was indeed proposed by 
Congress, received the assent of a majority of the states composed of a majority of the American 
population, and, of course, was not added to the text because it did not receive the approval of the 
constitutionally required thirty-eight states.”). In some cases the judicial and executive branches may 
bring about the changes called for by the failed amendment via revisions of statutory and common law 
rules. See David A. Strauss, The Irrelevance of Constitutional Amendments, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1457, 
1475-78 (2001) (arguing that changes in the failed Child Labor and Equal Rights Amendments were 
effectuated by legislative and executive branch action). 
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Once we accept the dual-source thesis, the conclusion I advance follows 
programmatically from the regular and consistent application of a set of 
axiomatic meta-norms that lawyers and judges, often unconsciously, take as 
immutable givens in everyday legal arguments. This set of meta-norms 
constitutes a majoritarian democracy-reinforcing framework that governs 
adjudication of cases involving irreconcilably conflicting legal norms.17 
Courts never intentionally and openly veer from these meta-norms. By 
unreflectively treating all constitutional provisions as emanating from We the 
People, however, courts unwittingly violate the meta-norms.18 Once courts 
candidly acknowledge that constitutional provisions spring from two separate 
and distinct sources, consistent application of the meta-norms leads to three 
related conclusions. Popular sovereign-generated and government institution-
generated constitutional provisions (1) are different in kind, (2) are 
hierarchically ordered, and (3) when in irreconcilable conflict, the former 
must always and unconditionally trump the latter.  
With regard to the first meta-norm, which I call the “source axiom,” legal 
norms generated by different norm-generating institutions or entities belong 
to what I call different “legal categories and subcategories.” Conversely, 
legal norms generated by the same norm generating institutions or entities 
belong to the same “legal categories and subcategories.” For example, all 
legal norms generated by Congress (with the approval of the Chief 
Executive) are similar in kind and are members of the legal category 
“statutory norms.” Similarly, all norms generated by administrative agencies 
are similar in kind and are members of the legal category “administrative 
norms.”  
The source axiom applies to constitutional norms as well. The extant 
constitutional orthodoxy characterizes all of the Constitution’s provisions, 
including amendments, as originating in We the People, and as forming a 
single category of legal norms. To the extent that courts have been operating 
 
 
 17. I have previously developed and discussed in detail two of these meta-norms and their role in 
the adjudication of cases involving irreconcilably conflicting legal norms. Carlos E. González, The 
Logic of Legal Conflict: The Perplexing Combination of Formalism and Anti-Formalism in 
Adjudication of Conflicting Legal Norms, 80 OR. L. REV. 447 (2001). This Article elaborates on two 
additional meta-norms underlying the framework and also explains the framework’s majoritarian 
democracy-reinforcing tendencies. See also infra text accompanying notes 74-92. 
 18. Courts purport to adhere to the meta-norms when adjudicating cases involving irreconcilable 
constitutional provisions. The seemingly consistent application of these meta-norms in constitutional 
cases, however, is an illusion fostered by the orthodox notion that all constitutional provisions are 
sourced in the popular sovereign and are therefore similar in kind. If one accepts the dual-source 
thesis—the idea that some constitutional provisions locate their source in the popular sovereign, while 
others locate their source in ordinary legislative bodies—it becomes apparent that courts have in fact 
failed to consistently apply the democracy-reinforcing meta-norms at the constitutional level. See infra 
text accompanying notes 100-06.  
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under the orthodoxy, they have remained true to the source axiom. Passive 
acceptance of the orthodoxy, however, is problematic. As this Article argues, 
any realistic descriptive account of the origins of constitutional norms must 
admit that they derive from two distinct sources—We the People and 
ordinary government institutions. Given the dual sources of constitutional 
provisions, consistent application of and adherence to the source axiom meta-
norm demands that the legal system treat constitutional textual norms 
sourced in the popular sovereign as categorically different from those 
sourced in ordinary legislative bodies. Just as the legal system treats statutes 
and administrative regulations as different in kind, it should treat 
constitutional provisions emanating from We the People as categorically 
different from constitutional provisions emanating from mere government 
institutions. Thus, the Free Exercise Clause, which emanates from We the 
People, is categorically different in kind from the hypothetical RFRA-like 
amendment, which lacks a valid popular sovereignty pedigree and emanates 
from ordinary state legislatures. 
Where consistency with the source axiom requires separating popular 
sovereign-generated and government institution-generated constitutional 
provisions into separate categories, a second meta-norm requires that the 
legal system treat the former as hierarchically superior to the latter. Under 
what I call the “hierarchic axiom,” legal categories populated by legal norms 
sourced in institutions or entities of relatively greater democratic legitimacy 
are hierarchically superior to those populated by legal norms sourced in 
institutions or entities of relatively lesser democratic legitimacy. Thus, for 
example, statutory norms are sourced in Congress, while administrative 
norms are sourced in administrative agencies. Because the former source 
enjoys greater democratic legitimacy than the latter source, the legal system 
treats statutes as hierarchically superior to administrative regulations. Based 
on consistent application of the hierarchic axiom meta-norm, constitutional 
provisions sourced in We the People—the norm generating entity of highest 
democratic legitimacy—should be treated as hierarchically superior to 
constitutional provisions sourced in agent legislative bodies—a norm 
generating institution of comparatively lesser democratic legitimacy. Thus, 
the Free Exercise Clause, which emanates from We the People, is 
hierarchically superior to the hypothetical RFRA-like amendment, which 
emanates from ordinary state legislatures.  
A third meta-norm supplies the final piece of the puzzle. Under this third 
meta-norm, which elsewhere I have labeled the “categoric axiom,”19 legal 
 
 
 19. See supra note 17. 
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norms belonging to legal categories of superordinate hierarchic status always 
and unconditionally trump irreconcilably conflicting legal norms belonging 
to legal categories of subordinate hierarchic status. Thus, for example, when 
a statute and administrative regulation irreconcilably conflict, the 
hierarchically superior statute will always and unconditionally trump the 
hierarchically inferior administrative norm. Based on consistent application 
of the categoric axiom meta-norm, a hierarchically superior popular 
sovereign-sourced constitutional provision should always and 
unconditionally trump an irreconcilably conflicting hierarchically inferior 
government institution-sourced constitutional provision. Thus, the Free 
Exercise Clause, belonging to a superordinate legal category, trumps the 
hypothetical RFRA-like amendment, which belongs to a subordinate legal 
category.  
The basic strategy, in sum, is to offer a more honest and accurate 
description of the sources of constitutional textual norms—the dual-source 
thesis—and then apply three existing fundamental, axiomatic, democracy-
reinforcing meta-norms—the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms—to 
that new descriptive account. Once we accept the dual-source thesis, 
consistency with the three axiomatic meta-norms leads directly to the 
conclusion that constitutional provisions sourced in the popular sovereign 
should always and unconditionally trump irreconcilably conflicting 
constitutional provisions sourced in government institutions.  
The Article is organized as follows: First, Part II summarizes the basic 
framework governing adjudication of cases in which a court has determined 
that two legal norms stand in a posture of irreconcilable conflict. Briefly, a 
hierarchy of legal categories and subcategories, along with the categoric 
axiom and chronologic axiom meta-norms, govern almost all cases in which 
legal norms irreconcilably conflict. Next, Part II elaborates on the framework 
by explaining the two additional axiomatic meta-norms—the source and 
hierarchic axioms—which account for the ordering of legal categories and 
sub-categories. Finally, Part II outlines how the four axiomatic meta-norms 
promote majoritarian democracy-reinforcing ends. Part III returns the 
discussion to the central proposition of the Article—the idea that 
constitutional textual norms generated by We the People should trump 
conflicting constitutional textual norms created by ordinary government 
institutions—and briefly summarizes the argument in support of that 
proposition. The core of the argument calls for the consistent application of 
the four axiomatic meta-norms in the constitutional arena. Part IV turns to 
the lynchpin of the argument, the above-mentioned dual-source idea that 
some constitutional textual norms originate from We the People, while others 
originate from mere legislative bodies. Part IV traces the reasons  why the 
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dual-source thesis offers a more honest and accurate description of the 
sources of constitutional textual norms than does the extant orthodoxy. Part 
V explains how, given the dual-source thesis, failure to treat popular 
sovereign-sourced constitutional textual norms as categorically distinct from, 
and hierarchically superior to, government institution-sourced constitutional 
textual norms, is inconsistent with the democracy-reinforcing meta-norms 
discussed in Part II. Part V also offers some thoughts on the practical 
implications of the dual-source thesis and explains why pragmatic concerns 
for stability, continuity, and tradition ought not deter us from embracing the 
dual-source thesis with all of its consequences. Among the most important 
reasons why we ought not be deterred from embracing the dual-source thesis 
is the following: Though inferior to popular sovereign generated 
constitutional textual norms, government institution-generated constitutional 
textual norms count as constitutional norms. As such, they may nullify both 
conflicting state and federal statutes, and judicial interpretations of 
constitutional provisions. Part VI summarizes some of the issues touched 
upon throughout the Article that deserve more in-depth treatment in future 
work.  
II. FIRST STEPS: REVIEWING THE META-NORMS GOVERNING 
IRRECONCILABLY CONFLICTING LEGAL NORMS 
Why ought constitutional provisions generated by the popular sovereign 
always and unconditionally trump irreconcilably conflicting constitutional 
provisions created by government institutions? Stated most simply, allowing 
the latter to trump the former is inconsistent with the axiomatic, majoritarian 
democracy-reinforcing meta-norms governing adjudication of cases where 
legal norms irreconcilably conflict.20 This Part briefly reviews the axiomatic 
meta-norms and their majoritarian democracy-reinforcing tendencies.  
I begin with two preliminary issues. First, let me carefully define what I 
mean by cases in which legal norms stand in a posture of irreconcilable 
conflict, or what I elsewhere have referred to as “true legal conflict.”21 A true 
legal conflict occurs when a court determines that legal norms demand 
mutually exclusive outcomes. I have in mind, to give one possible iteration, 
cases where one legal norm prohibits X (or is interpreted to prohibit X), 
 
 
 20. Briefly, although no legal system can hope to achieve perfect consistency, the incongruent 
application of fundamental, democracy-reinforcing meta-norms—basic presuppositions undergirding 
the legal system—is particularly problematic and in need of reform, especially once those 
incongruities have been exposed. See infra notes 361-64. 
 21. See González, supra  note 17, at 457-73. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/3
p127 Gonzalez book pages.doc  8/5/2002   6:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] TWO CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 137 
 
 
 
 
while another legal norm allows X (or is interpreted to allow X). For 
example, where one statute prohibits vehicles—including bicycles—from 
entering into the park, while another statute specifically authorizes bicycle 
racing in the park on Sundays, the two norms stand in a posture of 
irreconcilable conflict. The two norms stand in what I call a posture of “true 
legal conflict” because the statutes demand irreconcilably incompatible 
outcomes—the simultaneous prohibition and allowance of bicycles in the 
park.22  
At the outset it is important to note that whether two legal norms stand in 
a posture of true conflict is very often determined by an exercise of judicial 
discretion in the interpretation of legal norms. Returning to the hypothetical, 
if the initial statute prohibits vehicles, but does not explicitly include bicycles 
in the definition of the term “vehicles,” a court must exercise its interpretive 
discretion to decide whether that term includes bicycles. Only where a court 
determines that the statutory term “vehicles” encompasses bicycles does a 
true conflict between the permissive and prohibitory statutes arise.23 Though 
judicial discretion plays a key role in whether legal norms truly conflict, it is 
not the main focus of this Article. Instead, the Article focuses on factors 
driving substantive outcomes once a court, using its interpretive discretion, 
has determined that legal norms stand in a posture of true legal conflict.24 
 
 
 22. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 127-29 (2d ed. 1994) (setting forth Hart’s famous 
“no vehicles in the park” hypothetical); González, supra note 17, at 10-11 (using “no vehicles in the 
park” hypothetical). Cases of true legal conflict include cases in which norms demand partially 
mutually exclusive outcomes. For example, if norm 1 allows X, Y, and Z, but norm 2 prohibits V, W,  
and X, norm 1 and norm 2 are in true legal conflict because of the inconsistent rules governing X.  
 23. González, supra note 17, at 464. 
 24. Courts rely on a complex array of interpretive rules, presumptions, and principles, which 
vary from context to context, and even from case to case, to determine whether legal norms stand in 
true conflict. Id. at 22 n.39. Briefly consider the complex array of rules, presumptions, and principles. 
In the above mentioned no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical, both of the norms involved are statutory 
norms. In order to determine whether the two statutes truly conflict, courts would focus on (1) the 
meaning of the norms, (2) the rules regulating the implied repeal of preexist ing statutes by newly 
created statutes, (3) canons of statutory interpretation, and (4) uses of the word “vehicle” in other 
statutes, and the like. Courts would use these rules and canons to determine whether the statute 
allowing Sunday bicycle races expresses a legislative intent to partially or fully repeal the earlier 
created statutory norm prohibiting vehicles, including bicycles, from the park, or whether the 
prohibitory statute even prohibited bicycles in the first place. Note that in this example a court would 
not address whether the statute prohibiting vehicles could be reconciled with the statute allowing 
Sunday bicycle races. More specifically, a court would not try to eliminate the true conflict between 
the two statutes by interpreting the word “vehicle” in the first statute as not including bicycles.
Any slight variation in the hypothetical will alter the rules and canons relevant to determining whether 
the norms in question truly conflict. If the norm allowing bicycle racing were an administrativ e 
regulation, rather than a statute, courts would turn to the rules according deference to agency 
interpretations of statutory norms in order to determine whether the norms are reconcilable or 
irreconcilable. See, e.g., Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
Likewise, if the norm prohibiting vehicles in the park were a constitutional norm, a court would turn to 
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As a second preliminary issue, let me differentiate between what I refer to 
as “meta-norms” versus ordinary “legal norms.” So far I have used these 
terms without defining them, but in a way that suggests that they are 
distinguishable. Both “legal norms” and “meta-norms” are positive 
prescriptive legal rules that can influence actors, outcomes, or both. Ordinary 
legal norms are foremost in the minds of lawyers and judges in everyday 
legal practice. Legal norms are in some manner codified in an authoritative 
legal text, be it a constitution, a statute, a regulation, or a case authority. They 
are the grist of everyday practical legal discourse and are cited by lawyers 
and judges on a daily basis.  
In contrast, meta-norm, as I use the term, refers to those deeply 
internalized and ingrained, uncodified, immutable, fundamental building-
block principles of positive law that constitute the presupposed framework 
within which everyday practical legal discourse takes place.25 Lawyers and 
judges treat meta-norms as indisputable givens, and for that reason, rarely 
explicitly state them in making practical legal arguments. Indeed, in many 
instances meta-norms become so deeply internalized as presuppositions that 
lawyers and judges are not even cognizant of their existence, operation, or 
influence in everyday legal practice. Legal discourse nonetheless reflects 
their omnipresent effect on the content of legal discourse.  
As an example of an easily recognizable meta-norm, consider the 
principle that, all other things being equal, like cases should be treated alike. I 
will refer to this as the “consistency principle.” Lawyers and judges, often 
quite unconsciously, take this principle as an indisputable given when 
engaging in everyday, practical legal discourse.26 Though the consistency 
 
 
the principles applicable to conflicts between statutory and constitutional norms. See, e.g., NLRB v. 
Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 30 (1937) (“We have repeatedly held that as between two 
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it would be unconstitutional and by the other 
valid, our plain duty is to . . . save the act.”); Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 348 
(1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring) (“When the validity of an act of Congress is drawn into question, and 
even if a serious doubt of constitutionality is raised, it is a cardinal principle that this Court will first 
ascertain  whether a construction of the statute is fairly possible by which the question may be 
avoided.”). Under any variation, however, courts essentially focus their reasoning (or at least their 
stated reasons) on the meaning of the two norms in question and whether those meanings 
irreconcilably conflict. González, supra  note 17, at 540-47. The issue of whether legal norms truly 
conflict involves interpretation or construction of a norm, while the issue of resolving this conflict 
involves the mediation of a true conflict between norms once interpreted. Where principles of norm 
interpretation dominate the former issue, the axiomatic meta-norms discussed in this Part govern 
adjudication of the latter issue. 
 25. Meta-norms may find particular expression in regular legal norms. Unlike ordinary legal 
norms, their existence does not depend on their expression in some authoritative codified form.  
 26. Lawyers and judges may argue about whether in a given instance all other things are equal or 
that some other meta-norm contradicts and overrides the dictate to treat like cases the same. Lawyers 
and judges, however, cannot dispute the notion that treating like cases the same way constitutes a 
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principle may find expression in certain inscribed, codified legal norms, its 
existence is entirely independent of any such codification.27 To see how this 
meta-norm functions as an incontestable positive law presupposition, 
consider the following prototypical legal argument:  
 
Proposition 1: The previously decided Fulano case established X rule, and 
arrived at Y outcome.  
Proposition 2: The yet to be decided Mengano case is factually 
indistinguishable from the Fulano case.  
Conclusion: The Mengano case should follow X rule established in 
Fulano, and arrive at Y outcome.  
 
The conclusion does not necessarily follow from the two stated 
propositions. To complete the syllogism, the consistency principle must be 
inserted as a third proposition: all other things being equal, like cases should 
be treated alike.28 Though lawyers rarely, if ever, explicitly state the 
consistency principle proposition in oral arguments or legal briefs, judges 
gladly accept this incomplete syllogistic form of argument every day.29 They 
accept it because the omitted consistency principle proposition is not really 
omitted, but merely unstated. It literally goes without saying that, all other 
things being equal, like cases should be treated alike. The proposition is 
assumed because the consistency principle is a meta-norm.30 
 
 
fundamental, immutable, and presupposed statement of positive legal force that is wholly independent 
of any particular inscribed codification.  
 27. For example, the rule of stare decisis, which directs courts to decide present cases in the same 
way as factually similar previously decided cases, reflects the consistency principle. Stare decisis is a 
particular example of the principle in application.  
 28. In addition, it may be necessary to assert that all other things in fact are equal.  
 29. See, e.g. , Wigglesworth v. Teamsters Local Union No. 592, 68 F.R.D. 609 (E.D. Va. 1975) 
(holding based on and consistent with previous case presenting nearly identical facts). 
 30. The consistency principle is not merely a common law approach to deciding cases. See, e.g., 
Jim Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 501 U.S. 529 (1991) (J. Souter) (rejecting the prospective 
application of a newly announced constitutional doctrinal rule, coupled with retroactive application of 
the new rule on grounds that the practice “breaches the principle that litigants in similar situations 
should be treated the same, a fundamental component of stare decisis, and the rule of law generally”). 
As a meta-norm, the consistency principle has broad application. In the statutory interpretation 
context, for example, the consistency principle results in the courts interpreting the same word or 
words found in two different statutes the same way, all other things being equal. See, e.g. , Flowers v. 
S. Reg’l Physician’s Servs., 247 F.3d 229, 233 (5th Cir. 2001) (reading language in ADA as having 
same meaning as identical language in Title VII); Jeldness v. Pearce, 30 F.3d 1220, 1227 (9th Cir. 
1994) (“Because Title IX and Title VI use the same language, they should, as a matter of statutory 
interpretation be read to require the same levels of protection and equality.”). Thus, in the context of 
statutory interpretation, the consistency principle is the unstated third proposition that completes the 
following syllogism: 
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p127 Gonzalez book pages.doc  8/5/2002   6:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
140 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 80:127 
 
 
 
 
This Part lays out the four meta-norms central to adjudication of cases 
involving true legal conflict. Unlike the consistency principle, some of the 
four meta-norms may not be immediately recognizable to lawyers and 
judges. Though not immediately recognizable, they are in fact embedded in 
legal practice. I deduce them by using a methodology similar to that used in 
rational choice social science modelling. In this type of modelling, one 
assumes that relevant actors or entities operate as rational maximizers of a 
particular variable. One constructs a model based on that assumption and 
then tests the model’s predictive ability. If the model has high predictive 
value, one can, with a high degree of confidence, conclude that in fact the 
actors do operate as rational maximizers of the particular variable.31 A model 
offered below reflects the meta-norm axioms that I uncover and discuss. 
Because the model reflecting the meta-norms ultimately predicts the 
outcomes of almost all cases in which two legal norms stand in a posture of 
true legal conflict, we can be confident that the meta-norms in fact operate 
 
 
Proposition 1: The word “reasonable” in statute A means X.  
Proposition 2: Statutes A and B are alike. 
Conclusion: The word “reasonable” in statute B should be interpreted to mean X. 
Indeed, to the extent that a legal system strives towards rationality, the consistency principle is a 
requisite meta-norm. Consistency, often expressed in the form of the transitivity principle in the 
literature on rational choice, constitutes a necessary ingredient to rationality. See SHAUN HARGEAVES 
HEAP ET AL ., THE THEORY OF CHOICE : A CRITICAL GUIDE  5-6 (1992) (identifying transitivity as a 
prerequisite axiom to rational choice); JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF 
RATIONALITY  1-15 (1985) (discussing consistency as a key element of the “thin” theory of rationality 
and stating that “consistency, in fact, is what rationality in the thin sense is all about”). Under the 
transitivity principle, if a $ b, and b $ c, then a $ c. See SHAUN MARTIN HOLLIS, supra, at 5-6. 
Though perhaps broader than the transitivity principle, see ELSTER, supra, at 6 (stating that 
consistency at least involves compliance with transitivity), the consistency principle permeat es legal 
discourse. Consider for example, the following common form of legal argument:  
Premise 1: If N condition, then X outcome;  
Premise 2: A is an instance of N condition;  
 if A, then X outcome 
Premise 3: A = B;  
 if B, then X outcome.  
This form of legal argument is found in California v. Carney , 471 U.S. 386 (1985). Carney held that a 
warrantless search of a motor home did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against 
unreasonable search and seizures. Id. at 395. As explained in Carney, the Court had previously held 
that where there is a diminished expectation of privacy (N condition), a warrantless search does not 
violate the Fourth Amendment (X outcome). Id. at 391-92. Moreover, the Court had previously held 
that individuals have a diminished expectation of privacy in an automobile (A is an instance of N 
condition), and that therefore, a warrantless search of an automobile does not violate the Fourth 
Amendment ( if A, then X outcome). Id. In Carney, the Court reasoned that the expectation of privacy 
in a motor home (B) is essentially similar to the expectation of privacy in automobiles (A = B), and that 
therefore a warrantless search of a motor home does not violate the Fourth Amendment ( if B, then X 
outcome). Id. at 393. 
 31. See generally MELVIN J. HINICH & MICHAEL C. MUNGER, ANALYTICAL POLITICS (1997) 
(using various models to test voter predictability). 
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on, and exert prescriptive influence within, the legal system.32 
With these preliminary issues in mind, I turn to the meta-norms governing 
adjudication of cases in which legal norms stand in a posture of 
irreconcilable or true legal conflict. The meta-norms center on the following 
key elements: first, the grouping of legal norms into different legal categories 
and subcategories; second, the arrangement of those legal categories and 
subcategories into a hierarchy; third, the privileging of norms belonging to 
hierarchically superordinate legal categories and subcategories over truly 
conflicting legal norms belonging to subordinate legal categories and 
subcategories; and fourth, the privileging of newer norms over older truly 
conflicting norms belonging to the same legal category and subcategory.33 
The first two elements result in a hierarchy of types of legal norms. The 
second two elements are twin axiomatic meta-norms that grant trumps to 
certain kinds of norms over other kinds of norms. The ordering and the twin 
axiomatic meta-norms are all that are necessary to predict the outcomes of 
cases in which courts find legal norms in a posture of true legal conflict. In 
essence, the ordering and twin axioms govern the adjudication of such cases.  
A. An Ordering of Different Kinds of Legal Norms  
Begin with the first two factors—the separation of legal norms into 
different categories and subcategories, and the ordering of those legal 
categories and subcategories into a hierarchy. No one will dispute that our 
legal system treats constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law 
 
 
 32. Moreover, the four meta-norms that I have identified have both descriptive and prescriptive 
value. That is to say, they both describe fundamental features of the legal system and also indicate the 
way courts ought to adjudicate cases. Consider an analogy to the norms of baseball. In baseball, when 
a batter hits the ball over the outfield fence, that batter’s team is credited with a run. This phenomenon 
describes something that is a normal occurrence in the game of baseball. It also, however, results from 
a prescriptive rule in the game of baseball. Under the prescriptive rules of the game of baseball, when 
a batter hits the ball over the outfield fence, the official scorer must credit that batter’s team with a run. 
THE OFFICIAL RULES OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL, 10.04(1) (2000), available at http://www.mlb. 
com/NASApp/mlb/mlb/baseball_basics/mlb_basics_official_scorer.jsp. The rules define a run as “the 
score made by an offensive player who advances from batter to runner and touches first, second, third 
and home bases in that order.” Id. at 2.00. Furthermore, “the batter becomes a runner when . . . [a] fair 
ball passes over a fence or into the stands at a distance from home base of 250 feet or more. Such hit 
entitles the batter to a home run when he shall have touched all bases legally.” Id. at 6.09(d). An 
official scorer who fails to credit the run not only does something out of the ordinary, but also 
transgresses a prescriptive rule of baseball commanding the official scorer to credit a run under 
particular circumstances. Such an official scorer would violate what the scorers do as a rule, and 
transgresses what scorers are supposed to do because of a rule. Like the rule of baseball commanding 
that a team be credited with a run when one of its batters hits the ball over the outfield fence, the four 
meta-norms governing the adjudication of true legal conflicts both describe what courts do as a rule 
and command courts to adjudicate cases to particular outcomes because of a rule or set of rules.  
 33. González, supra note 17, at 455. 
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norms as different in kind. I will speak of the practice of treating 
constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law norms as different 
in kind as the assignment of legal norms into separate “legal categories.”34 
Further, legal practice treats these four basic legal categories as though they 
were arranged in a particular hierarchy. Constitutional norms occupy the 
highest strata, while statutory, administrative, and common law norms each 
occupy, in descending order, the remaining strata. I will refer to this 
hierarchy as our “ordering” of legal categories.35  
The ordering, however, incorporates a layer of complexity beyond the 
four basic categories. Lawyers and judges treat inscribed, codified words that 
constitute legal norms as different in kind and hierarchically superior to 
judicially sanctioned interpretations of those inscribed words. For example, 
lawyers and judges treat the words “[N]or shall any State deprive any person 
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”36 as one kind of legal 
norm—a textual norm—and treat judicial interpretations of that textual norm 
as an entirely distinct kind of legal norm—a doctrinal norm. I will refer to the 
cleavage between textual and doctrinal norms as the assignment of legal 
norms to what I call “legal subcategories.”37 When I speak of textual norms, I 
am speaking of the actual inscribed words of constitutional, statutory, and 
administrative texts of normative force created by the norm-generating 
entities and institutions charged with creating such norms. Lawyers and 
judges find textual norms in written constitutions, code books, and 
compilations of administrative textual regulations. When I speak of doctrinal 
norms, I am speaking of the sanctioned interpretations or constructions of 
textual norms generated by judicial institutions. Doctrinal norms are 
evidenced in written opinions, which are compiled in case reporters. 
Not only do lawyers and judges treat textual and doctrinal norms as 
different in kind, but they also treat textual norms as hierarchically superior 
to corresponding doctrinal norms. Within the constitutional norm category, 
for example, the legal system recognizes constitutional textual norms—the 
textually inscribed passages of the Constitution—as separate from and 
hierarchically superior to constitutional doctrinal norms—the interpretations 
of constitutional textual norms by the federal courts.38 Similarly, within the 
statutory norm category, our legal system treats statutory textual norms—the 
textually inscribed sections of the United States Code—as different in kind 
 
 
 34. See id. 
 35. Id. 
 36. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
 37. González, supra note 17, at 495. 
 38. Id. at 482, 488-503.  
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and as hierarchically superior to statutory doctrinal norms—the statutory 
constructions given to passages of the United States Code by the federal 
courts.39 Even administrative law makes a distinction between textual norms 
and doctrinal norms.40 What I label administrative textual norms are the 
binding, inscribed textual regulations of general application, which are 
promulgated by administrative agencies—agency legislative rules.41 What I 
call administrative doctrinal norms, in contrast, are agency interpretations of 
agency legislative rules found in agency adjudications, which enjoy stare 
decisis value.42 Administrative law practice treats the former as different in 
kind from and hierarchically superior to the latter.43 Together, the legal 
categories and subcategories give us a framework for classifying legal norms 
into different types. Figure No. 1, below, models the legal categories and 
subcategories. The left hand side of the model represents the four principal 
legal categories and the hierarchical ordering in which they are arranged. The 
right hand side of the model represents the legal subcategories. Within three 
of the four principal legal categories there are two legal subcategories, which 
correspond to the division between textual and doctrinal norms. Again, 
textual norms are the actual inscribed words of constitutional, statutory, and 
 
 
 39. Id. at 503-11. 
 40. Id. at 511-15. 
 41. See 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS & RICHARD J. P IERCE ,  JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW T REATISE 
§§ 6.3, 6.5 (3d ed. 1994) (discussing agency legislative rules and their binding effect). 
 42. Agency interpretations of their own legislative rules found in quasi-judicial formal 
adjudications enjoy the force of law because they enjoy the precedential value of stare decisis and 
therefore operate as rules of general application. See id. § 8.1 (discussing agency adjudications); 
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Co. Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 807-08 (1973) (stating 
that agency adjudicatory decisions “may serve as precedent[s] . . . [that there is] a presumption that the 
policies [announced in adjudications] will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to . . . [and 
the agency’s] duty to explain its departure from prior norms” flows from that presumption); Kelley v. 
FERC, 96 F.3d 1482, 1489 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (“It is, of course, axiomatic that an agency adjudication 
must either be consistent with prior adjudications or offer a reasoned basis for its departure from 
precedent.”); M.M.& P. Mar. Advancement v. Dep’t of Comm., 729 F.2d 748, 755 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 
(“An agency is obligated to follow precedent, and if it chooses to change, it must explain why.”); 
NLRB v. Int’l Union of Operating Eng’rs, Local 925, AFL-CIO 460 F.2d 589, 604-05 (5th Cir. 1972) 
(holding that an agency cannot depart from its own precedents unless it sufficiently articulates a reason 
for so doing); 2 DAVIS & PIERCE, supra note 41, § 11.5, at 204-07; 3 DAVIS & P IERCE , supra  note 41, 
§ 17.2, at 104 (discussing the precedential effect of agency adjudications and stating that “if an agency 
resolves adjudication A in one way by applying a policy or set of decisional criteria, and then resolves 
adjudication B in a different way by applying a different policy or set of decisional criteria, the second 
action must be reversed and remanded as arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion unless the 
agency explicitly acknowledges and explains the reasons for its change in policy.”). 
 43. See González, supra note 17, at 511-14. See also Iran Air v. Kugleman, 996 F.2d 1253, 1260 
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (citing Joseph Zwerdling, Reflections on the Role of an Administrative Law Judge, 25 
ADMIN. L. REV. 9, 12-13 (1973) (An Administrative Law Judge “is governed, as in the case of any 
trial court, by the applicable and controlling precedents. These precedents include the applicable 
statutes and agency regulations, the agency’s policies as laid down in its published decisions, and 
applicable court decisions.”)).  
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administrative texts of normative force. Doctrinal norms are the sanctioned 
interpretations of normative force given to those inscribed texts by judicial 
institutions. Within the statutory norm category, for example, the model 
represents statutory textual norms and statutory doctrinal norms. The 
hierarchical ordering of legal categories and subcategories represented in 
Figure No. 1 constitutes the first of three key elements governing 
adjudication of cases in which legal norms irreconcilably conflict. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. The Categoric and Chronologic Axioms 
A pair of immutable, axiomatic meta-norms make up the remaining two 
elements governing the adjudication of cases involving true legal conflict. 
Both meta-norms mediate conflicts between irreconcilably conflicting legal 
norms by granting absolute trumps to one norm over another depending on 
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Constitutional Doctrinal Norms 
 
 
Constitutional Textual Norms 
 
 
 
Statutory Norms 
 
Statutory Doctrinal Norms 
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Figure No. 1 
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the category and subcategory memberships of the conflicting norms. As the 
first axiomatic meta-norm, legal norms belonging to legal categories of 
superordinate hierarchic status always and unconditionally trump 
irreconcilably conflicting legal norms belonging to legal categories of 
subordinate hierarchic status. I call this phenomenon the “categoric 
axiom.”44 Thus, for example, constitutional norms always trump truly 
conflicting statutory norms, and statutory norms always and unconditionally 
trump truly conflicting administrative norms.45 Similarly, norms belonging to 
the constitutional textual norms subcategory always and unconditionally 
trump truly conflicting norms belonging to the constitutional doctrinal norms 
subcategory.46  
The idea that legal norms belonging to superordinate legal categories 
trump (and nullify) truly conflicting norms belonging to subordinate legal 
categories lies beyond controversy. Further, once properly understood, the 
idea that textual norms always and unconditionally trump doctrinal norms of 
the same kind also proves uncontroversial. A bit of clarification, however, 
will be necessary. The key is understanding textual norms, doctrinal norms, 
and true conflicts between them.  
The inscribed words of a given textual norm—a constitutional provision, 
statute, or agency regulation—quite often lend themselves to a range of 
plausible meanings.47 Returning to Hart’s no-vehicles-in-the-park 
hypothetical,48 a textual norm prohibiting vehicles in the park prohibits 
mechanized things used in transport and conveyance, possibly including 
anything from cars, to tractors, to bicycles, to skateboards, to wheel barrels.49 
The exact confines of the prohibition on vehicles in the park found in the 
textual norm, however, is imprecise. In other words, reasonable minds can 
disagree over which mechanical means of transport and conveyance the 
norm prohibits from the park.50 This range of imprecise meaning constitutes 
the scope of the textual norm, or in other words, the range of plausible 
meanings attributable to the textual norm.  
 
 
 44. See González, supra  note 17, at 479.  
 45. Id. at 480.  
 46. Id. at 483.  
 47. See id. at 484-88.  
 48. HART, supra note 22, at 127-29. 
 49. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 2109 (2d ed. 1997) (defining “vehicle” to 
include “a conveyance moving on wheels, runners, tracks, or the like, as a cart, sled, automobile, or 
tractor”). 
 50. See, e.g., Fowles v. Dakin, 205 A.2d 169, 173 (Me. 1964) (finding that a bicycle is not 
included within the statutory meaning of vehicle); Richards v. Goff, 338 A.2d 80, 86 (Md. Ct. Spec. 
App. 1975) (finding that a bicycle is included within the statutory meaning of vehicle).  
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A doctrinal norm is a judicial institution-generated norm of precedential 
value that adopts and endorses a particular meaning of a given textual norm. 
For example, a court could generate a doctrinal norm by construing the 
textual norm prohibition of vehicles in the park as prohibiting cars and 
tractors, but not bicycles, skateboards, and wheelbarrels. This sort of 
doctrinal reading of the textual norm is permissible because it is entirely 
plausible that the term “vehicle” in the textual norm refers to cars and 
tractors, but not to bicycles, skateboards, and wheelbarrels. If a court chooses 
this particular doctrinal construction of the textual norm, the doctrinal norm it 
has generated is within the scope of, and therefore not in true conflict with, 
the range of meanings plausibly attributable to the textual norm prohibition 
on vehicles in the park.51  
However, when a judicial institution adopts a meaning that is outside the 
range of meanings plausibly attributable to the textual norm it interprets, that 
judicial institution creates a doctrinal norm that is in true conflict with the 
textual norm it interprets. Under such circumstances, the categoric axiom 
requires that the hierarchically superordinate textual norm always and 
unconditionally trump and nullify the truly conflicting subordinate doctrinal 
norm.52 For example, a doctrinal norm that interprets the term “vehicle” in 
the textual norm as covering human beings who carry bacterial infections 
would probably fall outside the range of plausible meanings attributable to 
the textual norm in question. Although a person carrying a bacterial infection 
does, under a particular definition, constitute a vehicle, 53 this does not appear 
to be the kind of vehicle or meaning of the term “vehicle” embraced by the 
textual norm prohibition on vehicles in the park.54 Though textual norms may 
not have precise meanings, they do not have boundless meanings.  
 
 
 51. Similarly, depending on the wording of the textual norm, the intent or purpose of the statute, 
and principles of statutory construction, a court could also interpret vehicle to include bicycles and 
skateboards within its meaning. Although bicycles and skateboards may be at the fringes of the range 
of meanings attributable to the textual norm, they still fit plausibly within that range.  
 52. Stated as a command, the categoric axiom instructs judicial institutions not to generate 
doctrinal norms adopting meanings outside, beyond, or different from the range of meanings plausibly 
attributable to the textual norms they interpret.  
 53. See RANDOM HOUSE , supra note 49, at 2109 (defining “vehicle” to include “a carrier, as of 
infection”). 
 54. Though one could certainly imagine a prohibitory textual norm using the word vehicle in the 
sense of a carrier of a bacterial infection, the hypothesized textual norm prohibition on vehicles in the 
park does not appear to embrace this meaning.  
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Now that I have clarified what I mean by textual norms, doctrinal norms, 
and conflict between them, we can better understand how the categoric 
axiom works. Stated simply, where a court adopts a doctrinal interpretation 
of a textual norm falling outside the range of plausible meanings attributable 
to the textual norm, the categoric axiom calls for nullification of the doctrinal 
norm. Where, for example, a court interprets a statute prohibiting vehicles in 
the park as prohibiting people carrying bacterial infections from entering the 
park, the categoric axiom calls for nullification of the interpretation (by an 
appellate court, or in a later litigation revisiting the meaning of the statute).  
Moving to the second axiomatic meta-norm, whenever two truly 
conflicting legal norms belong to the same legal category and subcategory, 
the more recently created norm always and unconditionally trumps the 
preexisting norm. I call this phenomenon the  “chronologic axiom.”55 For 
example, a constitutional amendment—or in other words a newly created 
constitutional textual norm—trumps or amends a truly conflicting preexisting 
constitutional text.56 Likewise, a new interpretation of a statute—or in other 
words a new statutory doctrinal norm—will always trump and replace an 
older interpretation of that same statute—an old statutory doctrinal norm.57 
Simply stated, when dealing with truly conflicting legal norms of the same 
kind—both belonging to the same legal category and subcategory—the norm 
of more recent vintage trumps and nullifies the norm of older vintage.58  
Figure No. 2, below, adds representation of the categoric and chronologic 
axioms to the ordering of legal categories and subcategories illustrated in 
Figure No. 1, above. The vertical arrows on the right and left sides of the 
graph represent the categoric axiom, while the horizontal arrow at the top of 
the graph depicts the chronologic axiom. 
 
 
 55. González, supra note 17, at 475-78. 
 56. Id. at 476.  
 57. Id. at 475.  
 58. When the conflicting norms do not belong to the same legal subcategory, the categoric axiom 
resolves the conflict. A statutory textual norm, for example, trumps and nullifies a truly conflicting 
statutory doctrinal norm, regardless of the chronologic order in which the textual and doctrinal norms 
come into being. Id. at 504. 
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The ordering and twin axioms represented in Figure No. 2 fully account 
for the outcomes of cases in which a court has found two legal norms 
standing in a posture of true legal conflict. The model works as follows: 
Reflecting the categoric axiom, norms belonging to a given superordinate 
legal category and/or subcategory will always and unconditionally trump 
truly conflicting norms belonging to a given subordinate legal category or 
subcategory. Statutory norms, for example, always and unconditionally 
trump truly conflicting common law norms.59 Likewise, statutory textual 
norms always and unconditionally trump truly conflicting statutory doctrinal 
norms.60 Reflecting the chronologic axiom, in cases where two truly 
conflicting norms belong to the same legal category and subcategory, the 
 
 
 59. Id. at 479-80.  
 60. Id. at 504-11. 
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newer norm always and unconditionally trumps the older norm. Thus, for 
example, a newly passed statute trumps a truly conflicting preexisting 
statute,61 and a newly created administrative regulation nullifies a truly 
conflicting preexisting regulation. 62 Graphically, norms located in the upper 
right hand corner of the box—recent constitutional textual norms—will 
always and unconditionally trump any other truly conflicting norm. Those 
norms located in the lower left hand corner of the box—old common law 
norms—will always and unconditionally be trumped by any other truly 
conflicting norm.  
In sum, the model illustrates the simplest set of principles—the grouping 
of legal norms into different categories and subcategories, the arrangement of 
those categories and subcategories into a hierarchical ordering, a preference 
for higher order norms over truly conflicting lower order norms, and a 
preference for newer norms over truly conflicting older norms—accounting 
for and predicting the result in cases where legal norms demand mutually 
exclusive outcomes.63 
C. The Presupposed Yet Invisible Nature of the Ordering and Twin 
Axioms  
We can be confident that the ordering and twin axioms exist as positive 
law, even though rarely referred to in practical legal discourse, because taken 
together they robustly predict the outcomes of cases in which legal norms of 
all kinds stand in a posture of true legal conflict.64 In any case where a legal 
norm belonging to a superordinate category irreconcilably conflicts with a 
norm belonging to a subordinate legal category, we can be sure that the 
former norm will trump the latter norm.  
We can also be confident that the axioms are meta-norms. When litigating 
cases where legal norms may be found to stand in a posture of true legal 
conflict, lawyers and judges, perhaps quite unconsciously, treat these features 
as unmoveable presuppositions around which they must argue.65 Return 
again to the no-vehicles-in-the-park hypothetical66 and assume that the norm 
prohibiting vehicles in the park is a constitutional norm, and that the norm 
allowing Sunday bicycle races is a statutory norm. In litigating such a case, 
 
 
 61. Id. at 475-76. 
 62. Id. at 476 n.49. 
 63. The only class of true legal conflicts the model does not account for are those between two 
legal norms of the same category and subcategory created at the same point in time. Id. at n.203.  
 64. Id. at 535-37. 
 65. Id. at 538, 540-48. 
 66. HART, supra note 22, at 127-29. 
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we certainly would not expect the discourse to center on whether or not 
constitutional norms are different in kind or hierarchically superior to 
statutory norms, or whether constitutional norms trump irreconcilably 
conflicting statutory norms. Lawyers and judges would not focus on such 
issues because it is incontestable that constitutional and statutory norms are 
different in kind, and that constitutional norms always trump truly conflicting 
statutory norms.67 The ordering and twin axioms are assumed prior to the 
point when lawyers and judges begin the process of adjudicating a case of 
true legal conflict.  
Given the immutable nature of the legal categories and subcategories, the 
hierarchical order into which they are arranged, and the categoric and 
chronologic axioms, lawyers and judges focus their arguments on whether 
norms in fact stand in a posture of true legal conflict.68 The meaning of legal 
norms, in contrast to the rigidly immutable ordering and twin axioms, is 
open, textured, mutable, and flexible. The lawyer arguing in favor of 
allowing bicycles in the park on Sundays could not successfully argue 
against the principle that norms belonging to a superordinate legal category 
(constitutional norms) trump truly conflicting norms belonging to a 
subordinate legal category (sta tutory norms). Instead, that lawyer must argue 
that the norms in question do not irreconcilably conflict, or, more precisely, 
that the term “vehicle” in the constitutional norm that prohibits vehicles does 
not include bicycles.69 
Another reason we should be confident in the existence of the axioms as 
positive law meta-norms is that lawyers and judges are comfortable talking 
about ideas incorporated in the ordering and axioms. Where the ordering and 
axioms are stated at the highest possible level of generality that retains 
predictive and explanatory power, lawyers and judges speak with a more 
context specific vocabulary. All lawyers and judges recognize as obvious, for 
example, that courts will nullify statutes that are incompatible with the 
Constitution, and invalidate administrative regulations incompatible with 
statutory mandates.70 Similarly, all lawyers and judges know that Supreme 
Court-developed constitutional doctrine that cannot be squared with any 
plausible meaning attributable to the text of the Constitution, or judicial 
statutory interpretations irreconcilable with any plausible meaning 
attributable to statutory text, are illegitimate.71 The categoric axiom 
 
 
 67. See González, supra  note 17, at 537-39. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 544. 
 70. Id. at 481, 537-39.  
 71. Id. at 537-39.  
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summarizes these kinds of context-dependent ways of speaking and thinking 
into a highly generalized, simple, context-independent rule: Norms belonging 
to superordinate legal categories or subcategories always trump truly 
conflicting norms belonging to subordinate legal categories or subcategories. 
In short, although lawyers may not be aware of such a legal rule, lawyers are 
quite aware of the more context-specific ways of expressing this general 
meta-norm principle.  
The same holds true for the chronologic axiom. All lawyers and judges 
regard as obvious that a new constitutional amendment, statute, or 
administrative regulation will nullify a corresponding old conflicting 
constitutional clause, statute, or administrative regulation.72 Likewise, all 
recognize that when the Supreme Court offers a new doctrinal interpretation 
of a constitutional passage or statutory text, the old doctrinal interpretation of 
that constitutional passage or statutory text loses its normative force and 
ceases to operate as a valid legal norm. 73 The chronologic axiom generalizes 
or abstracts these context-specific notions into a simple meta-norm that is 
applicable in all contexts: More recent norms always trump truly conflicting 
preexisting norms belonging to the same legal category and subcategory.  
In short, the descriptive explication of the ordering of legal categories and 
subcategories, and the categoric and chronologic axioms, constitute a 
generalized, simple, and context-independent way of stating rules that 
lawyers and judges already consciously and/or unconsciously apply 
everyday, though at a more complex, and context-specific level. The value of 
this kind of descriptive exercise is twofold. First, it distills the essence of 
what appears at first glance to be a relatively complex and contextually 
varying part of our legal practice. Boiling legal practice down to its bare 
elements allows us to understand the essential mechanisms behind an area of 
legal practice. Second, distillation to the bare elements allows one to quickly 
and easily see the essential forces driving a set of practices, the threads that 
tie (or fail to tie) a given set of practices together, the underlying structure 
and patterns characterizing a given practice, and as we will see in Parts III 
and V, the incongruities riddling a practice that would otherwise remain 
camouflaged.  
D. The Two Additional Axiomatic Meta-Norms Behind the Ordering 
The ordering and twin axioms are all that are necessary to predict the 
outcomes of cases in which courts find legal norms in true conflict. In order 
 
 
 72. Id. at 542-43.  
 73. Id. at 488-93, 542-43.  
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to see how judicial treatment of conflicting constitutional provisions is 
inconsistent with the meta-norms, however, we will need to know a bit more 
about the meta-norms. The categoric and chronologic axioms are prescriptive 
norms. Beyond merely describing how courts adjudicate cases involving true 
legal conflict, they indicate how courts ought to adjudicate such cases. The 
ordering of legal categories and subcategories illustrated in the previous 
Parts, in contrast, merely describes the different classes of legal norms and 
hierarchical arrangements that judges and lawyers use everyday. It does not 
tell courts how they ought to adjudicate cases or how they ought to separate 
legal norms into different hierarchically-arranged categories and 
subcategories. The ordering merely represents a background set of 
assumptions that courts treat as immutable truths when dealing with 
instances of true legal conflict.  
Two additional axiomatic meta-norms, which are prescriptive in nature, 
lie beneath the ordering. Only by understanding these two additional meta-
norms will we be able to understand how judicial treatment of conflicting 
constitutional provisions is inconsistent with the meta-norms governing 
adjudication of true legal conflicts. These two additional axiomatic meta-
norms are less familiar than the categoric and chronologic axioms. 
Nonetheless, because they account for the particular architecture and 
characteristics of the ordering, we can be confident that the two additional 
meta-norms operate as positive law and are prescriptive in nature. One of 
these additional axiomatic meta-norms explains the particular legal 
categories and subcategories that the ordering utilizes. The other additional 
axiomatic meta-norm accounts for the hierarchical ordering in which those 
legal categories and subcategories are arranged. 
1. The Source Axiom 
What accounts for the particular categories that the legal system uses, as 
opposed to some other categoric arrangement? Why does the legal system 
differentiate constitutional norms from statutory norms, or statutory norms 
from common law norms, rather than drawing some entirely different lines of 
distinction between different kinds of norms? We are so familiar with the 
divisions between constitutional, statutory, administrative, and common law 
norms, and between textual versus doctrinal norms, that these divisions may, 
at first glance, appear as though they are the only way to divide legal norms 
into different kinds. Their familiarity, however, ought not be mistaken for an 
iron-clad mandate dictating the use of the extant legal categories. 
Conceivably, the legal system could discard the extant categories and divide 
up the universe of legal norms on different axes.  
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Our system, for example, could recognize categoric distinctions between 
norms corresponding to their time of creation (old versus new norms), their 
level of support (high, medium, and low support), their subject area (public 
versus private), the nature of their commands (prohibitory versus 
permissive), or their function (power-granting, rights-creating, and 
institution-creating and regulating). All of these constitute different 
descriptive labels that lawyers and judges commonly apply to different legal 
norms. None, however, constitute different legal categories, or at least none 
are legal categories relevant to the resolution of conflicts between legal 
norms that irreconcilably conflict. Whether a norm may be labeled 
prohibitory or permissive, power-granting or rights-establishing, or public 
versus private is immaterial to the adjudication of such conflicts.74  
Whether by dint of historical accident or conscious design, our legal 
system has come to use a particular categoric system that separates the 
universe of legal norms into constitutional, statutory, administrative, and 
common law categories, and textual versus doctrinal subcategories. Even if 
emerging by fortuity, as opposed to conscious design, a phenomenon so 
foundational and deeply rooted as our extant set of legal categories and 
subcategories necessarily reflects an underlying prescriptive rudiment.  
An axiomatic meta-norm, which I will refer to as the “source axiom,” 
constitutes that prescriptive element. According to the source axiom, legal 
norms emanating from different norm-generating institutions or entities 
belong to different legal categories and subcategories; legal norms 
emanating from the same norm generating institutions or entities belong to 
the same legal categories and subcategories. Differences between the 
sources from which legal norms originate, in other words, determine the lines 
of demarcation separating one legal category or subcategory from another 
legal category or subcategory. Legal norms sourced in a particular law-
creating entity or institution constitute a particular legal category or 
subcategory; legal norms sourced in some other law-creating entity or 
institution constitute and are members of a separate legal category or 
subcategory.  
Let me clarify. The sources of legal norms to which I refer are the four 
basic kinds of institutions or entities empowered to create legal norms: We 
the People (the popular sovereign), legislative bodies, executive branch 
agencies, and the courts. All legal norms are sourced in a given lawmaking 
entity or institution, or combination of entities or institutions. The source 
axiom perfectly explains or accounts for the particular architecture of the four 
 
 
 74. Id. at 517-20. 
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different legal categories. Norms created by a given entity or institution 
comprise and belong to a particular legal category. For example, legal norms 
sourced in We the People belong to the constitutional norm category, 
whereas legal norms sourced in legislative bodies (with Chief Executive 
approval) belong to the statutory norm category. Norms created by executive 
branch agencies comprise the administrative norm category, while norms 
formulated by courts are common law norms. Our extant categoric and 
subcategoric distinctions between norms, in other words, tightly correspond 
with our four principle lawmaking entities and institutions: the popular 
sovereign, legislative bodies, administrative agencies, and the courts.  
The source axiom also accounts for the subcategoric distinctions between 
textual and doctrinal norms. The legal system, for example, treats 
constitutional textual norms as categorically different from constitutional 
doctrinal norms.75 The fact that the former are thought of as the product of 
the popular sovereign, while the latter locates its immediate source in courts 
interpreting the former, explains this phenomenon. The same holds true at the 
statutory level. The legal system treats statutory texts as different in kind 
from case authorities interpreting statutory texts. Again, the different sources 
of statutory textual and doctrinal norms—legislative bodies versus courts—
explains the difference in treatment. Even at the level of administrative law, 
the distinction between textual and doctrinal norms is attributable to 
differences in the sources of those norms. Administrative agencies perform 
both quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial functions.76 In the former capacity, 
agencies create legislative rules, or what I have labeled administrative textual 
norms, via quasi-legislative informal notice and comment rulemaking 
procedures.77 In the latter capacity, agencies use quasi-judicial formal agency 
adjudications to apply earlier created legislative rules.78 In short, paralleling 
the statutory textual versus doctrinal norms dichotomy and corresponding 
legislative versus judicial law creation processes, agencies routinely use 
 
 
 75. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court, 1999 Term–Forward: The Document and the 
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Supreme Court] (generally focusing 
on the difference between constitutional doctrine and constitutional text); David A. Strauss, Common 
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996) (calling attention to constitutional 
doctrinal and textual norms). 
 76. BERNARD SCHWARTZ,  ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 164 (3d ed. 1991) (“Administrative action 
under the Federal Administrative Procedure Act is either rulemaking or adjudication. The APA is thus 
based on the fundamental rulemaking-adjudication dichotomy that governs administrative law itself.”) 
(footnotes omitted).  
 77. RICHARD J. PIERCE ,  JR. ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCESS 276 (3d ed. 1999) 
(“Informal rulemaking closely resembles the process of enacting legislation.”). 
 78. Id. (“Formal adjudication looks very much like a judicial trial .  . . . [and] is designed to serve 
functions analogous to those of a judicial trial . . . .”). 
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different administrative norm-creating processes—informal notice and 
comment rulemaking versus formal adjudications—when creating 
administrative textual norms versus administrative doctrinal norms.79  
In sum, norms sourced in a particular law-creating entity or institution are 
grouped together and considered members of a single legal category or 
subcategory. Legal norms sourced in some different law-creating entity or 
institution are grouped together and treated as members of a distinct legal 
category or subcategory. Stated more briefly, the dividing lines between legal 
categories, as well as the criteria for membership in a legal category, both 
correspond with the different law-making entities or institutions from which 
legal norms spring.80  
 
 
 79. One might argue that both administrative textual and doctrinal norms are the product of 
singular law-creating institutions—administrative agencies. Statutory textual and doctrinal norms, in 
contrast, are the product of different law-creating institutions—legislative bodies and the courts. This 
difference, however, is trivial. Though formally housed within a given agency, notice and comment 
rulemaking and formal administrative adjudications constitute lawmaking processes as different as the 
legislative and judicial process. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. Agency textual norms 
derive from the quasi-legislative notice and comment rulemaking, while agency doctrinal norms derive 
from the quasi-judicial formal agency adjudications. In a second way, however, the correlation 
between different derivations and different legal subcategories is weaker in the administrative area 
than in the statutory realm. Most agency legislative rules (i.e., administrative textual norms) are the 
product of notice and comment rulemaking, but some result from formal rulemaking processes which 
closely resemble the formal adjudications-producing agency doctrinal norms. PIERCE ET AL., supra 
note 77, at 315-16 (explaining that agencies make legislative rules via both informal notice and 
comment rulemaking and formal adjudication rulemaking.). The similarity between formal agency 
adjudicatory rulemaking and formal agency adjudications that establish agency norms of precedential 
value degrades somewhat the tight correlation between different legal subcategories and different law-
creating processes or entities. Relatively few agency textual norms, however, are the product of formal 
rulemaking. See SCHWARTZ, supra  note 76, at 164, 192 (stating that agency rulemaking is “largely 
informal in character, although provision is also made for the comparatively rare case of formal 
rulemaking” and that “only a few federal statutes provide expressly for ‘trial-type’ hearings in 
rulemakin g.”). Further, despite procedural similarities, formal adjudications and formal rulemaking are 
distinct forms of agency action. PIERCE ET AL., supra note 77, at 275 (“The APA sets forth four types 
of procedures potentially available to agencies—formal adjudication, informal adjudication, formal 
rulemaking and informal rulemaking.”). Therefore, one should not over-emphasize any degradation of 
the correlation between different derivations of textual and doctrinal norms and different legal 
subcategories.  
 80. The difference between the four principle legal categories and the textual versus doctrinal 
norm subcategories is that the former’s categoric boundaries are defined by the perception of what is 
the ultimate source, whereas the latter is defined by immediate sources of legal norms. For example, 
the broad legal category “statutory norms” includes as members both the inscribed texts of statutes 
found in code books as well as the judicial interpretations of the inscribed texts of statutes found in the 
reporters. Both kinds of statutory norms—inscribed texts in code books and judicial interpretations in 
reported cases—ultimately derive from Congress (with approval by the Chief Executive). Thus, when 
dealing with the four legal categories, the source axiom works as follows: Whenever legal norms 
derive from different norm-generating institutions or entities, they belong to different legal categories. 
It follows, then, that legal norms ultimately sourced in Congress (with approval of the Chief 
Executive) belong to the legal category “statutory norms.” Once the broad membership of a legal norm 
has been determined (according to its ultimate source), the question of legal subcategory membership 
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As with the categoric and chronologic axioms, my claim is that the source 
axiom is a prescriptive meta-norm. It is a meta-norm because it operates as a 
presupposed, and therefore usually unstated principle of positive law that 
judges and lawyers utilize in everyday legal discourse and thinking. It is 
prescriptive, rather than merely descriptive, because its violation would not 
only be aberrant, but would also be subject to condemnation as mistaken or 
erroneous.81 If, for example, a court ruling were to treat a legal norm created 
by an administrative agency as a statute rather than an administrative 
regulatory norm, lawyers and judges would instantly recognize the ruling as 
erroneous for having transgressed a principle that governs the way that courts 
ought to decide cases. An appellate court reviewing such a ruling would 
reverse the ruling, not necessarily because the ruling deviates from the way 
courts usually rule on such matters, but rather because such a ruling would 
violate a fundamental and incontrovertible norm to which courts ought to 
adhere when adjudicating cases. The source axiom, in other words, 
commands that lawyers and judges should not lump a legal norm sourced in 
one norm-generating institution in a legal category populated by legal norms 
generated by another norm-generating institution. To do so would go against 
 
 
arises. Here the source axiom works as follows: Whenever a legal norm belonging to a given legal 
category derives from the norm-generating source charged with creating legal norms belonging to that 
legal category, the legal norm in question belongs to the textual subcategory. For example, statutory 
norms, with an immediate source in Congress, belong to the legal subcategory “statutory textual 
norms.” In contrast, whenever a legal norm that belongs to a given legal category locates its immediate 
source in the norm-generating source not charged with creat ing legal norms for that legal category, the 
legal norm in question belongs to the doctrinal subcategory. For example, statutory norms with an 
immediate source in the courts belong to the legal subcategory “statutory doctrinal norms.” 
 81. The line between description (what normally happens) and prescription (what happens 
because of a norm) is sometimes not acknowledged. Where, for example, one observes that drivers 
halt their vehicles when they reach a stop sign, one may ask whether this phenomenon is something 
that drivers do as a rule (what normally happens), or instead something that drivers do because of a 
prescriptive rule (what happens because of a norm), or both. As with the norm commanding drivers to 
halt their vehicles at a stop sign, the meta-norms discussed herein, including the source axiom, are 
prescriptive in nature. They not only describe what is ordinarily done in the legal system, but they also 
delineate principles that dictate what ought to be done or the way cases ought to be adjudicated.  
 The recent dispute over the status of the Miranda rule illustrates the concept of the source axiom 
as a prescriptive meta-norm. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). Justice Scalia’s 
dissenting opinion in Dickerson essentially accuses the majority of violating the source axiom. Id. at 
444-65 (faulting majority for failing to clarify whether Miranda rule is a requirement of the Self-
Incrimination Clause or merely a Supreme Court -created common law rule that is not required by the 
Self-Incrimination Clause). At least one scholar has joined Justice Scalia in using source axiom 
principles to criticize the majority opinion in Dickerson. See Susan R. Klein, Identifying and 
(Re)formulating Prophylactic Rules, Safe Harbors, and Incidental Rights in Constitutional Criminal 
Procedure, 99 MICH . L. REV. 1030, 1071-78 (2001) (criticizing the majority opinion in Dickerson for 
failing to clarify whether Miranda lays down a rule required by the Fifth Amendment, and is therefore 
ultimately sourced in the popular sovereign, or whether it is merely a prophylactic—a judicially -
created common law norm based on the right against compelled self-incrimination).  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/3
p127 Gonzalez book pages.doc  8/5/2002   6:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] TWO CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 157 
 
 
 
 
not only what judges and lawyers usually do, but what judges and lawyers 
are supposed to do.  
2. The Hierarchic Axiom 
The source axiom explains only one phenomenon—that the legal system 
treats legal norms created by different norm-generating institutions as 
different in kind, or in other words, as members of different legal categories 
and subcategories. Why, however, does the legal system hierarchically 
arrange the legal categories and subcategories with constitutional norms at 
the top, common law norms at the bottom, and statutory and administrative 
norms sandwiched in between? Similarly, why are textual norms of a given 
species considered superior to doctrinal interpretations of those textual 
norms? The legal system need not organize categories of norms in a 
hierarchic ordering, or in this particular hierarchical ordering. In light of the 
hierarchy of textual norms over doctrinal norms, some commentators have 
advanced theories of statutory interpretation that would privilege statutory 
doctrinal norms over statutory textual norms.82 Looking at the principle legal 
categories, several commentators have questioned the impenetrable 
superiority of constitutional norms over statutory norms, and in so doing 
have hinted at a reversal of that hierarchy.83  
A legal system need not base adjudication of true legal conflicts on a 
hierarchically-arranged ordering of legal categories and subcategories 
defined by the sources from which legal norms originate. That our legal 
system is organized in this fashion represents a choice, though perhaps an 
unconscious one. Such fundamental organizational features of a legal system 
cannot be dismissed as arbitrary or as without an underlying foundation. 
What then explains and justifies the extant hierarchical ordering that the legal 
system utilizes in adjudicating instances of true legal conflict?  
The answer lies with a second axiomatic meta-norm, which I will refer to 
as the “hierarchic axiom.” According to the hierarchic axiom, legal 
 
 
 82. See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 163-66 (1982) 
(arguing that courts should be able to treat statutes in much the same way as they treat established 
common law rules—as subject to judicial revision if outdated and no longer in synch with the legal 
landscape); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Updating Statutory Interpretation, 87  MICH. L. REV. 20, 21 
(1988) (using metaphors to describe statutory interpretation; the archeological metaphor means that the 
“meaning of a statute is set in stone on the date of its enactment,” while the nautical metaphor implies 
that “a statute [i]s an on-going process (a voyage)”). Both Calabresi’s and Aleinikoff’s theories of 
statutory interpretation permit courts to create statutory doctrine that is irreconcilable with the range of 
plausible meanings attributable to statutory textual norms at the time of their creation.  
 83. See Amar, The Supreme Court, supra  note 75, at 27 (discussing the “doctrinalist” school of 
thought under which doctrinal precedent “displaces” constitutional text). 
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categories populated by legal norms emanating from institutions or entities 
of relatively greater democratic legitimacy are always and unconditionally 
hierarchically superior to those legal categories populated by legal norms 
emanating from institutions or entities of relatively lesser democratic 
legitimacy. This simple axiomatic rule explains the entire hierarchy of the 
ordering of legal categories and subcategories.  
What explains, for example, the phenomenon of the first-order legal 
category, statutory norms, occupying a higher position in our ordering of 
legal categories than the first-order legal category, common law norms? 
Legislative bodies, the source of norms belonging to the former category,  
have greater majoritarian democratic legitimacy than courts, the origin of 
norms belonging to the latter category. Why do we place constitutional 
norms in a superordinate position over statutory norms? The answer is 
similar: constitutional norms, which are derived from the popular sovereign, 
claim greater democratic legitimacy than the source of statutory norms—
legislative bodies.  
In short, as we ascend the hierarchy of legal categories, the entity or 
institution giving rise to the norms populating each of the four legal 
categories makes an increasingingly strong claim to majoritarian democratic 
legitimacy. At the bottom of the hierarchy, unelected courts and the common 
law norms they create claim very weak democratic legitimacy.84 The 
democratic legitimacy of administrative agencies and their regulations are 
also suspect.85 Agencies possess an advantage over the courts, however, in 
 
 
 84. See Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 384 (2001). In that case, the Court 
stated: 
Unlike courts, Congress directly reflects public attitudes and beliefs, enabling Congress better to 
understand where, and to what extent, refusals to accommodate a disability amount to behavior 
that is callous or unreasonable to the point of lacking constitutional justification. Unlike judges, 
Members of Congress can directly obtain information from constituents who have firsthand 
experience with discrimination and related issues. 
 Moreover, un like judges, Members of Congress are elected. When the Court has applied the 
majority’s burden of proof rule, it has explained that we, i.e., the courts, do not “sit as a 
superlegislature to judge the wisdom or desirability of legislative policy determinat ions.” 
Id. (citation omitted). 
 85. Jody Freeman, Symposium, The Contracting State, 28 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 155, 198 (2000) 
(“In a democratic system, we expect our elected representatives to be accountable for state-sponsored 
coercion. Although Congress might delegate the bulk of the regulatory task to administrative agencies, 
agency discretion is constrained by numerous formal and informal accountability mechanisms, 
including legislative and executive oversight, judicial review, procedural rules, and media scrutiny.”). 
See also  Japan Whaling Ass’n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221, 232-33 (1986) (finding that if 
Congress has directly and precisely addressed an issue, the Agency may not act contrary to Congress’s 
will); Chem. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125 (1985) (“[I]f Congress 
has clearly expressed an intent contrary to that of the Agency, our duty is to enforce the will of 
Congress.”). 
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that they are more directly checked by the electorally accountable executive 
and legislative branches than are Article III courts. Next, legislative bodies, 
which are subject to direct electoral checks, and the statutes they produce, 
make a stronger claim to majoritarian democratic legitimacy.86 Ascending to 
the top rung in the hierarchy, the popular sovereign, considered the ultimate 
source of constitutional norms, makes the strongest claim to democratic 
legitimacy. In a political system that allocates ultimate sovereignty to the 
people no entity or institution may make a stronger claim to democratic 
legitimacy than the People themselves.87  
The perceived different levels of legitimacy account not only for the 
superordinate and subordinate majoritarian democratic legitimacy of each of 
the four basic legal categories, but also for the positions of the various textual 
and doctrinal legal subcategories. Beginning at the constitutional level, the 
legal subcategory, “constitutional textual norms,” for example, occupies a 
superordinate position over the legal subcategory, “constitutional doctrinal 
norms.” Constitutional textual norms are spoken of as products of the 
popular sovereign.88 Constitutional doctrinal norms derive from judicial 
interpretation and application of constitutional textual norms. Manifestly, the 
majoritarian democratic pedigree of the popular sovereign is purer than that 
of unelected courts.  
Similarly, at the statutory level, statutory textual norms originate from 
legislative bodies, while courts produce the case authorities establishing 
doctrinal precedents that interpret statutory texts. The electorally accountable 
former claims greater majoritarian democratic legitimacy than the unelected 
latter.89 This difference in degrees of democratic legitimacy accounts for the 
hierarchy of the statutory textual norm over statutory doctrinal norm. Even in 
the administrative realm the hierarchy of textual norms over doctrinal norms 
corresponds with differing degrees of democratic legitimacy. As mentioned 
above, administrative textual norms are largely the product of quasi-
legislative informal notice and comment rulemaking, whereas administrative 
doctrinal norms spring from quasi-judicial formal agency adjudications.90 As 
the quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial descriptive labels imply, the former 
administrative law-creating process can claim greater democratic legitimacy 
 
 
 86. See supra note 84. 
 87. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The 
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE. The 
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate 
authority.”). See also  Corwin, infra note 132.  
 88. See infra  text accompanying notes 108-34. 
 89. See supra note 84.  
 90. See supra text accompanying notes 76-79. 
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than the latter. Agencies promulgating legislative rules via informal notice 
and comment rulemaking “have sought to democratize the rulemaking 
process” via broad participation, consultation, and legislative committee style 
hearing procedures.91 Agency formal adjudications, in contrast, employ trial-
like procedures that are not designed to enhance the scope of participation, 
but rather, to establish a trial-like record that forms the basis for an 
administrative order.92  
In sum, the hierarchic axiom fully accounts for the particular hierarchical 
ordering of legal categories and subcategories. In other words, the axiom 
explains why any given legal category or subcategory occupies a 
superordinate or subordinate position in the ordering of legal categories and 
subcategories.  
E. The Majoritarian Democracy Reinforcing Justification Underlying the 
Four Axioms  
The four axiomatic meta-norms can be stated as follows: 
1. The source axiom: Legal norms emanating from different norm-
generating institutions or entities belong to different legal categories and 
subcategories; legal norms emanating from the same norm-generating 
institutions or entities belong to the same legal categories and subcategories.  
2. The hierarchic axiom: Legal categories populated by legal norms 
emanating from norm-generating institutions or entities of relatively greater 
democratic legitimacy are hierarchically superior to those legal categories 
populated by legal norms emanating from institutions or entities of relatively 
lesser democratic legitimacy.  
3. The categoric axiom: Legal norms belonging to legal categories of 
superordinate hierarchic status always and unconditionally trump 
irreconcilably conflicting legal norms belonging to legal categories of 
subordinate hierarchic status.  
4. The chronologic axiom: Whenever two truly conflicting legal norms 
belong to the same legal category and subcategory, the more recently created 
norm always and unconditionally trumps the preexisting norm.  
Taken together, the four axiomatic meta-norms account for the outcomes 
of almost all cases in which courts find that legal norms stand in a posture of 
true legal conflict. Without the meta-norms, or some substitute set of meta-
norms performing the same function, the legal system would have no way of 
 
 
 91. See SCHWARTZ, supra note 76, at 189-92.  
 92. See id. at 192-93. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol80/iss1/3
p127 Gonzalez book pages.doc  8/5/2002   6:00 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2002] TWO CATEGORIES OF CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 161 
 
 
 
 
predictably resolving cases of true legal conflict. Why, however, have we 
chosen to use these particular meta-norms to resolve true legal conflicts? The 
meta-norms need justification because the meta-norms play such an 
important and fundamental role, and because we could easily imagine 
alternative systems for mediating true legal conflict.  
As it turns out, the outcomes produced by the four meta-norms justify 
their role in mediating true legal conflicts. Stated most simply, when the four 
meta-norms work in conjunction, they always privilege the legal norm 
produced by the institution or entity of greatest majoritarian democratic 
legitimacy over the legal norm produced by the institution or entity of lesser 
democratic legitimacy. In this way, the four meta-norms promote 
majoritarian democracy-reinforcing outcomes. The meta-norms achieve 
these outcomes by (1) hierarchically ordering the legal categories and 
subcategories according to the democratic legitimacy of the various norm-
generating sources, and (2) granting norms that emanate from sources of 
higher majoritarian democratic legitimacy an absolute trump over norms that 
emanate from sources of lesser majoritarian democratic legitimacy.  
Figure No. 3 engrafts the source and hierarchic axioms accounting for the 
legal categories and subcategories onto the model represented in Figures No. 
1 and 2. The left-most part of the graph illustrates the one-to-one positive 
correspondence between the degree of democratic legitimacy that the source 
of norms populating a given legal category or subcategory may claim, with 
the position in the ordering that the legal category or subcategory occupies. 
The greater the degree of majoritarian democratic legitimacy that a source 
may claim, the higher the position of the legal category or subcategory 
populated by norms rooted in that source. The top-most part of the graph 
illustrates the nexus between the recency of a norm’s creation and its 
democratic legitimacy. All other things being equal, norms of more recent 
vintage enjoy greater democratic legitimacy than norms of older vintage.  
Figure No. 3 also identifies the sources of legal norms. I do not claim that 
the listed sources represent the exclusive, or even the actual, sources of legal 
norms.93 Instead, at least regarding the four legal categories, they represent 
 
 
 93. At least one scholar, for example, claims that the various forms of administrative “guidance” 
constit ute a species of legal norms. See PETER L. STRAUSS, PUBLICATION RULES IN THE RULEMAKING 
SPECTRUM:  ASSURING PROPER RESPECT FOR AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT 2 (Columbia Law School 
Center for Law and Economic Studies, Working Paper No. 189 (2001)). 
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the ultimate sources that our legal culture normally associates with the 
various kinds of legal norms. Our constitutional folklore maintains that the 
Constitution emanates from the popular sovereign.94 As I will argue in Part 
IV, no one could reasonably claim that all constitutional norms originate 
from We the People.95 Nonetheless, under extant constitutional orthodoxy, 
We the People are thought to be, and are spoken of as, the font of 
constitutional norms.96 Similarly, lawyers and judges commonly think of 
statutory norms as the product of legislative bodies. To be certain, the Chief 
Executive, courts, and administrative agencies play important roles in the 
elaboration of statutory norms.97 Nonetheless, our legal culture associates 
statutes with legislative bodies and purports to limit the role of the Chief 
Executive, courts, and agencies in the elaboration of statutory norms to 
carrying out the sometimes ambiguous legislative will or commands 
embedded in statutes.98  
At the subcategoric level, the identified sources represent not just the 
ultimate and normally associated sources of legal norms, but rather, the 
actual and immediate sources. Statutory textual norms, for example, are 
primarily the product of legislative bodies, while the doctrinal norms 
interpreting them are creations of the courts. To give a second example, 
administrative textual norms are most immediately the creation of quasi-
legislative administrative processes, which promulgate regulations of general 
application. Administrative doctrinal norms, in contrast, are creations of 
administrative quasi-judicial procedures, which interpret administrative 
regulations. 
 
 
 94. See infra  text accompanying notes 108-34. 
 95. See infra  text accompanying notes 135-323. 
 96. See infra  text accompanying notes 108-34. 
 97. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, The Article I, Section 7 Game, 80 GEO. L.J. 
523 (1992) (setting forth a formal rational choice model that articulates the strategic and dynamic 
influence of different actors in a statutory policy-elaboration game).  
 98. See Carlos E. González, Reinterpreting Statutory Interpretation , 74 N.C. L. REV. 585, 624-
33 (1996) (reviewing the honest agent conception, which maintains that when interpreting statutes 
courts must faithfully execute the directive and intent of the enacting legislative body). 
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The four axioms represented in Figure No. 3 encapsulate the narrow 
majoritarian democracy-reinforcing narratives that lawyers and judges 
commonly use to justify small pieces of the hierarchical arrangement. 
Lawyers and judges have used a democracy reinforcing narrative to justify 
the nullification of statutory norms and other sub-constitutional norms by 
truly conflicting constitutional norms since Marbury v. Madison.99 Likewise, 
a democracy reinforcing narrative justifies the hierarchy of statutory norms 
over both administrative and common law norms. The same is true for the 
justification, at the subcategoric level, of the hierarchy of statutory textual 
norms over statutory doctrinal norms. Courts ought not create statutory 
 
 
 99. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). See infra note 115. 
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Figure No. 3 
(Older = lesser democratic legitimacy) (Newer = greater democratic legitimacy) 
    Legal Categories            Legal Subcategories 
    (Ultimate source)           (Immediate source) 
 
Constitutional Norms 
(Popular Sovereign) 
Constitutional Doctrinal Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Constitutional Textual Norms 
(Popular Sovereign) 
 
 
Statutory Norms 
(Legislatures)  
Statutory Doctrinal Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Statutory Textual Norms 
(Legislatures)  
 
Administrative Norms 
(Administrative Agencies) 
Administrative Adjudicatory Norms 
(Agency Quasi-Judicial Adjudicatory Processes) 
 
Administrative Regulatory Textual Norms 
(Agency Quasi-Legislative Rulemaking Processes) 
 
 
Common Law Norms 
(Courts)  
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doctrinal norms that irreconcilably conflict with the range of meanings 
reasonably attributable to sta tutory textual norms. Allowing courts to create 
doctrinal norms incompatible with textual norms would empower a 
lawmaking institution of lesser democratic legitimacy—the courts—to 
nullify or modify a norm created by a law-creating institution of greater 
democratic legitimacy—a legislative body. The four axioms aggregate these 
and other similar justificatory narratives into a generalized and simplified 
justificatory narrative that is applicable regardless of the particular kinds of 
norms involved. 
III. CONSISTENCY WITH THE META-NORMS DEMANDS THAT POPULAR 
SOVEREIGN-GENERATED CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS TRUMP TRULY 
CONFLICTING GOVERNMENT INSTITUTION-GENERATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS 
Thus far I have defined the concepts of true legal conflict and of meta-
norms; identified both the hierarchical ordering of legal categories and 
subcategories, and the categoric, chronologic, source, and hierarchic meta-
norm axioms; argued that the four meta-norms govern the adjudication of 
true legal conflicts; and explained how the meta-norms advance majoritarian 
democratic outcomes.  
Having laid the groundwork, I now return the discussion to the central 
normative proposition of the Article—consistency with the axiomatic meta-
norms requires that constitutional norms sourced in We the People always 
and unconditionally trump truly conflicting constitutional norms sourced in 
ordinary government institutions. As a corollary, consistency with the 
axiomatic meta-norms requires that constitutional norms sourced in We the 
People be immune from repeal by later-in-time created truly conflicting 
constitutional norms sourced in ordinary government institutions. This 
proposition presupposes a categoric distinction between popular sovereign-
generated and government institution-generated constitutional norms, a 
distinction not currently acknowledged by the courts.100 
On the orthodox view, reflected in Figure No. 3, all constitutional 
provisions (constitutional textual norms) emanate from a single source—We 
the People.101 Unlike some constitutional systems, American courts have 
 
 
 100. At this juncture, I refrain from defining the line between constitutional norms originating 
from the popular sovereign and those originating from ordinary government institutions. The important 
point, at least for now, is recognizing that there is a clear distinction between the two sources.  
 101. See infra  text accompanying notes 108-34.  
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never recognized a subset of super-constitutional norms.102 Instead, all 
constitutional provisions are treated as similar in kind and enjoy an equal 
hierarchical status.103 
As long as we accept the orthodox view, the way that courts have 
adjudicated true conflicts between constitutional provisions fully conforms 
to, and is consistent with, all four axiomatic meta-norms.104 My claim, 
however, is that the orthodox view is more myth than reality, more fable than 
fact. The dual-source thesis more accurately and honestly describes the 
origins of constitutional norms than the extant orthodoxy. Only some 
constitutional textual norms may rightfully claim a popular sovereignty 
pedigree. Others can in no way be characterized as emanating from We the 
People, but rather are more honestly characterized as creations of ordinary 
legislatures that fail to embody the popular sovereign’s norm-creating acts. 
Contrary to the orthodoxy, an accurate descriptive account of the origins of 
constitutional textual norms must acknowledge that constitutional provisions 
in fact originate from two different sources—the popular sovereign and 
ordinary legislative bodies.  
 
 
 102. See infra  text accompanying notes 330-37. The Slave Trade Clause and the Equal Suffrage in 
the Senate Clause are notable exceptions. See U.S. CONST., art .  V. The former was purportedly 
unamendable until 1808, while the latter makes equal suffrage of the states in the Senate unamendable 
without the consent of each state. 
 103. Though lawyers and judges may, for example, descriptively differentiate rights-granting 
constitutional provisions from power-granting constitutional provisions, such a distinction has no 
relevance in adjudicating cases of true conflict between constitutional provisions. Further, though 
some constitutional provisions may have more influence, be the subject of a greater volume of judicial 
attention, or reflect principles closer to the core of the Constitution, at least for purposes of 
adjudicating conflicts between constitutional norms, all constitutional provisions are treated with equal 
hierarchical status. See González, supra  note 17, at 516. 
 104. In conformity with the source axiom, under the supposition that all constitutional provisions 
originate from We the People, the courts treat all constitutional provisions as similar in kind. Similarly, 
in conformity with the hierarchic axiom, courts treat constitutional norms—supposedly originating 
from the popular sovereign—as hierarchically superior to statutory, administrative, and common law 
norms, which originate from norm-generating institutions of lesser majoritarian democratic legitimacy 
than We the People. Moreover, given that all constitutional provisions are supposedly derived from the 
same entity, for purposes of adjudicating true conflicts between constitutional norms, no constitutional 
provision or subcategory of constitutional provisions is treated as different in kind from, or 
hierarchically superior to, other constitutional provisions. Finally, because all provisions of the 
Constitution belong to a single indivisible legal category (and therefore enjoy an equal hierarchic 
status) the courts never use the hierarchic axiom to resolve true conflicts between constitutional norms. 
Instead, the chronologic axiom alone determines which of two truly conflicting constitutional norms 
will prevail. In short, in light of the extant constitutional orthodoxy positing that all constitutional 
provisions are derived from We the People, the courts’ adjudication of truly conflicting constitutional 
norms has perfectly mirrored the four axiomatic meta-norms that govern the adjudication of true legal 
conflicts.   
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Once we accept the dual-source thesis, consistency with the source, 
hierarchic, and categoric axioms requires: (1) that popular sovereign and 
government institution-generated constitutional provisions be treated as 
different in kind, (2) that the former be treated as hierarchically superior to 
the latter, and (3) that in cases of true conflict the former always and 
unconditionally trumps the latter. 
Figure No. 4 below incorporates the dual-source thesis into the model 
developed in Figures No. 1-3. The model presented in Figure No. 4 illustrates 
five, rather than four, principle legal categories. In contrast to our current 
ordering of legal categories and subcategories, constitutional norms under the 
structure I advance constitute two separate legal categories, “popular 
constitutional norms” and “government constitutional norms,” with the 
former hierarchically superior to the latter. The division of constitutional 
norms into distinct categories follows from the source axiom. Because 
constitutional provisions emanate from two different sources—the popular 
sovereign or government institutions—the legal system must treat those 
sourced in the former as categorically distinct from those sourced in the 
latter.  
Other than the division of the previously undivided legal category 
“constitutional norms” into two separate legal categories, the model works 
exactly as before. In accordance with the categoric axiom, legal norms 
belonging to superordinate legal categories or subcategories always and 
unconditionally trump truly conflicting norms belonging to subordinate legal 
categories or subcategories. As applied to the new ordering, any norm 
belonging to the legal category “popular constitutional norms” trumps any 
irreconcilably conflicting norm belonging to the category “government 
constitutional norms,” and only a newly created popular constitutional 
amendment can trump an existing popular constitutional textual norm.  
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If the dual-source thesis is accurate, then courts inadvertently have been 
violating the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms when dealing with true 
conflicts between constitutional provisions. By uncritically adhering to the 
orthodox view that all constitutional norms emanate from a single source, the 
courts have wrongly treated all constitutional provisions as similar in kind (a 
violation of the source axiom) and as hierarchically indistinguishable (a 
violation of the hierarchic axiom), thereby allowing constitutional provisions 
that emanate solely from legislative bodies to trump constitutional provisions 
that emanate from We the People (a violation of the categoric axiom). 
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Figure No. 4 
(Older = lesser democratic legitimacy) (Newer = greater democratic legitimacy) 
    Legal Categories            Legal Subcategories 
    (Ultimate source)           (Immediate source) 
 
Administrative Norms 
(Administrative Agencies) 
Administrative Adjudicatory Norms 
(Agency Quasi-Judicial Adjudicatory) 
 
Administrative Regulatory Textual Norms 
(Agency Quasi-Legislative Rulemaking) 
 
 
 
Common Law Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Statutory Norms 
(Congress) 
Statutory Doctrinal Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Statutory Textual Norms 
(Congress) 
 
Government Constitutional Norms 
(State Legislatures)  
Government Constitutional Doctrinal Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Government Constitutional Textual Norms 
(State Legislatures)  
 
 
Popular Constitutional Norms 
(Popular Sovereign) 
Popular Constitutional Doctrinal Norms 
(Courts)  
 
Popular Constitutional Textual Norms 
(Popular Sovereign) 
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To see how judicial treatment of truly conflicting constitutional 
provisions can transgress the meta-norms, return to the hypothesized RFRA-
like constitutional amendment discussed in Part I.105 Again, assume that the 
Supreme Court would find that such an amendment is in true legal conflict 
with the Free Exercise Clause. Assume further, under given criteria for 
separating popular sovereign-generated constitutional provisions from 
ordinary government institution-generated constitutional provisions, that the 
Free Exercise Clause belongs to the former category, while the hypothesized 
RFRA-like amendment falls into the latter category. How would we expect 
the Supreme Court to adjudicate the conflict? As suggested above, the Court 
would hold that the RFRA-like amendment expands and alters the contours 
of Free Exercise Clause protections.106 The court would do so because, 
operating under the extant orthodoxy, it would consider the RFRA-like 
amendment to emanate from the same source as the Free Exercise Clause, 
and would therefore treat them both as constitutional norms of equal 
hierarchical status. Because they would be treated as members of the same 
legal category and subcategory, the chronologic axiom would govern and the 
more recently created norm would trump or alter the preexisting norm.  
Yet, if the RFRA-like amendment emanates from ordinary government 
institutions, while the Free Exercise Clause emanates from We the People, 
allowing the former to trump the latter violates the source, hierarchic, and 
categoric axioms. It violates the source and hierarchic  axioms by treating 
norms sourced in two distinct norm-generating entities of different 
democratic legitimacy as categorically and hierarchically indistinguishable. It 
violates the categoric axiom by privileging the RFRA-like amendment—a 
norm that should be treated as a member of a hierarchically inferior legal 
category—over the Free Exercise Clause—a norm that should be treated as a 
member of a hierarchically superior legal category. 
All of these conclusions, of course, rely heavily on the dual-source thesis. 
Without the dual-source thesis, judicial treatment of truly conflicting 
constitutional norms fully complies with the meta-norms. Once we accept the 
dual-source thesis as a more accurate descriptive account of the origins of 
constitutional norms, however, consistency with the source, hierarchic and 
categoric meta-norms requires that popular sovereign-generated 
constitutional provisions trump truly conflicting government institution-
generated constitutional norms. Why ought we embrace the dual-source 
thesis and reject the extant orthodoxy? The next Part addresses this question. 
 
 
 105. See supra text accompanying notes 6-9. 
 106. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. 
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IV. EMBRACING THE DUAL-SOURCE THESIS 
The lynchpin of the argument lies in supplanting the orthodoxy (all 
constitutional textual norms, including the amendments, are sourced in We 
the People) with the dual-source thesis (constitutional textual norms emanate 
from two separate and distinct kinds of law creating sources—We the People 
and ordinary state legislatures, which ratify amendments pursuant to Article 
V). I harbor no false hope that my argument will cause the legal community 
to instantly jettison the orthodoxy and replace it with the dual-source thesis. 
Persuading lawyers to discard long held presuppositions in favor of novel 
interpretations is a process rather than an event. Instead of aiming to 
convince that the extant orthodoxy is “wrong” and that the dual-source thesis 
is “correct,” I will advance the more palatable argument: The orthodoxy rests 
on questionable foundations, and the dual-source thesis offers a plausible, 
and perhaps superior, alternative understanding of the sources of 
constitutional textual norms.  
Keeping in mind my limited objectives, I will merely outline the 
arguments against the orthodoxy and in favor of the dual-source thesis. In 
forthcoming articles, and with the eventual intent to persuade lawyers and 
judges to fully embrace the dual-source thesis, I will take up a more 
comprehensive consideration of the argument’s most controversial and 
crucial components. For now, in order to narrow the scope of my task, I will 
assume that both the body of the Constitution and the Bill of Rights emanate 
from the popular sovereign,107 and I will focus only on the Constitution’s 
post-Bill of Rights amendments. I will advance the following proposition: 
Contrary to the orthodox view of sources of constitutional amendments, we 
must take seriously the notion that at least some amendments created 
pursuant to Article V cannot accurately be described as emanating from, or 
created by, We the People. Instead, these amendments are more honestly 
described as creations of the ratifying legislative bodies alone.  If at least 
some constitutional amendments are sourced in ordinary government, rather 
than in We the People, the orthodoxy cannot stand. 
A. The Orthodoxy and Article V 
Before countering the orthodoxy, let me first survey its manifestations. 
That constitutional norms emanate from We the People is part and parcel of 
the theory of popular sovereignty, a constitutional cornerstone that found 
 
 
 107. Of course I reserve the right to examine the validity of this assumption at some future date.  
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early expression during the American Revolution, and later in the Founding 
Era. In both periods, the legitimacy of constitutions rested on their status as 
legal norms sourced in the sovereign People.108 Most prominently, during the 
Founding period, Federalists used the idea that constitutional norms are 
sourced in the sovereign People to rebut a key Anti-Federalist critique of the 
then-proposed Constitution. Anti-Federalists argued that Article VII of the 
proposed Constitution, proclaiming the Constitution ratified upon the 
approval of popular constituent conventions in only nine of the thirteen 
states,109 violated both the Articles of Confederation Amendment Clause110 
and provisions of the then-in-force state constitutions.111 Federalists, 
however, responded that under Article VII, the sovereign People, assembled 
in popular constituent conventions, would be the ratifiers of the proposed 
Constitution. 112 If the sovereign People chose to adopt the Constitution, any 
conflict with the Amendment Clause of the Articles of Confederation or with 
extant state constitutions would be moot. As law sourced in We the People, 
the Constitution would trump the conflicting Articles of Confederation and 
state constitutions.113 
 
 
 108. See U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the People of the United States .  . . do ordain and establish this 
Constitution . . . .”);  WILLI PAUL ADAMS,  THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS:  REPUBLICAN 
IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA (Rita 
Kimber & Robert Kimber trans., 1980) (discussing Revolutionary era state constitutions, which lodge 
sovereignty in the People); STEPHEN M. GRIFFIN, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 12 (1996) 
(describing how the authorship of constitutions evolved to require special popular constituent 
conventions and how Americans adopted the idea that the People are the creators of constitutions); 
Walter Dellinger , The Legitimacy of Constitutional Change: Rethinking the Amendment Process, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 386, 386 (1983) (“That the American system of government traces its authority to a 
Constitution originally consented to by conventions elected by (a portion of) the people is one 
significant legitimating feature of the regime.”); Martin S. Flaherty, History in Constitutional 
Argumentation, in  3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 1290, 1291 (Leonard W. Levy 
& Kenneth L. Karst eds., 2d ed. 2000) (explaining the idea that popular sovereign’s ratification of the 
Constitution legitimizes its authority unless and until the popular sovereign amends the Constitution); 
Abner S. Greene, The Irreducible Constitution , 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 293, 295-96 (1996) 
(discussing democratic foundationalism). 
 109. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 110. Article of Confederation art. XIII. The Amendment Clause provides: 
And the Articles of this Confederation shall be inviolably observed by every state, and the Union 
shall be perpetual; nor shall any alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless 
such alteration be agreed to in a congress of United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the 
legislatures of every state. 
Id. 
 111. See Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside 
Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 464-75 (1997) [hereinafter Amar, The Consent of the Governed] 
(explaining the Anti-Federalist arguments relating to the conflict between the proposed Constitution, 
the Articles of Confederation, and state constitutions, including the Federalists’ popular sovereignty-
based rebuttal). 
 112. See id. 
 113. See id . See also  2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 476 (Max 
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During the nation’s early years, a nationalist Supreme Court voiced the 
orthodox view that the Constitution emanates from the popular sovereign. In 
McCulloch v. Maryland,114 Justice Marshall clearly articulated the orthodoxy 
with the following statement:  
[W]hen, “in order to form a more perfect union,” it was deemed 
necessary to change this alliance [the Articles of Confederation] into 
an effective government, possessing great and sovereign powers, and 
acting directly on the people, the necessity of referring it to the people, 
and of deriving its powers directly from them, was felt and 
acknowledged by all.  
The government of the Union, then . . . is, emphatically, and truly, a 
government of the people. In form and in substance it emanates from 
them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly 
on them, and for their benefit.”115  
Justice Story offered another early assertion of the orthodoxy in Martin v. 
Hunter’s Lessee116 with the following statement: “The constitution of the 
United States was ordained and established, not by the states in their 
sovereign capacities, but emphatically, as the preamble of the constitution 
declares, by ‘the people of the United States.’”117  
The period leading up to the Civil War featured a Southern challenge to 
the orthodox view.118 Most prominently, John C. Calhoun argued that the 
 
 
Farrand ed., 1937) [hereinafter 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION] (James Madison speaking of the People as 
the “fountain of all [political] power” and as ratifiers of the proposed constitution).  
 114. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). 
 115. Id. at 404-05 (emphasis added). For another opinion in which Justice Marshall expressed the 
orthodox view, see Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). In Marbury, Marshall justified 
judicial review as the Court enforcing “the original and supreme will” of the popular sovereign 
expressed in the Constitution, over the will of the legislature, expressed in ordinary legislation. Id. at 
176. Marshall’s Marbury opinion closely tracks Hamilton’s justification for judicial review. See THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 464-72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (arguing in favor of 
judicial review on the grounds that the courts’ enforcement of constitutional norms over statutory 
norms amounts to courts’ enforcement of norms emanating from People over norms emanating from a 
legislative body). The position Marshall advances is not one of the Court trumping Congress, but 
rather of the People’s Constitutional norms trumping Congress. See William Van Alstyne, A Critical 
Guide to Marbury v. Madison, 1969 DUKE L.J. 1, 16-17 (1969); Thomas E. Baker, Exercising the 
Amendment Power to Disapprove of Supreme Court Decisions: A Proposal for a “Republican Veto ,” 
22 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 325, 326-27 (1995).  
 116. 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816). 
 117. Id. See also  Ware v. Hylton, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 199, 236 (1796) (“There can be no limitation on 
the power of the people of the United States. By their authority . . . the Constitution of the United 
States was established . . . .”); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 470-71 (1793) (“[T]he people, 
in their collective and national capacity, established the present Constitution . . . .”).  
 118. See Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1451-67 (1987) 
[hereinafter Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism ] (succinct yet inclusive summary of the Southern 
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states or the people of the states, rather than the national people, had created 
the Constitution, and therefore the states retained a right to secede from the 
union.119 Other Civil War era actors, as exemplified by Abraham Lincoln, 
followed to the Marshallian orthodox line and spoke of the Constitution and 
its amendments as emanating from the national popular sovereign. Lincoln 
articulated the orthodoxy in his 1861 inaugural address as follows:  
This country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. 
Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing Government, they can 
exercise their constitutional right of amending it or their revolutionary 
right to dismember or overthrow it . . . . I fully recognize the rightful 
authority of the people over the whole subject, to be exercised in either 
of the modes prescribed in [Article V] . . . .”120  
Whatever controversy may have existed prior to the Civil War, the war and 
the ensuing amendments resolved the debate in favor of the idea that the 
Constitution derives from the national We the People, and not, as the South 
had insisted, from the states or the peoples of the states.121  
Modern courts and scholars have continued to speak of the Constitution 
as emanating from We the People. Most notably for present purposes, 
modern authorities have unwaveringly spoken of constitutional amendments 
that are ratified pursuant to Article V as emanating from We the People. In 
 
 
challenge to the orthodox view). 
 119. See JOHN R. VILE, THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS IN AMERICAN POLITICAL 
THOUGHT, 80-88 (1992). See also  Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , supra  note 118, at 1451-66 
(recounting the debate on whether sovereignty resides with a national We the People or with the 
peoples of individual states in the period leading up to the Civil War). Indeed, the Southern Civil War 
idea that sovereignty resided in the states grew out of uncertainty as to the location of sovereignty, 
dating at least as far back as the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions that were spurred by the Alien and 
Sedition Acts. See ALFRED H. KELLY ET AL ., THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND 
DEVELOPMENT 136-41 (6th ed. 1983).  
 120. Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1861), in INAUGURAL ADDRESSES OF 
THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES 1789-1989, at 140 (bicentennial ed. 1989). Curiously, in the 
next breath Lincoln may have differentiated the popular constituent convention from the state 
legislature ratification models, favoring the former as the only ratification method that “allows 
amendments to originate with the people themselves.” Id. It is not entirely clear, however, whether 
Lincoln was speaking of a national constitutional convention for proposing amendments, or of popular 
constituent conventions organized for ratification of proposed amendments.  
 121. See BRUCE ACKERMAN, WE THE PEOPLE:  FOUNDATIONS 81-82 (1991) [hereinafter 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS] (reviewing how the pre-Civil War debates regarding the primacy of the 
national people versus the states—so hotly debated up to and during the Civil War was decided in 
favor of the former by the outcome of the Civil War and the Civil War Amendments); 1 WESTEL 
WOODBURY WILLOUGHBY , THE CONSTITUTION LAW OF THE UNITED STATES 600 (2d ed. 1929) 
(stating that the idea that the Constitution was an agreement between the states, rather than higher law 
emanating from the popular sovereign, is a “theory which, since the Civil War, has been so decisively 
rejected by the American people and by the courts”). 
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Hawke v. Smith,122 a case focusing on challenges to the legitimacy of the 
Ohio legislature’s approval of the Prohibition Amendment,123 the Court 
stated that “both methods of ratification [of amendments under Article V], by 
legislatures or conventions, call for action by deliberative assemblages 
representative of the people, which it was assumed would voice the will of the 
people.”124 The Court was even more forceful in Dillon v. Gloss,125 stating 
that 
the people of the United States, by whom the Constitution was 
ordained and established, have made it a condition to amending that 
instrument that the amendment be submitted to representative 
assemblies in the several States and be ratified in three-fourths of 
them. The plain meaning of this is (a) that all amendments must have 
the sanction of the people of the United States, the original fountain of 
power, acting through representative assemblies, and (b) that 
ratification by these assemblies in three-fourths of the States shall be 
taken as a decisive expression of the people’s will and be binding on 
all.”126  
Hawke and Dillon are momentous in that they extend the orthodox 
rationale, which was traced early in the Court’s history by nationalist Justices 
Marshall and Story. Marshall and Story adopted the orthodoxy in cases that 
challenged clauses in the Constitution’s main body.127 By holding that the 
Constitution emanates from We the People, Justice Marshall and Story 
simply echoed the Preamble and Founding Era understandings. In contrast, 
Hawke and Dillon extended the orthodoxy to amendments, holding that the 
amendments too emanate from the popular sovereign, regardless of which 
Article V mode of ratification had been employed. As I argue below, 
although Marshall and Story’s adherance to the orthodoxy may find strength 
in the text and original understanding of the Constitution, the case for 
extending the orthodoxy to amendments finds little such support.128  
 
 
 122. 253 U.S. 221 (1920). 
 123. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII, repealed by U.S. CONST. amend. XX, § 1. 
 124. 253 U.S. at 226-27 (emphasis added). 
 125. 256 U.S. 368 (1921). 
 126. Id. at 374 (emphasis added). See also  Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 
452-53 (1934) (speaking of the people—rather than the Supreme Court—as responsible for amending 
the Constitution); United States v. Sprague, 282 U.S. 716 (1931) (rejecting argument differentiating 
ratification by convention from ratification by state legislatures, only the former was empowered to 
ratify amendments that granted federal government new powers). 
 127. See supra notes 115-17 and accompanying text. 
 128. See infra  text accompanying notes 135-94. 
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More recently, a concurring opinion in Frontiero v. Richardson129  
reaffirmed the orthodox view of the source of constitutional amendments 
established in Hawke and Dillon.130 In Frontiero, Justice Powell, speaking of 
the proposed Equal Rights Amendment then under consideration by the state 
legislatures, stated, “If this Amendment is duly adopted, it will represent the 
will of the people  accomplished in the manner prescribed by [Article V of] 
the Constitution.”131 Recent academic commentary has also espoused the 
orthodoxy and, in particular, has embraced the orthodox view that all 
constitutional amendments ratified pursuant to Article V emanate from We 
the People.132  
 
 
 129. 411 U.S. 677 (1973). 
 130. Id. at 692. 
 131. Id. (emphasis added). 
 132. Professor Corwin early on articulated the orthodoxy as follows:  
It is customary nowadays to ascribe the legality as well as the supremacy of the Constitution . . . 
exclusively to the fact that, in its own phraseology, it was “ordained” by “the people of the United 
States.” Two ideas are thus brought into play. One is the so -called “positive” conception of law as 
a general expression merely for the particular commands of a human lawgiver, as a series of acts 
of human will; the other is that the highest possible source of such commands, because the highest 
possible embodiment of human will, is “the people.” . . . [T]he Constitution of the United States 
. . . is assumed to have proceeded immediately from the people . . . . [I]n the American written 
constitution, higher law at last attained a form which made possible the attribution to it of an 
entirely new sort of validity, the validity of a statute emanating from the sovereign people.  
Edwin S. Corwin, The ‘Higher Law’ Background of American Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 
149, 151-52, 409 (1928-29). More recent scholarly work echos the orthodoxy and applies it to the 
amendments. See, e.g., WAYNE D. MOORE , CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AND POWERS OF THE PEOPLE 4-
5, 58-59, 77-84 (1996) (discussing the idea that We the People are the authors of the Constitution and 
how We the People act “through” legislative bodies to amend the Constitution under Article V); JOHN 
R. VILE,  CONTEMPORARY QUESTIONS SURROUNDING THE CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDING PROCESS 
114-15 (1993) (“Previous commentators on the amending process understood that, when it came to 
amending the Constitution, sovereignty would not be exercised by any fifty-one percent or more of the 
voters but only be the people acting through the requisite majorities established in Article V.”); Amar, 
The Supreme Court, supra note 75, at 29, 36, 38, 43, 49, 84-85 (referring to amendments as well as the 
main body of the Constitution as emanating from We the People); Brendon Troy Ishikawa, Everything 
You Always Wanted to Know About How Amendments Are Made, but Were Afraid to Ask, 24 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545, 555 (1997) (“Both the Preamble and Article V articulate a form of 
government that derives its authority from the people through the actions of state constitutional 
conventions or legislatures.”); Lawrence G. Sager, The Incorrigible Constitution, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
893, 900 (1990) (discussing the widely held notion that the Constitution “enjoys the pedigree of 
enactment by persons who reasonably can be expected to have represented the public will in lending 
their formal assent to its ratification”). Even Bruce Ackerman has alluded to the Article V “classical” 
system of constitutional amendment as providing one of two higher lawmaking systems by which the 
popular sovereign can create new constitutional amendments. See BRUCE ACKERMAN,  WE THE 
PEOPLE:  TRANSFORMATIONS 15 (1998) [hereinafter ACKERMAN,  TRANSFORMATIONS] (Article V 
authorizes constitutional amendment in the name of the People); ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 121, at 69, 267. Ackerman, however, is honest enough to admit that ratification via Article V may 
not always coincide with the kind of deliberated and decisive popular consensus needed to constitute 
an act of constitutional norm creation on the part of We the People. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, 
supra  note 121, at 291 (stating that “a constitutional amendment may be approved by three-quarters of 
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The orthodox view of the sources of constitutional norms, and in 
particular of the sources of amendments, is firmly established. A handful of 
lawyers and scholars, however, contested the orthodox view of the source of 
amendments in challenging the Prohibition Amendment. Most notably, 
Professor Selden Bacon called attention to Article V’s two ratification 
methods—approval by state legislatures or approval by popular constituent 
conventions—and suggested that new constitutional textual norms ratified by 
the former have not necessarily been ratified by We the People.133 The 
Supreme Court, however, rebuffed these theories in the aforementioned 
Hawke and Dillon cases,134 thus relegating Bacon and the few others who 
challenged the orthodoxy to a status as isolated voices against the entrenched 
view that any amendment overcoming Article V ratification hurdles ipso 
facto  emanates from We the People.  
B. Article V and the Dual-Source Thesis 
Can the orthodox view, particularly the part that speaks of the 
Constitution’s amendments as emanating from the popular sovereign, 
successfully withstand critical analysis? Close examination will, at the very 
least, cast a long shadow of doubt on the orthodoxy, and establish the dual-
 
 
the state assemblies without the transformative initiative gaining the requisite kind of support of the 
mobilized People”).  
 133. See Selden Bacon, How the Tenth Amendment Affected the Fifth Article of the Constitution , 
16 VA. L. REV. 771, 791 (1930). Bacon argues that the Tenth Amendment requires that only the 
popular sovereign, assembled in popular constituent conventions, and not state legislatures, may ratify 
amendments that grant new powers to the national government and that therefore the Eighteenth 
Amendment is unconstitutional because it was ratified by state legislatures and grants new powers to 
the national government. Id. at 780-82. Specifically, Bacon wrote that  
the Fifth Article does not say, it does not pretend to say, that the legislatures in so voting are 
agents of the people . . . .  
 . . . The ratification by legislatures was thus an alternative method, provided by the Fifth 
Article, for adopting an amendment by action of the state legislatures, without going back to the 
people as the source of power.  
 The [convention] method of ratification and adoption provided by the Fifth Article was a 
method of going back to the people themselves as the source of the power sought and securing 
their adoption of the amendment . . . . 
Id. at 780-81 (italics in original). Elih u Root advanced arguments similar to Bacon’s. In arguing the 
National Prohibition Cases, Root stated that “ratification by state legislatures does not as a matter of 
fact provide an opportunity for the people to express their will . . . as the calling of conventions might 
have done.” Elai Katz, On Amending Constitutions: The Legality and Legitimacy of Constitutional 
Entrenchment, 29 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 251, 280 (1996). See also DAVID E. KYVIG, EXPLICIT 
AND AUTHENTIC ACTS: AMENDING THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 1776-1995, at 247 (1996) [hereinafter 
KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS] (same); DAVID E. KYVIG, REPEALING NATIONAL 
PROHIBITION 17-18 (2000) [hereinafter KYVIG, PROHIBITION] (discussing Elihu Root’s arguments on 
anti-prohibition litigation). 
 134. See cases cited supra  notes 122 and 125. 
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source thesis as a credible alternative account of the sources of constitutional 
amendments. Analysis begins with the text of Article V:  
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it 
necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the 
Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, 
shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either 
Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this 
Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the 
several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or 
the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress 
. . . .135 
According to the extant orthodoxy, any norm ratified pursuant to Article V is 
a constitutional textual norm created by We the People, no different and of 
no less weight than the provisions within the main body of the Constitution.  
From where does the orthodox view on the source of constitutional 
amendments spring? Not from the text of Article V. Simply stated, Article 
V’s text does not address the issue of whether amendments ratified under its 
terms emanate from We the People or from some other source. Article V 
merely outlines the procedural rules that regulate the addition of new textual 
norms to the Constitution. The text indicates that proposed amendments 
“shall be valid to all [i]ntents and [p]urposes” when ratified by the requisite 
ratio of state legislatures or popular constituent conventions. Nothing in the 
text of Article V indicates that norms ratified pursuant to its terms, whether 
by state legislatures or conventions, are sourced in We the People. Because 
Article V fails to address this issue, we will ultimately have to look beyond 
its confines to determine the source or sources of constitutional amendments.  
To the extent that Article V’s text could be construed as revealing 
something meaningful about the source or sources of constitutional 
amendments, it tends to support the dual-source thesis over the orthodox 
view that all amendments emanate from We the People. Article V candidly 
bypasses direct consultation with We the People. Instead, Article V straight 
forwardly lodges the immediate source of amendments in ordinary legislative 
bodies. Article V charges Congress with proposing amendments and the state 
legislatures with ratifying proposed amendments. Although Article V also 
allows a national constitutional convention to propose amendments and 
permits popular constituent conventions organized in the states to ratify 
amendments, these clauses have little practical import. None of the twenty-
 
 
 135. U.S. CONST. art . V. 
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seven amendments has been proposed by a constitutional convention, and 
popular constituent conventions have ratified only one of the twenty-seven 
formal amendments.136 For all intents and purposes, amendments are 
proposed by Congress and ratified by state legislatures.137 It follows then, 
that constitutional amendments (or at least twenty-six of the twenty-seven 
amendments) emanate not from We the People as the orthodoxy maintains, 
but instead from ordinary legislative bodies.  
Moreover, once we factor in the popular constituent convention route to 
amendment ratification, the orthodoxy appears even less connected to Article 
V’s text. The founding generation considered popular constituent 
conventions to be the only kind of representative bodies capable of 
embodying and speaking as We the People for purposes of ratifying the main 
body of the Constitution.138 As mentioned above, the Federalist reading of 
Article VII is that it provided a way for We the People to ratify the body of 
the proposed constitution through popular constituent conventions organized 
in each state.139 Consequently, it is completely natural to read Article V’s 
reference to ratification of amendments with similar constituent conventions 
as providing a way for We the People to ratify new constitutional textual 
norms. Although Article V does not incorporate direct approval by We the 
People, it enables We the People to indirectly ratify proposed amendments 
through popular constituent conventions specially elected for the sole 
purpose of considering amendments.140  
If there is language in Article V supporting the orthodox view that 
amendments emanate from We the People, the clause providing for 
ratification by popular constituent conventions is that language. Yet this 
language ultimately damages, rather than assists, the orthodoxy. If, in 
accordance with original understandings, we read the convention route to 
ratification as a mode by which We the People ratify new constitutional 
textual norms, then what are we to do with the other mode of ratification, 
 
 
 136. EDWIN S. CORWIN THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 268-71 (Harold W. 
Chase & Craig R. Ducat eds., 14th ed. 1978) (only the repeal of the Prohibition Amendment was 
submitted for ratification to conventions); Gerald Benjamin & Tom Gais, Constitutional 
Conventionphobia , 1 HOFSTRA L. & POL’Y SYMP. 53, 54-57 (1996) (commenting on the absence of 
federal constitutional conventions).  
 137. See EDWIN S. CORWIN, supra  note 136, at 268-71. 
 138. See infra  text accompanying notes 146-61.  
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 111-12. 
 140. Professor Amar offers a compact and instructive discussion of the Founding Era concept of 
popular constituent conventions as a virtual embodiment of the People and of the superior status of 
such conventions over legislative bodies. See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , supra note 118, 
at 1459-61 & n.147 (reviewing the Founding Era notion that only conventions and not legislative 
bodies could embody the People for purposes of ratifying constitutional norms).  
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approval by state legislatures? The orthodoxy insists that all amendments 
emanate from a single source. Article V, however, plainly lays out two 
separate and distinct methods of ratification. The orthodoxy insists that We 
the People are the sole source of constitutional amendments. Yet if We the 
People ratify amendments through the device of popular constituent 
conventions, the state legislature ratification route would appear to provide 
the method by which organs of ordinary government may ratify amendments. 
This reading, at least, follows from the original understanding of state 
legislative and popular constituent convention ratification of new 
constitutional textual norms. Rather than conforming with the orthodoxy, 
Article V’s binary ratification modalities favor an interpretation more in line 
with the dual-source thesis.141  
Not so fast, I hear the defender of the orthodoxy jumping forward to 
rebut. The notion that amendments emanate from two separate and distinct 
sources simply because Article V sets forth both state legislature and 
convention tracks for amendment ratification is too facile. The orthodox 
reading of Article V is not so ham-handed. We are interpreting a 
Constitution, not some local parking ordinance. Such simple-mindedness will 
not wash in this arena. We need a more subtle and urbane understanding of 
Article V’s language. All constitutional amendments do emanate from a 
single source—We the People—because Article V contemplates (or should 
be read as contemplating) that both conventions and state legislatures are 
representational structures that embody and personify the popular sovereign, 
and operate as conduits through which We the People act to create higher law 
norms. Article V attempts to set forth two ways—state legislatures and 
popular constituent conventions—for one source—We the People—to 
indirectly ratify new constitutional textual norms.  
Indeed, this is the orthodox reasoning sanctioned by the Supreme Court. 
Though all but one of the twenty-seven amendments have been ratified by 
 
 
 141. Moreover, the issue of whether amendments created by the popular constituent route 
convention are superior to those created via the state legislature route is not explicitly addressed by 
Article V. The closest the text of Article V comes to addressing this issue is the phrase stating that 
proposed amendments “shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution” upon 
ratification via either method of ratification. U.S. CONST. art. V. One could possibly construe this 
language as suggesting that constitutional amendments, no matter how ratified, are of equal weight and 
hierarchical status as any other constitutional provision. This represents the orthodox interpretation. A 
more plausible reading, however, is that this phrase does not, in any way, address the relative weight 
or hierarchical status of constitutional amendments. Instead, as its language simply states, the proposed 
constitutional amendments become part of the constitution when ratified by either the requisite number 
of state legislatures or the requisite number of popular constituent conventions. The phrase, in other 
words, clearly defines the circumstances under which a proposed amendment becomes part of the 
constitution—by ratification by state legislatures or by constitutional conventions. The weight or 
hierarchical status of amendments, however, remains an entirely open question. 
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state legislatures, the Court steadfastly maintains that amendments ratified by 
state legislatures emanate from We the People.142 Tempting. It sounds 
eminently plausible and gloriously convenient. If we buy into the subtle 
notion that state legislatures, as well as popular constituent conventions, 
embody We the People, we can all pat ourselves on the back and go home 
feeling good about the popular sovereignty pedigree and democratic 
legitimacy of our constitutional amendments. All’s well that ends well. 
Unfortunately, a happy ending is not so easily attained. Nothing in the 
text of Article V binds us to the idea that state legislatures embody We the 
People for purposes of ratifying new constitutional textual norms. More 
importantly, we have serious reason to doubt that state legislatures 
personifying the popular sovereign constitutes a reasonable reading of Article 
V. The orthodox rejoinder cuts against basic principles of constitutional 
interpretation. To read Article V’s binary amendment ratification language as 
providing two ways for the popular sovereign to ratify new constitutional 
textual norms renders one of the two constitutional amendment ratification 
methods superfluous. If, as the orthodox reading suggests, ordinary 
legislative bodies operate as agents through which We the People create new 
constitutional textual norms, why include in Article V the second popular 
constituent convention route to ratification? Stated differently, if state 
legislatures embody We the People for the purpose of creating new 
constitutional textual norms, why add the popular constituent convention 
method as a second means of embodying We the People? Equating 
ratification via the state legislature method with ratification by the popular 
sovereign renders the popular constituent convention amendment method 
unnecessary excess baggage, and vice versa. The Constitution normally will 
not be read in ways that render parts of it superfluous, but instead should be 
read so that all of its clauses have substance and import.143 Therefore, in 
order to give meaning to the binary ratification language of Article V, the 
language must be read as permitting the People to ratify new constitutional 
 
 
 142. See cases cited supra  notes 114-17, 122-26, 129. 
 143. Holmes v. Jennison, 39 U.S. (14 Pet.) 540, 570-71 (1840). In explaining the principle of 
constitutional interpretation, Chief Justice Taney stated: 
[E]very word must have its due force, and appropriate meaning; for it is evident from the whole 
instrument, that no word was unnecessarily used, or needlessly added. The many discussions 
which have taken place upon the construction of the Constitution, have proved the correctness of 
this proposition; and shown the high talent, the caution, and the foresight of the illustrious men 
who framed it. Every word appears to have been weighed with the utmost deliberation, and its 
force and effect to have been fully understood. 
Id. See also  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 490-91 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting 
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 174 (1803) (“[I]t cannot be presumed that any clause in 
the constitution is intended to be without effect.”). 
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textual norms via the popular constituent convention route, and as permitting 
legislative bodies to create new constitutional textual norms via the state 
legislature route.  
Case closed? Hardly. The orthodoxy did not get to be the orthodoxy by 
walking away from a challenge. A defender of the orthodoxy might try a 
slightly more refined tactic, arguing that the popular constituent convention 
method is not superfluous, but rather just a second option by which We the 
People can create new constitutional norms when the state legislature route 
is at an impasse. Every proposed constitutional amendment approved by 
three-fourths of state legislatures has indeed gained the constructive consent 
of We the People. Because legislative bodies do not perfectly personify the 
People, however, not every proposed constitutional amendment that is 
capable of gaining the consent of the popular sovereign can also obtain the 
approval of three-fourths of state legislatures. The popular constituent 
convention path offers a second method of amendment ratification that is 
useful when a proposed amendment enjoys strong popular acceptance, but 
due to agency problems, would not likely obtain approval via the state 
legislature route.144 In other words, the popular constituent convention 
method operates not as the sole method by which We the People approve 
new constitutional textual norms, but rather as a safety valve available 
whenever a proposed amendment that We the People favor could not gain  
approval from three-fourths of the state legislatures. Because all amendments 
that gain the approval of three-fourths of state legislatures reflect the 
approval of We the People, Article V truly does set up two meaningful and 
nonsuperfluous methods by which one law-creating entity—We the 
People—may create new constitutional textual norms.  
Clever. Has the orthodoxy found a way to coexist with basic principles of 
constitutional interpretation? Admittedly, this twist would give significance 
and substance to both the popular constituent convention method and the 
state legislature amendment ratification method. The argument, however, 
suffers from two fatal flaws, both of which strike at the core defect in the 
orthodox reading of Article V. The first flaw stems from the orthodoxy’s 
insistence that all constitutional amendments ratified via the state legislature 
 
 
 144. One might buttress this orthodox reading of Article V with the following idea: Article V had 
to include the constitutional convention method in order to provide a way for We the People to adopt 
amendments that limit the power of the state governments. Even if strongly favored by the electorate, 
state legislatures might reject a proposed amendment that would limit the power of state governments. 
The convention method allows We the People to ratify such proposed amendments. This argument, 
however, is ultimately detrimental to the orthodoxy, for it admits that state legislatures will (at least 
under certain circumstances) fail to embody and reflect the will of We the People when considering 
proposed amendments.  
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route have been ratified by We the People. Again, the orthodoxy justifies the 
existence of the convention method of ratification as a safety valve available 
for cases where state legislatures might fail to ratify a proposed amendment 
that We the People want ratified. This justification concedes the possibility of 
an Article V false negative—the failure of state legislatures to ratify what We 
the People want ratified. Yet, in arguing that each and every amendment 
ratified by state legislatures ipso facto  constitutes ratification by We the 
People, the orthodoxy insists that the opposite agency problem—the false 
positive—will never occur.145 
The proposition that false negatives occur, but that false positives are an 
impossibility, lacks credibility. I defer full consideration of this issue until 
Part IV.C. For now, it will suffice to foreshadow the argument. Suppose that 
ordinary legislatures usually can embody the popular sovereign, and that We 
the People usually can act through ordinary standing state legislatures to 
ratify constitutional amendments. Assume, in short, that in most instances, 
ratification by state legislatures is tantamount to ratification by We the 
People. Nonetheless, there will be some cases in which state legislatures fail 
to embody the popular sovereign and malfunction as conduits through which 
We the People act to ratify new constitutional textual norms. In these cases, 
ordinary state legisla tures will ratify amendments over which We the People 
have not engaged, deliberated, or arrived at a decisive consensus sanctioning 
the creation of new higher law norms. Nonetheless, in these cases, an 
amendment may formally come into being (by virtue of satisfying Article 
V’s formal requirements). It strains the bounds of the credible, however, to 
describe an amendment that was not the subject of a meaningful popular 
deliberative process, much less a decisive popular consensus, as emanating 
from or sourced in We the People. On the contrary, such an amendment can 
only be described as a creation of ordinary legislative bodies that have 
malfunctioned as conduits through which We the People might act to ratify 
new constitutional textual norms. Thus, even if the orthodoxy is correct in 
reading Article V as contemplating both conventions and state legislatures as 
conduits through which We the People can ratify constitutional amendments, 
because of the false positive problem we will still have constitutional 
amendments emanating from two sources. One source is We the People. 
Those amendments ratified by conventions and state legislatures that 
properly embody and personify the popular sovereign’s deliberated 
consensus can honestly be described as emanating from, and created or 
 
 
 145. As Bruce Ackerman points out, efforts to eliminate the false positive make the false negative 
more probable. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 132, at 29. 
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ratified by, We the People. Ordinary legislatures constitute a second source. 
Where state legislatures fail to embody the popular sovereign and ratify an 
amendment over which We the People have not fully deliberated or reached 
a discernable consensus, the amendment only emanates from ordinary 
legislatures.  
I will have more to say on these issues in Part IV.C. For now, however, 
let me turn to the second flaw in the orthodox argument that Article V’s 
popular constituent convention ratification route is not superfluous. The first 
flaw suggests that, under some circumstances, amendments passed via the 
state legislature route may not in any meaningful sense emanate from We the 
People. In short, even if we can honestly describe some  amendments that are 
passed via the state legislature route as a product of We the People, not all 
amendments ratified by that method can honestly be described in that 
manner. The second flaw, in contrast, goes to whether under any 
circumstances amendments that are created via the state legislature route can 
honestly and accurately be deemed to emanate from, or be ratified by, the 
popular sovereign.  
If the original understandings I have touched on have anything to say 
about the issue, amendments created via the state legislative route never 
should be thought of as emanating from the popular sovereign. In simplest 
terms, the orthodox idea that We the People exercise the sovereign right to 
create new constitutional textual norms through representatives in ordinary 
state legislative bodies does not square with well-known and unequivocal 
Founding Era understandings. As previously indicated, under the original 
understanding, popular constituent conventions,  but not state legislatures, 
were thought of as capable of operating as a conduit through which We the 
People might ratify new constitutional textual norms.146 Thus, from the 
perspective of original understandings, not only might the false positive 
agency problem mean that some amendments ratified by state legislatures 
cannot honestly be considered to be ratified by We the People, but 
ratification of constitutional textual norms by state legislatures in and of itself 
can never equate with ratification by We the People.  
The original understandings on this point deserve attention. Since the 
Founding Era, American constitutional theory has conceived of both the 
popular sovereign and legislative bodies as creators of legal norms. The kinds 
of norms they are permitted to generate, however, are completely separate 
and distinct. Legislative bodies, but not We the People, are thought of as 
competent to generate statutory norms. Indeed, a major premise of Federalist 
 
 
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 108-13. 
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thinking was the notion that We the People ought not have any direct 
involvement in the creation of sub-constitutional norms (i.e., statutes).147 In 
contrast, with respect to the creation of constitutional norms, the opposite 
assumption reigns. We the People are presumed to be the source of 
constitutional norms (operating through popular constituent conventions, and 
if the orthodoxy would have its way, through state legislatures). Ordinary 
state legislative bodies, on the other hand, have been thought incompetent to 
ratify or alter constitutions on behalf of the popular sovereign.148 The clearly 
demarcated institutional roles of We the People and legislative bodies 
emerged in the period between the Revolutionary and the Founding Eras.149  
During the American Revolution, legislative bodies were thought to be 
capable of fairly and accurately reflecting popular preferences. Legislatures, 
as highly responsive and populist institutions, were thought to embody the 
People in government.150 Given this assumption, legislative bodies were 
considered to be fully competent to ratify constitutional norms on behalf of 
the sovereign people.151 In short, during the optimistic Revolutionary period, 
Americans sought to build governments not only emanating from the People, 
but also governed by the People, through legislatures embodying the People. 
By the time of the Founding Era, however, the republican notion of a unity of 
interests within society,152 and the idea that legislative bodies would fairly 
 
 
 147. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, at 387 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) 
(stating that one feature of government under the proposed Constitution is that it “lies in the total 
exclusion of the people in their collective capacity” from government). Although the Federalist 
constitutional theory affords We the People an ample role in creating and amending the Constitution, it 
offers no such role to the People in everyday government, for example, in the generation of statutory 
norms. See, e.g., ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 121, at 179-86 (arguing that under Federalist 
constitutional theory, the People are not present in government). This model of government stands in 
sharp contrast to the Revolutionary Era aspiration that the people would not only create constitutions, 
but also govern through highly responsive and populist state legislatures. For a discussion of the 
Revolutionary Era idea that state legislatures embody the People in government, see ADAMS, supra 
note 108, at 230-36; GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 
162-73 (1969).  
 148. See sources cited supra note 147. 
 149. See id. 
 150. ADAMS, supra  note 108, at 235 (discussing the 1778 Whig statement that legislature should 
be a “miniature replica of society”); Gordon S. Wood, American Revolution and Constitu tional 
Theory, in 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 83-86 (Leonard W. Levy & Kenneth 
L. Karst eds., 2000); WOOD, supra  note 147, at 162-65 (discussing the Revolutionary Era idea that the 
legislature embodies the People in government).  
 151. ADAMS, supra note 108, at 63-64 (discussing how popular sovereignty theory was 
effectuated via state legislatures—the “full and free representation of the people” ratifying state 
constitutions); WOOD , supra  note 147, at 306 (stating that legislatures had been thought “competent” 
to ratify constitutions); González, supra note 98, at 656 (“At the time of the Declaration of 
Independence, legislatures were thought competent to act as the voice of the people in making and 
ratifying state constitutions.”). 
 152. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 77 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (warning of the 
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and accurately embody the People, had vanished.153 Experience with populist 
state legislatures engendered distrust of legislative bodies among American 
constitution builders.154 Practical experience brought about a subtle but 
profound shift in the postulates of popular sovereignty theory.155 Once 
disabused of naive assumptions, American constitutional theorists began to 
conceive of legislatures as a regular part of government just as likely to abuse 
the rights of the People as powerful executives.156 Legislative bodies, in 
short, came to be seen not as the People in government, but as separate and 
distinct from the People and as a threat to the rights of the People. 
With this new and less naive conceptualization of the relationship 
between the sovereign People and their agent legislative bodies, American 
constitutional theory at the time of the Founding Period roundly rejected the 
notion that legislative bodies could legitimately function as a conduit through 
which the People could ratify constitutional textual norms.157 The prevailing 
practice by the time of the Founding Period was to give the sovereign people 
a role in creating constitutions, either via direct popular ratification or via 
popular constituent conventions.158 Founding Era thinking was quite clear, 
however, in the idea that legislative bodies do not embody We the People, 
 
 
dangers of factions and describing an institutional frame of government aimed at limiting the evils of 
factions). 
 153. WOOD , supra note 147, at 403-09 (surveying the abuses committed by state legislative bodies 
in the Revolutionary Era). 
 154. Id. at 409-13 (surveying the growing popular distrust of legislatures); González, supra note 
98, at 647-52 (discussing the shift in attitude towards legislative bodies in the years following the 
Declaration of Independence). 
 155. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN 
ENGLAND AND AMERICA 255 (1988) (arguing that “the misuse by representatives of powers,” as seen 
in the state legislatures following the Revolution, caused a reappraisal of the theory of popular 
sovereignty, rather than its repudiation).  
 156. WOOD , supra note 147, at 447-48 (explaining that legislatures came to be seen not as the 
embodiment of the People, but as agents of the People—not superior to the other branches of 
government). 
 157. ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, THE ROOTS OF DEMOCRACY : AMERICAN THOUGHT AND CULTURE , 
1760-1800, at 90 (1990) (“It became apparent that if constitutions were to be made genuinely 
impervious to legislative tampering, they must be created by a power greater than the legislatures 
themselves.”); WOOD, supra note 147, at 328 (connecting distrust of legislative assemblies with the 
subsequent emergence of conventions as a mechanism for ratifying constitutions); González, supra 
note 98, at 657-58 (explaining that the idea that legislatures could ratify constitutions had died by the 
time of the Constitution’s creation); Leslie Friedman Goldstein, Popular Sovereignty, the Origins of 
Judicial Review and the Revival of Unwritten Law, 48 J. POL. 51, 61-62 (1986) (same). 
 158. DONALD S. LUTZ, POPULAR CONSENT AND POPULAR CONTROL 71 (1980) (“Initially, since 
the legislatures wrote the constitutions, the people gave consent indirectly through their 
representatives. However, beginning with the 1780 Massachusetts Constitution (the first one framed 
by a constitutional convention and ratified by the people), the people at large gave consent directly.”); 
WOOD , supra  note 147, at 342 (stating that by the 1780s, the convention method of constitutional 
creation had become “firmly established”). 
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and therefore are incompetent to ratify constitutions.159 Conventions embody 
the popular sovereign.160 Legislatures, like any other branch of government, 
are agents, rather than embodiments, of We the People. Legislatures make 
ordinary law, but not higher law. The popular sovereign makes higher law, 
but not ordinary law. For this reason, Article VII explicitly avoids ratification 
of the Constitution by state legislatures and instead insists upon ratification 
by popular constituent conventions, which were thought to be the appropriate 
mechanism by which the popular sovereign could sanction constitutional 
norms.161 
In short, the orthodox reading of Article V collides with the Founding Era 
distinction between the proper roles of legislative bodies and popular 
constituent conventions. Given the widely espoused notion that only popular 
constituent conventions, and not legislative bodies, were capable of 
embodying We the People, reading Article V’s state legislature ratification 
method as ratification by We the People is hard to countenance. If state 
legislatures are incompetent as a conduit through which the popular 
sovereign acts in ratifying the main body of the Constitution under Article 
VII,162 how could state legislatures be competent to serve as a conduit 
through which the popular sovereign acts in ratifying amendments to the 
Constitution under Article V? Given Founding Era understandings, the most 
plausible reading of Article V runs not on orthodox lines, but instead more 
along the lines of the dual-source thesis. The state legislature ratification 
 
 
 159. LUTZ, supra  note 158, at 72-74, 204, 207 (There was a transition from the Revolutionary Era 
practice of state legislatures drafting and ratifying constitutions to drafting by a special popular 
constituent convention and ratification by direct popular vote or by popular constituent convention. 
This shift was largely due to distrust in the ability of legislative bodies to reflect majoritarian 
preferences, changing concepts regarding the relationship between legislative bodies and the people, 
and a shift from Whig to Federalist political underpinnings.); WOOD, supra note 147, at 306, 328-43 
(discussing the distrust of legislative bodies and the shift from legislative ratification of constitutions 
to ratification by popular constituent conventions). 
 160. WOOD , supra  note 147, at 337-38 (“[A] convention was ‘in a special manner the epitome of 
the People.’ . . . [and] an act of the people . . . .”). See Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism , supra 
note 118, at 1459-61 & n.147 (reviewing the Founding Era notion that only conventions—not 
legislative bodies—could embody the People for purposes of ratifying constitutional norms).  
 161. James Madison and others at the Philadelphia Convention thought legislatures were 
incompetent to ratify the Constitution. They instead sought to submit the document to the People 
through the Article VII mechanism of popular constituent conventions. Madison repeatedly expressed 
that conventions, not legislatures, were the appropriate mechanism through which the People should 
ratify the Constitution. See RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION, reprinted in  4 THE FOUNDERS’ 
CONSTITUTION 648, 650, 652, 654 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). Furthermore, 
Madison stated, among other things, that the provision recommending ratification by conventions 
rather than legislatures was “essential” because the “Constitution should be ratified in the most 
unexceptional form, and by the supreme authority of the people themselves.” Id. at 648. Other 
delegates espoused similar views. Id. at 648, 650-51 (comments of Wilson, Mason, and Ghorum).  
 162. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. For the text of Article VII, see supra note 13. 
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route is not an alternative method to the popular constituent convention 
method by which the People create new constitutional norms. Instead, it is a 
way for normal law-making institutions to amend the Constitution. Without 
some extra-Article V indicia of a deliberated popular consensus, we ought 
not view constitutional amendments ratified by the state legislature as 
constitutional norms emanating from We the People. Only those 
constitutional norms created via popular constituent conventions ought to 
enjoy the presumption of a popular sovereignty pedigree. In contrast, the 
legal system should treat constitutional amendments ratified by three-fourths 
of the state legislatures presumptively as creations of normal law-creating 
institutions.163  
Not so fast, the champion of the orthodoxy will again cry in protest. 
Granted, Article V’s text may be interpreted as setting up two methods of 
ratification by which either the popular sovereign or ordinary legislative 
bodies ratify new constitutional textual amendments. And perhaps the 
Founding Era understanding of the role of popular constituent conventions 
and state legislative bodies relating to Article VII did in fact dictate that only 
the former could operate as a conduit through which We the People ratified 
 
 
 163. Akhil Amar has advanced a somewhat similar interpretation of Article V. See Amar, The 
Consent of the Governed , supra  note 111, at 459. Amar argues that Article V offers a method by which 
“ordinary Government—Congress and the state legislatures—can change the Constitution . . . . It 
merely specifies how ordinary Government can amend the Constitution without recurring to the P eople 
themselves . . . .” Id. We the People, however, retain a popular sovereign-derived legal right to alter or 
abolish government outside the confines of Article V mechanisms. Id. See also Akhil Reed Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Amendment, in  RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE THEORY 
AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT 89 (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995) [hereinafter Amar, 
Popular Sovereignty]; Akhil Reed Amar, Philadelphia Revisited: Amending the Constitution Outside 
Article V, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1043 (1988) [hereinafter Amar, Philadelphia Revisited]. There are two 
key differences between Amar’s reading of Article V, and my own reading. First, my dual-source 
reading is offered merely for rhetorical purposes, and is inteneded only to show that the orthodox 
interpretation is not the only plausible reading of Article V. Amar, on the other hand, advances his 
interpretation as the best possible reading of Article V. Second, the dual-source reading of Article V 
contemplates that We the People may ratify constitutional amendments through Article V when 
popular constituent conventions (not state legislatures) ratify a proposed amendment. The Amarian 
reading of Article V, in contrast, apparently views Article V only as a way for government institutions 
to ratify amendments. Amar does not seem to acknowledge the possibility that the popular sovereign 
might act through popular constituent conventions organized in the states.  See Amar, The Consent of 
the Governed , supra note 111, at 460 (“Article V is Government-driven: if exclusive, it gives ordinary 
Government officials—Congress and the state legislatures—a monopoly on initiating the process of 
constitutional change.”). Despite this difference, I thoroughly agree with the idea central to Amar’s 
reading of Article V—that popular sovereignty means We the People can always alter, abolish, or 
replace constitutional norms, and can do so in ways not specified in the Constitution. In any political 
system constructed upon popular sovereignty foundations, the People always enjoy an inalienable right 
to alter constitutional norms. Moreover, Amar presumably never squarely considered whether ratifying 
amendments via the convention method is tantamount to ratification by We the People. He was most 
likely too immersed in developing his novel extra-Article V constitutional amendment theory to have 
focused on what, for his purposes, would have been a side issue. 
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the Constitution’s main body. But surely the original intent behind Article V 
itself—the debates centering specifically on the meaning of Article V—will 
make it abundantly clear that its words should be read as providing two 
methods by which one entity—We the People—can create new 
constitutional textual norms. Curiously, however, Article V’s original intent 
fails to provide a definitive answer on the issue. In the first instance, the 
framers dedicated relatively little time to Article V during the Philadelphia 
Drafting Convention. Any inferences that one may draw from this omission 
must be tempered by the fact that “consideration of amending procedures 
was one of the least adequate of the Convention debates.”164 What little 
evidence of Article V’s original intent that we have, however, does not aid 
the orthodox view of ratification.  
The delegates at the Philadelphia Convention never clarified whether 
ratification of amendments by state legislatures is tantamount to ratification 
by We the People. Early on at the Philadelphia Convention, the delegates 
agreed, without much controversy, on the need for an amendment provision, 
but postponed consideration of its content.165 In early August, 1787, the 
Committee of Detail submitted the following amendment clause to the 
Convention: “On the application of the Legislature of two thirds of the States 
in the Union, for an amendment of this Constitution, the Legislature of the 
United States shall call a Convention for that purpose.”166  
Up to this point, and for much of the Convention, the amendment 
provision made no reference to state legislative bodies or state popular 
constituent conventions as ratifiers of proposed constitutional amendments. 
Not until seven days before the Convention adjourned did the amendment 
provision receive significant attention. On September 10, 1787, the 
Convention agreed to reconsider the amendment clause.167 On that date, 
James Madison proposed the following language as a substitute for the 
language submitted by the Committee on Detail in August:  
 
 
 164. THORNTON ANDERSON, CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE 
FIRST CONGRESS 161 (1993).  
 165. 1 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 22, 121-22, 202-03 (Max Farrand 
ed., rev. 1937) [hereinafter FEDERAL CONVENTION] (resolution favoring amendment provision 
approved on May 29, 1787; issue of whether amendment should require assent of national legislature 
postponed on June 5, 1787, and again postponed on June 11, 1787). The Philadelphia Convention 
convened on May 25, 1787, and adjourned on September 17, 1787. 1 1787 DRAFTING THE U.S. 
CONSTITUTION 3 (Wilbourn E. Benton ed., 1986).  
 166. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 113, at 188. Text of Article XIX was introduced for 
consideration by the Committee on Detail on August 6, 1787. Id. On August 30, 1787, the Convention 
agreed to Article XIX without dissent. Id. at 467-68.  
 167. Id. at 557-58. 
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The Legislature of the U– S– whenever two thirds of both Houses 
shall deem necessary, or on the application of two thirds of the 
Legislatures of the several States, shall propose amendments to this 
Constitution, which shall be valid to all intents and purposes as part 
thereof, when the same shall have been ratified by three fourths at 
least of the Legislatures of the several States, or by Conventions in 
three fourths thereof, as one or the other mode of ratification may be 
proposed by the Legislature of the U.S.168  
The Convention tentatively approved Madison’s language, and agreed to 
reconsider the amendment clause at a later time.169 On September 12, 1787, 
the Committee of Style reported a draft of the Constitution, which included 
Article V language nearly identical to Madison’s proposal.170 As such, on 
September 10, 1787, only one week before the Convention would adjourn, 
the binary amendment ratification language emerged.171 Madison left no 
contemporaneous explanation for his choice of both state legislatures and 
conventions as ratifiers of proposed amendments. More to the point, he said 
nothing that suggests whether he considered both state legislative bodies and 
popular constituent conventions capable of embodying We the People for 
purposes of amending the Constitution.172  
Article V’s amendment provisions received one last treatment by the 
delegates on September 15, 1787, just two days before adjournment.173 
 
 
 168. Id. at 559 (emphasis added). It was also on this date that an entrenchment clause ensuring 
that no amendment to the Slave Trade Clause of Article I, prior to 1808, would be added to what 
would become Article V. Id. 
 169. Id.  
 170. See id. at 602 & nn.25-29. 
 171. Id. at 557-59. 
 172. Madison expressed concern with the vagueness of the initial amendment provision. That 
provision allowed a convention to consider amendments. Id. at 558. Madison asked, “How was a 
convention to be formed? by what rule decide? what the force of its acts?” Id. at 558. Perhaps 
Madison’s proposal to allow three-fourths of either state legislatures or state-organized popular 
constituent conventions to ratify proposed amendments was aimed at nothing more than providing 
more clarity and certainty than the previously proposed amendment provision. Another possibility is 
that Madison had federalism concerns in mind when proposing his binary ratification modality 
language. The previously proposed amendment provision gave the states a role in proposing 
amendments, but appeared to give ratification power to a national constitutional convention to be 
convened by Congress. See 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra  note 110, at 188. Madison’s version, in 
contrast, gave the states a definite role not only in the proposal of amendments, but also in their 
ratification. Madison’s language could have been primarily aimed at placating delegates who were 
concerned that the amendment process could be used to weaken the states. It is even conceivable that 
in offering language aimed at placating such delegates, Madison himself did not think of consequences 
beyond the federalism implications of granting both state legislatures and conventions the power to 
ratify proposed amendments. 
 173. Id. at 629. 
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Various objections and proposed changes were advanced.174 None, however, 
touched on the meaning of Article V’s dual amendment ratification 
mechanisms, or whether We the People could use both mechanisms to create 
new constitutional textual norms.175 George Mason of Virginia, an advocate 
of state power, unconvincingly argued that Article V made the amendment 
process too difficult and relied too heavily on Congress.176 Roger Sherman of 
Connecticut sought to add two entrenchment clauses, one prohibiting any 
amendment that might affect the internal police of the states, and the other 
prohibiting amendments that would deprive the states of equal representation 
in the Senate.177 Only the second entrenchment clause ultimately became part 
of Article V.178 Governeur Morris of Pennsylvania and Elbridge Gerry of 
Massachusetts moved successfully to add a clause requiring Congress to call 
a constitutional convention at the request of two-thirds of the state 
legislatures.179 A handful of additional unsuccessful motions were made by 
Sherman, Gerry, and others. No such motions, however, touched on the 
meaning of Article V’s binary amendment mechanism.180  
Close scrutiny of the entire Convention record relating to the amendment 
provision offers nothing that would indicate that the Framers considered the 
dual amendment mechanism. Instead, the Convention debates on the 
amendment clause, as sparse as they were, concentrated on the federalism 
issues of whether the states, as opposed to Congress, played a sufficient role 
in the amendment process, whether the states would be protected from 
amendments aimed at weakening them, and whether the various proposed 
amendment provisions made the process too difficult. For example, on the 
state protection issue, Elbridge Gerry expressed concern regarding the 
August Committee on Detail amendment provision, claiming that a national 
constitutional convention with the sole power to ratify amendments could 
adopt “innovations that might subvert the State Constitutions altogether.”181 
Similarly, Roger Sherman suggested that equal state suffrage in the Senate 
Clause was aimed at protecting the states (or at least the small states) from 
future amendments that might degrade their power.182 Finally, George Mason 
 
 
 174. See id. 
 175. See id. 
 176. Id. 
 177. Id.  
 178. See U.S. CONST. art. V; 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra note 113, at 631 (Equal suffrage of 
States in the Senate language, suggested earlier by Roger Sherman, was approved without a formal 
vote on a motion by Governeur Morris.). 
 179. 2 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra  note 113, at 629-30. 
 180. Id. at 630. 
 181. Id. at 557-58.  
 182. See supra note 172. 
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expressed the common federalism concern with the balance of power 
between the national and state governments and of granting exclusive power 
to Congress to propose amendments.183  
Following adjournment of the Philadelphia Convention, both public 
discourse on the proposed Constitution and debates in the state ratifying 
conventions repeated the amendment provision controversies present at the 
Philadelphia Convention, but failed to address whether ratification of 
amendments by state legislatures would be tantamount to ratification by We 
the People. As in Philadelphia, Article V was not a central issue in the state 
ratifying conventions.184 Unlike the Philadephia Convention, however, the 
state ratification convention records contain a few explicit references to 
Article V as a way for We the People to alter higher law.185 Yet even here, 
such expressions failed to specify exactly how the People act through Article 
V mechanisms. For example, in the Massachusetts Convention, delegate 
Rufus King spoke of Article V as a mechanism by which “the people had . . . 
an opportunity to correct any abuse.”186 King, however, failed to specify 
exactly how We the People may act through Article V mechanisms. Did 
King believe that the state legislatures, as well as state conventions (similar 
to the ratifying convention in which he was taking part) could embody We 
the People? Or when he spoke of Article V as a method by which We the 
People might “correct any abuse,” was he thinking only of the convention 
method of amendment ratification? Or is it that none of these subtleties even 
occurred to King? Because King never clarified his thoughts, we will never 
know. King’s comment is too uncertain and ambiguous to advance the 
orthodox reading of Article V.  
Federalist commentaries leading up to ratification are equally unavailing. 
Discussion of Article V in the Federalist Papers is just as hazy on the 
intended meaning of Article V’s binary ratification mechanisms as were 
King’s comments during the Massachusetts Convention. For example, in 
Federalist No. 49 Madison wrote of Article V as a means by which We the 
People might resolve interbranch constitutional disputes. Expressing caution 
 
 
 183. 1 FEDERAL CONVENTION, supra  note 165, at 202-03. 
 184. Kurt T. Lash, Rejecting Conventional Wisdom: Federalist Ambivalence in the Framing and 
Implementation of Article V, 38 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 197, 211 (1994) (“Article V aroused little 
controversy in the state ratification conventions.”). Professor Lash notes that “there is no record of 
discussions regarding Article V in the state ratification conventions of Delaware, New Jersey, Georgia, 
Maryland, or New Hampshire.” Id. at 211 n.86.  
 185. Id. at 211 n.87 (citing statements in the Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Connecticut 
ratification conventions that spoke of Article V as a way for the People to amend the constitution).  
 186. 2 ELLIOT’S DEBATES ON FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 116 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1836); Lash, 
supra  note 184, at 211; Henry Paul Monaghan, We The People[s], Original Understanding, and 
Constitutional Amendment, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 121, 155 (1996).  
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regarding future use of Article V, Madison argued that “a constitutional road 
to the decision of the people [via Article V] ought to be marked out and kept 
open, for certain great and extraordinary occasions.”187 Clearly Madison 
believed that We the People may act through Article V’s legalistic 
mechanism. But how? Madison’s reference to Article V as a “road to the 
decision of the People” is certainly consistent with the idea that both 
ratification mechanisms, approval by state legislatures and by conventions, 
embody We the People. But consistency does not justify the orthodox 
reading of Article V. Nowhere does Madison specify whether ratification by 
state legislatures, as opposed to ratification via popular constituent 
conventions, constitutes a “road to the decision of the People.” Madison may 
very well have believed that only conventions, not state legislative bodies, 
constitute the Article V “road . . . to the people.” But Madison may have held 
the opposite belief, or he may have failed to consider the issue. At any rate, 
his allusion to Article V as a “road . . . to the People” is consistent with both 
the orthodox and dual-source readings of Article V. The problem we face 
today is that his comments do not address and decide the precise issue of 
whether state legislatures embody We the People for purposes of ratifying 
constitutional amendments, or in the alternative, operate as ordinary 
government institutions.  
The writings of the Anti-Federalists also fail to illuminate the issue.188 In 
public debate, the Anti-Federalists focused on the weaknesses in Article V 
that they had seized upon during the Philadelphia Convention.189 First, they 
vociferously argued that Article V made an amendment too remote a 
possibility. “An Old Whig,” for example, lamented, “I would full as soon sit 
down and take my chance of winning an important privilege to the people, by 
the casting the dice ’till I could throw sixes an hundred times in succession” 
before securing amendment under Article V.190 Similarly, another Anti-
Federalist, qualified Article V as “a cunning way of saying that no alteration 
 
 
 187. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 314 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).  
 188. See Lash, supra  note 184, at 216-19 (summarizing Anti-Federalist public opposition to 
Article V).  
 189. Brannon P. Denning, Means to Amend: Theories of Constitutional Change, 65 TENN. L. REV. 
155 (1997) (critics of Article V raised the same issues in press debates and state ratifying conventions). 
 190. An Old Whig (VIII),  PHILADELPHIA INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Feb. 6, 1788, reprinted in 
XVI THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY  OF THE RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION: COMMENTARIES ON 
THE CONSTITUTION PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 56 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1986). 
See also  JACKSON TURNER MAIN, THE ANTIFEDERALISTS:  CRITICS OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1781-
1788, at 161 (1961) (Anti-Federalists feared that the amendment under Article V would be too 
difficult); Lash, supra  note 184, at 218-19 (discussing comments of the Anti-Federalists that suggested 
that Article V made amendment too difficult).  
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shall ever be made.”191 Second, the Anti-Federalists emphasized their belief 
that the national government would dominate the amendment process under 
Article V. As one scholar recounts, the Anti-Federalist “Centinal” argued at 
least twice that Article V gave Congress too much control over the 
amendment process.192  
In short, the record on the intended meaning of the words “ratified by the 
Legislatures of three fourths of the several states, or by Conventions in three 
fourths thereof” is scant and therefore entirely indeterminate. The record of 
the Philadelphia Convention, the state ratifying conventions, and the public 
debates leading up to ratification show no signs that the meaning of Article 
V’s binary amendment ratification methods were considered, or subjected to 
protracted deliberation. Much like the text of Article V as a whole, the 
drafters, ratifiers, and commentators of the Founding Era simply did not 
directly confront the meaning of Article V’s two amendment ratification 
methods.193 As such, the orthodox reading of Article V cannot easily be 
confirmed by reference to the original intent behind Article V.  
Granted, the record of Article V’s original understanding is hardly a 
smoking gun in support of the dual-source interpretation. Nowhere, in other 
words, will we find a leading participant in the Founding Era debates over 
Article V who suggests that Article V provides for ratification by state 
legislatures, thus allowing ordinary government institutions to alter the 
Constitution. Nor will we find any participants in Founding Era debates who 
suggest that Article V provides for ratification by conventions, so that We the 
People might create new constitutional textual norms. The Founding 
generation’s failure to address the issue, at the very least, leaves the 
orthodoxy and the alternative dual-source reading of Article V on equal 
footing. Neither interpretation can find direct, decisive support from evidence 
of Article V’s original intent.  
If anything, a dual-source reading of Article V appears more plausible 
than the orthodox interpretation. The orthodoxy depends on the  possibility of 
state legislatures embodying the popular sovereign and operating as a conduit 
through which We the People ratify constitutional textual norms. Original 
 
 
 191. Denning, supra note 189, at 166 (citing An Old Whig  [George Bryan et al.] I, PHILADELPHIA 
INDEPENDENT GAZETTEER, Oct. 12, 1787, reprinted in  1 THE DEBATE ON THE CONSTITUTION: 
FEDERALIST AND ANTIFEDERALIST SPEECHES, ARTICLES, AND LETTERS DURING THE STRUGGLE OVER 
RATIFICATION 122-23 (Bernard Bailyn ed., 1993)). 
 192. Denning, supra note 189, at 166-67 (discussing two different occasions on which Samuel 
Bryan objected to Article V) (citations omitted). 
 193. ANDERSON, supra  note 164, at 161 (“No evidence appears in the records that the delegates 
evaluated the alternatives in terms of their implications for the locus of sovereignty; the word was 
never used.”). 
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understandings developed in connection with Article VII, however, rejected 
the idea that the legislative bodies are the People in government or that 
legislatures can embody We the People for purposes of ratifying 
constitutional textual norms. The lack of specific evidence to support the 
orthodoxy regarding the original understanding of Article V tilts the balance, 
and makes it difficult to conceive that state legislative bodies embodying We 
the People for purposes of creating constitutional amendments was the intent 
behind Article V.194  
This analysis brings us back to the orthodoxy’s inescapable dilemma: The 
orthodox insistence that all amendments ratified pursuant to Article V, 
whether ratified by state legislatures or popular constituent conventions, have 
been ratified by We the People, renders one (or both) of the ratification 
methods superfluous. If legislatures embody the popular sovereign and if We 
the People can operate through legislatures to ratify amendments, why 
include the second popular constituent convention method of ratification? 
We must read the Constitution to give each of its phrases and words 
meaning.195 The most natural reading of Article V, therefore, is the dual-
source reading, which suggests that Article V sets out two separate and 
distinct ratification methods by which two separate and distinct entities may 
ratify new constitutional textual norms: (1) We the People ratify amendments 
though popular constituent conventions organized in the states. (2) The 
government ratifies amendments through state legislative bodies.  
Of course this argument is a bit of a ruse. My survey of Article V and 
Article VII original understandings is just that—a survey. The arguments and 
evidence enumerated above will not suffice to convince even myself that my 
alternative reading of Article V offers the “correct” interpretation and that the 
orthodoxy is “wrong.” Article V’s inscribed words are open-ended, and 
subject to multiple plausible interpretations. My proposed alternative reading 
is just one among several plausible interpretations of Article V. The dual-
source thesis, therefore, is neither “right” nor “wrong.” The dual-source 
theory, however, is a plausible way to read Article V. In the final analysis, 
my quick survey of the original intent of Article V and VII is too cursory to 
decide the issue one way or the other. I will have to dig deeper and look at 
the issue from more angles in order to confidently conclude that the orthodox 
reading of Article V is wrong, and that the dual-source reading is correct.  
 
 
 194. This point, however, ought not be pushed too far. It is entirely possible that the Constitution’s 
drafters, ratifiers, and commentators simply did not devote much thought to, or fully comprehend, the 
subtle issue of whether or not Article V offers two ways for We the People to ratify constitutional 
amendments.  
 195. See cases cited supra  note 143 and accompanying text. 
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I am confident that a fuller analysis will show that the orthodoxy finds no 
support in the original understanding of Article V. That fuller analysis, 
however, deserves its own separate treatment, which I will supply in due 
course. Here, however, my aims are limited to tracing a broader line of 
argument. I will be content at this stage of the game to have piqued your 
interest, to have persuaded you that the orthodoxy rests on controvertible 
foundations, and to have convinced you that my alternative reading of Article 
V is in fact quite credible. Hopefully I have convinced you that neither 
Article V’s text nor original intent decisively addresses or answers the issue 
of the source or sources of constitutional amendments, but that the dual-
source interpretation is, at least, healthy competition for the orthodox reading 
of Article V.  
Ultimately, if we want to understand the true sources of amendments, we 
will have to look outside the confines of Article V’s text and original 
understandings. Yet, as we shall see, in looking outside of Article V, we must 
not make the mistake of looking past Article V, for embedded therein lies a 
peculiar principal-agent norm-generating mechanism that proves to be the 
key to the orthodoxy’s ultimate unraveling. 
C. Article V’s Principal-Agent Mechanism and the False Positive Problem  
From where do constitutional amendments originate? Why must we ask 
this strange question? After all, do we not usually have a pretty solid grasp of 
the sources of legal norms? As we saw in Part II, legal norms emanate from 
four basic norm-generating entities: the popular sovereign, legislatures, 
administrative agencies, and courts. Statutes emanate from legislatures (with 
Chief Executive approval), regulations emanate from administrative 
agencies, and common law norms emanate from courts. The orthodoxy tells 
us that constitutional norms, in general, and constitutional amendments, in 
particular, originate in We the People. Yet in Part IV.B we saw that the 
orthodoxy finds little support in Article V. Perhaps our grasp on the sources 
of constitutional amendments is less solid than we have presumed.  
Or is it? So far I have done little to actually refute the orthodox idea that 
all constitutional amendments derive from We the People. Just because 
Article V does not provide definitive support for the orthodoxy does not 
necessarily mean that the orthodoxy is wrong. Even though Article V does 
not address the issue, it nonetheless may be the case that constitutional 
amendments actually do emanate from We the People. Ultimately, the issue 
is not the meaning of Article V, but rather the concrete truths of practice. 
Both the orthodoxy and the dual-source thesis are descriptive claims. They 
make assertions about the sources of constitutional amendments in practice. 
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Thus, in the final analysis, they will stand or fall on whether they capture the 
reality of constitutional law in practice. The meaning and intent behind 
Article V cannot really get us very far towards understanding that reality, or 
more specifically towards understanding the true sources of constitutional 
amendments. Even if Article V spoke directly and unambiguously on the 
issue, we still would have to look beyond Article V to understand the true 
sources of constitutional amendments. Declarations etched into constitutions 
cannot transform fictions into truths. Does anyone believe that the 
proclamation of a “People’s Democratic Republic” engraved in a document 
called a constitution can turn a dictatorship into a democracy? Likewise, even 
if Article V began with the words “All constitutional amendments emanate 
from We the People,” we nonetheless would have to examine the real world 
processes by which amendments come into being in order to determine their 
true sources.196  
The ultimate inquiry, therefore, does not center on the meaning of Article 
V, but instead on the practical reality of the creation of constitutional 
amendments. Either the presumption underlying the orthodox justification for 
judicial review and orthodox reading of Article V—all constitutional textual 
norms, including amendments, are sourced in the popular sovereign—or the 
dual-source thesis—some constitutional textual norms are the creation of the 
popular sovereign while others are creations of state legislatures alone—
more closely describes and captures how constitutional textual norms 
realistically come into being.  
My fundamental claim is the following: Any serious analysis can only 
conclude that at least some constitutional amendments cannot be fairly and 
honestly characterized as sourced in We the People. At least some 
constitutional amendments quite clearly can only be described as created by 
legislative bodies that in no way embody an act of constitutional norm 
creation by the popular sovereign. These amendments satisfy the formal 
requirements of Article V’s state legislature ratification method, but do not 
bear a legitimate popular sovereignty pedigree. For this reason, the dual-
source thesis better describes the sources of constitutional amendments than 
does the orthodoxy. 
 
 
 196. I recognize, however, that inscribed words in a constitution can, by establishing a particular 
process, help bring about their own truth. By establishing a regular and legalistic process for amending 
the Constitution, Article V may prompt political entrepreneurs to channel popular reform efforts 
through its mechanisms. It is a deliberative popular consensus that sanctions constitutional reform, 
however, rather than formal satisfaction of Article V’s requirements, which signals a constitutional 
amendment emanating from We the People.  
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How do I arrive at such an unconventional conclusion? First, let me color 
the orthodoxy in the most favorable light. In Part IV.B we saw that the most 
sympathetic case for the orthodox approach to the origins of constitutional 
amendments runs as follows: Both state legislatures and popular constituent 
conventions can embody We the People. As such, ratification via both state 
legislatures and popular constituent conventions is tantamount to ratification 
by We the People. Article V’s dual amendment ratification methods are not 
redundant or superfluous. Article V’s convention route operates as a safety 
valve available when the state legislatures might fail to ratify an amendment 
that We the People have embraced and sanctioned after meaningful 
deliberation. This version of the orthodoxy offers a plausible Article V 
interpretation that does not violate fundamental principles of constitutional 
interpretation. Yet, even this most sympathetic version of the orthodoxy runs 
up against the original understanding of the proper roles of state legislatures 
and constituent conventions in ratifying constitutional textual norms. No 
matter. Again, the issue here centers not on the meaning of Article V, but 
instead on practical truths. Therefore, despite the original understandings, let 
us assume, as does this most sympathetic version of the orthodoxy, that state 
legislatures can embody We the People, and that ratification of a 
constitutional amendment by state legislative bodies can be tantamount to 
ratification by We the People.  
Even conceding this much, however, it is still impossible to conclude, as 
does the orthodoxy, that all constitutional amendments created pursuant to 
Article V’s mechanisms ipso facto  emanate from, or are generated or ratified 
by, We the People. Why is this so?  
Consider the processes by which constitutional and sub-constitutional 
norms come into being. Generally, the entity identified as the source of a 
particular kind of legal norm is the same entity charged with undertaking and 
completing a series of formal steps culminating in the creation of that kind of 
legal norm. For example, Congress (with Chief Executive approval) is 
identified as the source of statutes, and Congress is the entity that undertakes 
the formal procedural steps which culminate in the passage of statutes. 
Congress passes a statute through majority approval of both houses and with 
the consent of the Chief Executive. Likewise, regulatory agencies are 
identified as the sources of regulations and are the entities responsible for 
moving a potential regulation through the obstacle course of informal notice 
and comment rulemaking procedures. An agency regulation is created when 
an agency undertakes and satisfies the required steps of notice and comment 
rulemaking, which culminates with the agency announcing a new regulation 
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in the Code of Federal Regulations.197 In a like manner, the courts are 
identified as the source of common law rules and the institution responsible 
for their elaboration through the litigation process. Common law rules come 
into being when a court decides a novel issue and publishes its holding in an 
authorized case reporter. The creation of statutes, regulations, and common 
law rules share a common theme—the entity commonly identified as the 
source of the norm is inexorably responsible for executing the formal steps 
required to create the norm.  
The method for creating constitutional textual norms, however, is 
fundamentally different. In the constitutional context, the popular sovereign 
is the purported source of constitutional textual norms. However, other 
entities, such as popular constituent conventions or state legislatures, are 
charged with executing the formal steps required to establish a constitutional 
textual norm. We the People never directly generate norms, as do 
legislatures, administrative agencies, and courts, which respectively generate 
statutes, regulations, and common law rules. This principal-agent198 system 
of norm generation is codified into Articles V and VII of the Constitution. 
Under Article VII, popular constituent conventions ratified the main body of 
the Constitution on behalf of We the People.199 Under Article V, either 
popular constituent conventions or state legislatures ratify constitutional 
amendments on behalf of We the People.200 Principal-agency relationships 
are not unknown in the generation of legal norms. In fact, they are quite 
common. The principal-agent mechanism employed in the creation of 
constitutional textual norms, however, exhibits unique features. Only in the 
constitutional context do we find the creation of a norm by one entity—state 
legislatures or conventions—characterized as tantamount to creation of that 
norm by another entity—We the People.  
Compare the principal-agent mechanisms used in the creation of 
constitutional amendments with those used in the creation of administrative 
regulations. In the constitutional arena, Article V allows state legislatures to 
ratify norms in the name of We the People. On the orthodox view, when a 
state legislature approves a proposed constitutional amendment, it speaks not 
for itself, but as the embodiment or personification of We the People. 
Administrative norm creation also employs a principal-agent relationship. 
 
 
 197. 1 DAVIS & P IERCE , JR., supra note 41, § 7.1. 
 198. For a brief overview of principal-agent relationships, see THRÁINN EGGERTSSON, ECONOMIC 
BEHAVIOR AND INSTITUTIONS 40-45 (1990). For a seminal article on principal-agent relationships, see 
Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs 
and Capital Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305 (1976). 
 199. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. 
 200. See U.S. CONST. art. V. 
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Congress, which creates statutes, plays the role of the principal, and agencies, 
which create regulations that implement statutes, assume the role of agents.  
Administrative agencies however, are only empowered to create regulations. 
They cannot generate statutes in Congress’s stead. Were the principal-agent 
mechanism used in administrative norm generation parallel to the principal-
agent mechanism used in constitutional amendment generation, agencies 
would create statutes in the name of Congress. The nondelegation doctrine, 
however, clearly prohibits this sort of agency mechanism.201 The principal-
agent relationship between Congress and administrative agencies is 
characterized by the delegation of proscribed authority, the confines of which 
are set by a congressionally-generated statutory scheme, and which creates 
norms of an inferior hierarchical status. The principal-agent relationship 
employed in the creation of constitutional amendments, however, is entirely 
distinct and unique. Only in this situation does the agent, which is 
purportedly empowered to create norms of the very highest order, act in the 
name of the principal. Again, at least if the orthodoxy has its way, because 
state legislatures embody We the People, ratification of a constitutional 
amendment by state legislative bodies is tantamount to ratification of a 
constitutional amendment by We the People. In contrast, administrative 
agencies are not thought to embody Congress, and creation of an 
administrative regulation by an agency is never considered tantamount to the 
creation of a statute by Congress.202 
By utilizing a principal-agent mechanism to ratify constitutional 
amendments, Article V opens the door to the ubiquitous agency problem.203 
Principal-agent relationships cannot avoid situations where the agent fails to 
do that which the principal wants done, acts before the principal is prepared 
 
 
 201. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 529 (1935) (“The 
Congress is not permitted to abdicate or to transfer to others the essential legislative function with 
which it is thus vested.”). 
 202. The principal-agent relationship found in the creation of administrative norms is similar in 
structure to other common principal-agent relationships found in the generation of other kinds of 
norms. The conventional view of statutory norm creation, for example, holds that Congress is the 
principal that creates the statutory textual norm, while the courts operate as Congress’s agents in 
elaborating statutory doctrin al norms. See González, supra note 98, at 624-33 (describing major 
normative theories of statutory interpretation as all-conceiving of the relationship between Congress 
and the courts as a principal-agent relationship). Similar to the way that administrative agencies 
elaborate congressional mandates, courts elaborate the statutory commands of Congress. In so doing, 
the courts do not claim that judicial interpretation of a statute is tantamount to Congress interpreting 
the statute. Instead, the courts merely claim to interpret a statute according to the statutory command 
created by the principal legislature. 
 203. See Jensen & Meckling, supra  note 198, at 309 (describing the “generality of the agency 
problem [as] the problem of inducing an ‘agent’ to behave as if he were maximizing the ‘principal’s 
welfare’”). 
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to act, or even engages in self-dealing behavior against the interests or desires 
of the principal. The agency problem appears in other norm-generating 
contexts that employ principal-agent mechanisms. Returning to the creation 
of administrative regulations, in some instances the agent administrative 
agencies create regulations which cannot be squared with delegated authority 
that is codified in the legislative principal’s statutory scheme.204 In other 
situations an administrative agency will create a regulation prematurely, prior 
to actual Congressional deliberation and a decision to delegate authority.205 
Such errors are the inevitable price of the principal-agent mechanism. Just as 
they occur in the creation of administrative norms, they also occur in the 
creation of constitutional amendments.  
There is, however, a crucial difference between the consequences of the 
agency problem in the administrative law context and the constitutional 
amendment context. That difference stems from the aforementioned distinct 
roles that the agents play in different contexts when they create new norms. 
The agent in the constitutional amendment ratification game claims to be 
doing something quite extraordinary. Again, in ratifying constitutional 
amendments the agent state legislatures (at least on the orthodox view) 
purports to embody or personify the principal People—and to create a legal 
norm in the name of the principal people. When state legislatures ratify a 
constitutional amendment, the claim is that We the People (indirectly) have  
ratified that constitutional amendment. An administrative agency never 
makes so bold a claim. In the administrative context, the agent merely claims 
to have generated a hierarchically lower order norm that falls within the 
scope of the principal’s legislative delegation. An agency never claims to 
embody the legislative principal, or to have created a statutory norm in the 
name of the legislative principal.  
The unique and extraordinary claim of agent state legislatures gives rise 
to an equally unique agency problem. In the typical principal-agent 
relationship, agency problems involve the agent going beyond or against the 
interests or directives of the principal. Thus, when an administrative agency 
creating a regulation arguably acts ultra vires, the following question arises: 
Does the regulation go beyond the scope of the statutory authority delegated 
by the principal? If it does, the regulation may be nullified upon judicial 
 
 
 204. See, e.g., ETSI Pipeline Project v. Missouri, 484 U.S. 495, 517 (1988) (agencies may not 
exercise authority “in a manner that is inconsistent with the administrative structure that Congress 
enacted into law”). 
 205. See, e.g., Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 
(2000) (striking down FDA tobacco regulation for exceeding the scope of the regulatory authority 
delegated by Congress). 
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review.206 In the constitutional amendment context, however, the unique 
claims of the agent state legislatures give rise to an entirely different kind of 
uncertainty. Here, the agency problem is not of some act beyond the scope of 
authority delegated by the principal, but rather the agent failing to act in the 
name of the principal. A breakdown of the principal-agent mechanism in this 
context means that the agent fails to embody or personify the principal. The 
following kinds of uncertainties loom: Did the agent in fact embody the 
principal and thereby fail to ratify a constitutional amendment in the name of 
the principal? In other words, have We the People actually  spoken through 
our agent state legislatures? Or, have the agent state legislatures spoken 
before We the People have arrived at a deliberated consensus sanctioning the 
creation of new higher law, or spoken in a way which differs from We the 
People’s deliberated consensus? In short, an agency problem in the 
constitutional amendment ratification context raises the possibility that an 
amendment ratified by three-fourths of the state legislatures has not been 
(indirectly) ratified by We the People. A breakdown here could take the form 
of state legislatures ratifying constitutional amendments over which We the 
People have failed to engage and deliberate. Or it could take the form of state 
legislatures ratifying constitutional amendments over which popular 
deliberation has occurred, but not yet ripened into a discernable popular 
consensus sanctioning the creation of new higher law principles in the name 
of We the People. Or it could take the form of state legislatures ratifying 
constitutional amendments at variance from (or diametrically opposed to) a 
discernable and fully deliberated popular consensus. 
This kind of agency problem is fatal to the orthodox view that each and 
every amendment that achieves the approval of three-fourths of the state 
legislatures ipso facto  constitutes ratification by We the People. The best 
version of the orthodox view insists that state legislatures can embody the 
popular sovereign. But do they always embody the popular sovereign? At 
least in some cases, the agency problems inherent within Article V’s 
principal-agent mechanism will undeniably result in the malfunctioning of 
the agent state legislatures as an embodiment of We the People and, 
consequently, in the ratification of amendments that cannot be described as 
emanating from We the People.  
The orthodoxy concedes the existence of agency problems inherent in 
Article V. Again, in order to avoid redundancy of Article V’s two 
amendment ratification methods, the orthodoxy must admit the possibility of 
 
 
 206. See, e.g. , Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding 
that a court may nullify an agency regulation where the regulation is an unreasonable interpretation of 
the statute). 
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cases where the agent state legislatures fail to ratify amendments that the 
principal popular sovereign has, after arriving at a deliberated consensus, 
embraced. Thus, even the most sympathetic version of the orthodoxy cannot 
escape the agency problem inherent in Article V’s principal-agent 
amendment ratification mechanism.  
Technically, the orthodoxy has not conceded the existence of the agency 
problem that would produce constitutional amendments, which, although 
ratified by state legislatures, lack any meaningful popular sovereignty 
pedigree. By admitting the possibility that the agent state legislatures may 
fail to ratify an amendment that We the People have embraced, the 
orthodoxy has merely acknowledged the presence of the “false negative” 
agency problem. Nowhere, however, has the orthodoxy explicitly admitted 
the “false positive” agency problem—cases where the agent state legislatures 
actually ratify an amendment that is either at odds with the deliberated 
conviction of We the People or lacks a deliberated conviction of We the 
People.  
The false positive agency problem in the amendment process is 
nonetheless impossible to deny. Many commentators have spoken of the 
false negative agency problem that is produced by Article V’s principal-
agent mechanism.207 Thousands of constitutional amendments have been 
proposed in the halls of Congress,208 yet only twenty-seven have run the 
guantlet to become formal constitutional amendments. That at least some 
among the thousands of failed proposed amendments would have been 
sanctioned by a deliberated consensus of We the People, but for Article V’s 
principal-agent impediment, lies beyond doubt.209 Is it imaginable that the 
agent state legislatures fail to embody We the People when they mistakenly 
reject an amendment, but always perfectly embody We the People when they 
 
 
 207. See, e.g. , Stephen M. Griffin, The Nominee Is . . . Article V, in CONSTITUTIONAL 
STUPIDITIES, CONSTITUTIONAL T RAGEDIES 51-53 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Sanford Levinson eds., 
1998) (discussing how Article V makes a formal constitutional amendment “exceedingly difficult”). 
 208. JOHN R. VILE, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS, PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS, AND AMENDING ISSUES, 1789-1995, at 362 (1996) (chart indicating that thousands of 
amendments have been proposed since the 1780s). 
 209. See Allison L. Held et al., The Equal Rights Amendment: Why the ERA Remains Legally 
Viable and Properly Before the States, 3 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 113, 115-16 (1997) (noting 
that, despite the ERA’s broad popular support and passage by “an overwhelming majority” of 
Congress, the ERA failed to engender support from enough states to overcome the Article V 
requirement); Ishikawa, supra  note 132, at  587-88 & n.170 (discussing the Balanced Budget 
Amendment’s failure to overcome Article V’s proposal mechanism, despite the amendment’s great 
popularity); Dick Morris, Direct Democracy and the Internet, 34 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1033, 1048 
(2001) (noting that Congress has failed to propose constitutional amendments to ban flag burning and 
allow school prayer even though they “command a clear majority of the voters in virtually every 
poll”). 
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approve an amendment? Can we imagine a world in which false negatives 
abound, but false positives are impossible? Even if we could imagine such a 
world, this is not the world in which we live. As Bruce Ackerman has 
recognized, “The only way to eliminate all false positives is to make the 
Constitution completely unamendable.”210 Again, agency problems are an 
inevitable cost of principal-agent mechanisms.211 
We need not reinvent the study of legislatures to conclude that they often 
fail to accurately reflect the preferences of the electorate. If anything, our 
modern understanding of legislative bodies can only serve to corroborate the 
Founding Era understanding that legislative bodies cannot embody We the 
People. Agency problems are the norm rather than the exception when it 
comes to the ability of legislatures to mirror the preferences of the 
electorate.212 No doubt, Article V’s supermajority requirement minimizes the 
possibility that the state legislatures will ratify new constitutional textual 
norms that lack discernable and deliberated popular sanction.213 Even the 
supermajority requirement, however, cannot reduce the probability of false 
positives to zero.214  
 
 
 210. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 121, at 279. Ackerman acknowledges the possibility 
of an Article V false positive when he admits that “a constitutional amendment may be approved by 
three-quarters of the state assemblies . . . without the transformative initiative gaining the requisite 
kind of support of the mobilized People.” Id. at 291. Curiously, however, Ackerman leaves the Article 
V false positive problem unresolved. Other than this fleeting reference, he has not expanded further on 
the issue.  
 211. See EGGERTSSON, supra  note 198, at 44 (“Some opportunistic behavior by agents is 
presumably present in equilibrium contracts of most  hierarchical relationships, a residual that remains 
after the principal has taken advantage of all profitable opportunities to limit shirking.”). 
 212. Political scientists, whether using the pluralist model or the more recent rational choice 
model, have amply documented the inherent inability of legislative bodies to reflect the electorate’s 
preferences. For seminal works in this area, see KEITH KREHBIEL, INFORMATION AND LEGISLATIVE 
ORGANIZATION (1991); DAVID MAYHEW,  CONGRESS: THE ELECTORAL CONNECTION (1974); E.E. 
SCHATTSCHNEIDER, THE SEMISOVEREIGN PEOPLE: A REALIST’S VIEW OF DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 
(1960). For useful overviews of the political science literature on the topic, see DANIEL A. FARBER & 
PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (1991); Einer R. Elhauge, 
Does Interest Group Theory Justify More Intrusive Judicial Review?, 101 YALE L. REV. 31, 35-44 
(1991); Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, The Jurisprudence of Public Choice, 65 TEX. L. REV. 
873 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey, Promoting Public-Regarding Legislation Through Statutory 
Interpretation: An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223 (1986). 
 213. Those espousing the orthodoxy have relied on Article V’s supermajority of state legislatures 
requirement as the answer to the false positive agency problem. 
 214. At least two commentators agree. Working from the perspective of rational choice social 
science and speaking the language of principal-agent insitutional economics, Professors Boudreaux 
and Pritchard have concluded the following: 
[N]otwithstanding Article V’s protection of the status quo, its procedures cannot guarantee that a 
majority of the people support a constitutional amendment. Because the Constitution can be 
amended solely by the actions of political representatives, the opportunity exists for shirking by 
the people’s elected representatives. This shirking can take two forms: enacting an amendment 
that a majority (or substantial minority) of the people oppose, or failing to enact an amendment 
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While Article V requires ratification by three-fourths of the state 
legislatures, only a simple majority is required in each state legislature. It is 
entirely possible that an amendment could gain a simple majority in three-
fourths of the state legislatures in the absence of, or contrary to, a discernable 
deliberated popular consensus sanctioning the creation of new higher law 
norms. No one doubts that at least on some issues narrowly-focused interest 
groups exercise disproportionate influence within legislative chambers and 
have proven successful in securing the passage of legislation contrary to 
popular majoritarian preferences.215 Admittedly, the costs of disproportionate 
influences are higher when dealing with three-fourths of the state legislatures 
than when dealing with just one state legislature. In many cases, however, the 
same asymmetries that lend themselves to the disproportionate influence of a 
narrowly focused interest in one legislative body will replicate themselves 
across many or most of the state legislatures, thereby significantly reducing 
the cost of securing passage of special interest constitutional amendments. If 
a narrowly-focused special interest group can get one state legislature to 
approve an amendment despite the lack of a deliberated and discernable 
popular consensus, or contrary to the deliberated and discernable popular 
consensus, it probably can convince many state legislatures to do the same.216  
Those espousing the orthodoxy have been too quick to rely on Article V’s 
supermajority-of-state-legislatures requirement as a panacea for the false 
positive agency problem. For example, two commentators have recently 
 
 
that a supermajority of the people favor.  
 The first possibility, enacting an amendment contrary to the will of the majority, can take 
place only under specific conditions. Although Article V’s requirement of a supermajority in 
Congress seems to ensure that at least a majority of the citizenry supports an amendment, agency 
costs make a congressional majority no guarantee of a popular majority. 
Donald J. Boudreaux & A.C. Pritchard, Rewriting The Constitution: An Economic Analysis of the 
Constitutional Amendment Process, 62 FORDHAM L. REV. 111, 130 (1993). 
 215. See Macey, supra  note 212, at 230-31 (discussing the methods by which well organized 
interest groups exert influence on the policy formation process, achieving wealth transfers at the 
expense of society at large). 
 216. State-by-state lobbying is common in the amendment ratification process. Ratification of the 
Seventeenth Amendment (popular election of senators), for example, was brought about via a state-by-
state lobbying strategy. See Kris W. Kobach, Rethinking Article V: Term Limits and the Seventeenth 
and Nineteenth Amendments, 103 YALE L.J. 1971, 1976-80 (1994). Kobach’s analysis is enlightening. 
Though the Seventeenth Amendment ultimately was the product of meaningful popular deliberation 
and enjoyed popular support, it could not have been ratified without supporters of the Amendment 
waging a state-by-state battle to secure support in the state legislatures. See id. Congress initially 
opposed the Amendment, and therefore refused to propose it. Id. at 1977. The proponents of the 
Seventeenth Amendment, however, lobbied in the states to bring about the reforms called for by the 
amendment at the state level. Id. at 1977-78. By winning reforms in many states, the backers of the 
Seventeenth Amendment succeeded in building an irresistible pressure, eventually forcing Congress to 
propose the amendment. Id. at 1978-79. Having already built support in the states, ratification by state 
legislatures quickly followed. Id. at 1980. 
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stated that “although Article V . . . interposes deliberative institutional agents 
to express the popular will, namely, the state legislatures, there is no reason 
to believe that these agents would approve any change contrary to the desires 
of their principals.”217 The statement is both mistaken and under-inclusive. 
We should not expect that three-fourths of the state legislatures will approve 
an amendment that is contrary to the desires of their principals very often. As 
we will see below, however, this kind of false positive is far from 
impossible.218 The false positive agency problem, however, involves much 
more than the agent state legislatures acting in diametric opposition to the 
deliberated popular consensus of the principal We the People. More likely, 
false positives will take the form of the agent state legislatures ratifying an 
amendment without a fully deliberated popular consensus, or even absent 
any meaningful popular deliberation at all. Will simple majorities in three-
fourths the state legislatures approve X if We the People have, after 
meaningful deliberation, reached a discernable consensus opposing X? Only 
in the rarest of cases. But will simple majorities in three-fourths of the state 
legislatures approve X if We the People have not yet reached a discernable 
deliberated consensus on the issue, but are still in the midst of the 
deliberative process? At least sometimes, yes. Will simple majorities in 
three-fourths of the state legislatures approve X if We the People have simply 
failed to engage in a deliberative process over the issue? At least sometimes, 
yes. In each of these situations, the false positive agency problem results in 
the ratification of constitutional amendments that cannot honestly and 
accurately be described as emanating from, or sourced in, We the People.  
At the end of the day, any rule that uses one phenomenon—ratification by 
state legislatures—to identify a second phenomenon—ratification by We the 
People—encounters the unavoidable risk of falsely indicating the second 
phenomenon where it is not in fact present. State legislatures do not always 
embody We the People. Even if state legislatures sometimes perfectly 
represent and embody We the People, other times they will not. Despite 
Article V’s supermajority requirement, in some instances state legislatures 
will act contrary to a discernable, deliberated popular consensus, prior to the 
formation of a discernable, deliberated popular consensus, or in the absence 
of any meaningful popular deliberation at all. Although Article V’s 
supermajority requirement means that the false positive may not be nearly as 
common as the false negative, it is still a very real phenomenon. 
 
 
 217. Stewart Dalzell & Eric J. Beste, Is the Twenty-Seventh Amendment 200 Years Too Late? , 62 
GEO. WASH . L. REV. 501, 509 n.59 (1994). 
 218. See infra  text accompanying notes 219-92.  
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Consider the Twenty-seventh Amendment, the stealthy Congressional 
Pay Amendment.219 Can anyone seriously maintain that the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment, which was ratified via Article V’s state legislature route, in any 
way represents constitutional norm creation by We the People acting though 
the state legislatures? The Twenty-seventh Amendment was proposed in 
1789 as part of the original Bill of Rights.220 It initially gained approval in 
only six of the original thirteen state legislatures.221 The Amendment 
languished for over eighty years, until the Ohio legislature, enraged over the 
1873 federal “salary-grab” statute, gave its approval to the proposed 
amendment.222 Not until 1978 did the next state, Wyoming, ratify the 
proposed amendment.223 Several years later, two more states, Maine and 
Colorado, ratified the proposed amendment.224 From 1984 to 1992, 
numerous other state legislatures ratified the proposed amendment.225 It took 
until 1992, when Michigan joined the ratifying states, to finally achieve the 
requisite three-fourths of the state legislatures, thus formally ratifying the 
Congressional Pay Amendment.226 Even more surprising than the nearly two 
centuries it took to ratify the Twenty-seventh Amendment is the fact that in 
the final push from 1978 to 1992 to achieve the approval of three-fourths of 
the state legislatures, most Americans had no idea that the amendment was 
even being considered.227 Even legal scholars, who presumably stay abreast 
of such issues, were caught off guard.228 Though the Amendment’s extended 
ratification period at first raised questions of its constitutional legitimacy,229 
 
 
 219. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII (“No law, varying the compensation for the services of the 
Senators and Representatives, shall take effect, until election of Representatives shall have 
intervened.”). 
 220. Christopher M. Kennedy, Is There a Twenty-Seventh Amendment?: The Unconstitutionality 
of a “New” 203-Year-Old Amendment, 26 J. MARSHALL. L. REV. 977, 980-82 (1993).  
 221. Id. at 982. 
 222. Id. at 984. 
 223. Id. at 985. 
 224. Id. at 985-86. 
 225. Id. at 986. 
 226. See Michael Stokes Paulsen, A General Theory of Article V: The Constitutional Lessons of 
the Twenty-Seventh Amendment, 103 YALE L.J. 677, 679 (1993) (citing Michigan as the 38th state to 
ratify the proposed amendment). 
 227. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra note 133, at 461 (“Ironically, this 
extraordinary Twenty-Seventh Amendment drew less notice at  the moment of its ratification than 
perhaps any other constitutional reform . . . . Not surprisingly, few Americans even realized in spring 
1992 that their nation’s fundamental law had been altered. Those who did notice might well have 
wondered whether constitutional amending bore any importance.”).  
 228. See Paulsen, supra  note 226, at 679 (stating that ratification of the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment caught “a number of respected legal commentators, completely by surprise”). 
 229. Id. at 679-80 (discussing contradictory opinions on the validity of the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment). 
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the consensus now acknowledges that the Twenty-seventh Amendment is 
part of the Constitution.230  
The Twenty-seventh Amendment is the prime example of an amendment 
over which We the People never deliberated. Given the nearly two century 
time-span from the Amendment’s proposal to its ultimate ratification, the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment cannot honestly and accurately be characterized 
as an amendment reflecting an act of constitutional law creation by the 
popular sovereign. A contemporaneous popular consensus is a necessary 
condition to the ratification of an amendment by We the People.231 No such 
contemporaneous popular consensus existed for the ideas expressed in the 
Twenty-seventh Amendment. Indeed, what is more telling is that there was 
not even broad public awareness of the Twenty-seventh Amendment. For 
this reason, the state legislatures, even those that ratified the Amendment 
between 1978 and 1992, could not possibly have embodied a deliberated and 
discernable popular consensus. Consequently, the Twenty-seventh cannot 
honestly be described as an amendment emanating from, sourced in, or 
created by We the People. The Twenty-seventh Amendment is, plain and 
simple, a constitutional textual norm created exclusively by ordinary 
legislative bodies that in no way, shape, or form personified a discernable, 
deliberated popular consensus sanctioning the ratification of new higher law 
norms.  
Ratification of the Twenty-seventh Amendment may be an anomaly that 
will never again be repeated. However, the ratifications of several other 
amendments also cast doubt on the orthodox claim that ratification by the 
state legislatures is ipso facto tantamount to ratification by We the People. 
Consider the Twenty-second Amendment, the Presidential Term Limits 
amendment.232 Ratified by the state legislatures in 1951, the Twenty-second 
Amendment demonstrates how party politics can distort the ability of 
legislative bodies to embody We the People. The issue of presidential term 
limits had been on the national radar screen at various points in American 
history.233 In the 1940s, President Franklin Roosevelt’s four consecutive 
 
 
 230. Id. at 680 (“There quickly came to be general agreement that the Twenty-seventh 
Amendment had become law.”). 
 231. A contemporaneous popular consensus, however, does not appear to be a necessary condition 
of the ratification of an amendment by the state legislatures (as opposed to ratification by We the 
People). Against the tide of academic commentary and Supreme Court dicta, the Amendment was 
certified as part of the Constitution once Article V’s formal requirements had been satisfied. See id. at 
680, 684-88 (discussing the National Archivists certification of the Amendment and contrary academic 
commentary concurring with Supreme Court dicta that suggests a contemporaneous consensus is 
required by Article V).  
 232. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 233. Bruce G. Peabody & Scott E. Gant, The Twice and Future President: Constitutional 
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terms revived the term limit issue.234 Indeed, Gallup polls in the first half of 
the 1940s showed that a majority of those polled favored presidential term 
limits of some sort.235 However, public support for the term limit initiative 
faded as quickly as it had appeared. By 1944, “the popular appeal of the issue 
was gone.”236 At a minimum, however, unlike the congressional pay issues in 
the Twenty-seventh Amendment, the issue of presidential term limits had at 
least penetrated the public consciousness.237  
The Twenty-second Amendment, nevertheless, can hardly be described as 
emanating from a public consensus sanctioning a presidential term limit 
amendment. To the contrary, the Twenty-second Amendment was the result 
of strong party politics and a coalition between Republicans and conservative 
Southern Democrats reflecting their mutual frustration over the liberal 
policies of the four consecutive Roosevelt terms.238 Upon gaining control of 
Congress in the 1946 elections, Republicans made a presidential term limit 
amendment a legislative priority. 239 The House hearings on the Amendment 
were brief, in the hopes of drawing little public attention.240 Despite 
lukewarm public support for a presidential term limit, the House voted 285 to 
121 to propose the Amendment.241 The extreme degree of partisanship 
displayed in the vote is especially damaging to the orthodox view that 
legislative bodies will personify We the People when operating under Article 
V. Not one of the 238 House Republicans voted against the measure.242 
Moreover, thirty-seven of the forty-seven House Democrats who voted in 
favor of the measure were Southern Democrats who had long been aligned 
with Republicans against the Roosevelt Administration’s policies.243 The 
 
 
Interstices and the Twenty-Second Amendment, 83 MINN. L. REV. 565, 589-93 (1999) (recounting 
efforts by Congress to limit presidential terms at various points throughout American history). 
 234. See Stephen W. Stathis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan 
Maneuver?, 7 CONST.  COMMENT. 61, 64-65 (1990) (explaining how Roosevelt’s election to a third 
presidential term began the movement towards presidential terms limits, which culminated in the 
Twenty-second Amendment). 
 235. Id. at 65.  
 236. Id. 
 237. The Republican Party platform included planks in both 1940 and 1944 supporting a 
constitutional presidential term limit amendment. Id. at 62. 
 238. Id. See also  James Randolph Peck, Restoring the Balance of Power: Impeachment and the 
Twenty-Second Amendment, 8 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 759, 787 (2000) (“Historians have argued 
that the Republican Party forced this Amendment through Congress and the state ratification process 
in a frustrated response to the four terms to which President Franklin D. Roosevelt was elected.”). 
 239. Id. 
 240. Id. at 66-67. 
 241. Id. at 67. 
 242. Id. 
 243. Id. 
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same partisan-driven pattern repeated itself in the Senate.244 All forty-eight 
Senate Republicans supported the Amendment. Thirteen Democratic 
Senators, nine of whom were from Southern states, joined the 
Republicans.245 Party politics, rather than a popular consensus favoring 
presidential term limits, was the major impetus for proposing the Twenty-
second Amendment.246  
The ratification process in the state legislatures was equally driven by 
partisan politics.247 Of the 3,272 Republican state legislators in states that 
considered the Amendment, only twenty-five Republican senators and fifty-
eight Republican representatives opposed the Amendment.248 Because 
amendment approval requires only a simple majority of a state legislature, 
the unwavering Republican Party made passage of the Amendment by three-
fourths of the state legislatures highly probable. Beyond party politics, a 
slightly different kind of politics also influenced passage in the southern state 
legislatures. Initially, no Southern state legislature approved the Twenty-
second Amendment. However, once it became clear that the Truman 
Administration would continue strong support for civil rights initiatives, 
Southern Democrats used approval of the Twenty-second Amendment to 
register their disapproval of the Administration’s policies.249 
Where were We the People while these political machinations played 
themselves out in the halls of Congress and the state legislatures? Were the 
state legislatures, despite the political machinations, accurately registering a 
deliberated public consensus on the issue? Stephen Stathis’s analysis gives an 
unequivocal answer: 
The twenty-second amendment, according to the Nation, ‘glided 
through legislatures in a fog of silence—passed by men whose 
election in no way involved their stand on the question—without 
hearings, without publicity, without any of that popular participation 
that should have accompanied a change in the organic law of the 
country.’ The press and public were equally lax. There was only 
spotty coverage in the local press, virtually none in national 
periodicals, and little public participation. Even interest groups most 
 
 
 244. Id. at  68. 
 245. Id.  
 246. Id. at 69. 
 247. See Paul G. Willis & George L. Willis, The Politics of the Twenty-Second Amendment, 5 W. 
POL. Q. 469, 481 (1952) (describing the ratification of the Twenty-second Amendment in the state 
legislatures as exhibiting “strong political overtones”). 
 248. Stathis, supra note 234, at 70. 
 249. Id. at 71-72. 
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directly affected by the change in presidential tenure paid little 
attention to the ratification process.250  
In short, though the issue penetrated the public consciousness, We the People 
were largely missing from the process. Rather than an expression of a 
deliberated and discernable popular consensus, the Twenty-second 
Amendment was the result of partisan politics.251 Can we honestly describe 
such an amendment as emanating from and sourced in We the People?  
The Eighteenth Amendment (Prohibition) 252 may also represent a false 
positive. The Eighteenth Amendment appears to have been the combined 
product of disproportionate interest group influence and a systematic skew in 
the representational structures in state legislatures. In the end, forty-six of the 
forty-eight state legislatures eventually approved the Eighteenth 
Amendment.253 One would think that in order to secure passage in all but two 
state legislatures, prohibition would have been favored by a decisive majority 
after extensive and meaningful public debate.254 Unlike both the Twenty-
seventh and Twenty-second Amendments, no one can claim that the 
Eighteenth Amendment was not the subject of a meaningful and extended 
process of public deliberation.255 However, it is not at all clear that the 
process of public deliberation ever culminated in a discernable popular 
consensus sanctioning the state legislatures’ ratification of the Prohibition 
Amendment.256 Although I have not found scholarly analysis focusing 
directly and exclusively on the issue, there is evidence to suggest that, despite 
its ratification by all but two state legislatures, the Eighteenth Amendment 
lacked majoritarian popular support.257 Even if when ratified prohibition 
 
 
 250. Id. at 71 (citations omitted). 
 251. See supra text accompanying note 238. 
 252. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
 253. See SEAN DENNIS CASHMAN, P ROHIBITION: THE LIE OF THE LAND 1 (1981). 
 254. KYVIG, PROHIBITION, supra note 133, at 12 (lopsided victory of Eighteenth Amendment 
indicates wide acceptance of prohibition). 
 255. Temperance had been an issue of waxing and waning importance on the national agenda 
since the earliest days of the Republic. See RICHARD F. HAMM, SHAPING THE EIGHTEENTH 
AMENDMENT:  TEMPERANCE,  REFORM,  LEGAL CULTURE, AND THE POLITY 1880-1920, at 20-21 
(1995). Hamm’s book offers a comprehensive and detailed look at the temperance movement from its 
earliest days through ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment.  
 256. KYVIG, P ROHIBITION, supra  note 133, at 12 (“The absence of a direct national referendum or 
reliable public opinion survey [on prohibition] makes it impossible to judge precisely the degree of 
[its] popular support.”). 
 257. See CASHMAN, supra note 253, at 6-8 (reviewing the number of states that had some form of 
prohibition prior to the enactment of the Eighteenth Amendment and concluding that even though 
many states had enacted some form of prohibition, “it does not signify that prohibition had reached 
such epidemic proportions that it already had national support”); KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC 
ACTS, supra note 133, at 241 (those who disagreed with prohibition “concluded that a skillful, 
manipulative minority had overridden the preferences of most citizens”); William L. Marbury, The 
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enjoyed slight majoritarian support, a discernable national consensus 
favoring prohibition never congealed. The issue was, at best, a close one.258  
How then did the Eighteenth Amendment gain the approval of forty-six 
of the forty-eight state legislatures? To begin, formidable and focused 
lobbyists pressured the state houses for passage of the Amendment.259 In 
contrast, opponents of prohibition were diffuse and ineffective.260 More 
importantly, and more problematic for the orthodox view, was a systematic 
skew in the representational structure of the state legislatures of the era. 
Support for prohibition did not have an even geographic distribution. Urban 
areas opposed prohibition, while rural areas strongly favored prohibition. 
Unfortunately for the urban opponents of prohibition, however, 
malapportioned state legislatures greatly under-represented urban voters and 
their preferences.261 The Eighteenth Amendment won by landslide margins 
in the state senates, which especially over-represented rural areas. In the less 
skewed sta te houses, the votes were very close. Nevertheless, the prohibition 
lobbyists effectively used the large margins of victory in the heavily skewed 
state senates to influence the less skewed state houses in their favor.262 
Moreover, the politically shrewd prohibition lobbyists, with knowledge that 
they could win their greatest victories in state legislatures that over-
represented rural America, lobbied successfully to have the proposed 
Amendment submitted for ratification in the state legislatures rather than 
popular constituent conventions that might not be malapportioned.263 
 
 
Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 HARV. L. REV. 223, 223-24 (1919) (Stating that the 
Eighteenth Amendment was ratified by state legislatures “contrary to the well-known sentiments and 
wishes of a vast majority of the people of those states”).  
 258. See CASHMAN, supra note 253, at 9 (concluding that “[t]he evidence hardly suggests a solid 
bloc in favor of prohibition even in the rural states”). 
 259. See id. at 20, 25 (describing the Anti-Saloon League as “masters at lobbying the state 
legislatures” and stating that “[t]he success of the prohibition movement at the turn of the century 
belongs to the Anti-Saloon League”). 
 260. HAMM, supra  note 255, at 241 (describing the anti-prohibition lobby as “hopelessly and 
bitterly divided . . . leaderless and lost”). 
 261. See CASHMAN, supra  note 253, at 19-20 (recounting that in state senates, rural areas had as 
much as seven times the number of representatives as urban areas and explaining that the pro-
prohibition lobby feared state referenda on prohibition for fear of losing at the hands of anti-
prohibition urban votes); KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra  note 133, at 242 (referring to 
disproptionate representation of rural pro-prohibition interests in the Ohio legislature); KYVIG, 
PROHIBITION, supra note 133, at 140, 171 (referring to over-representation of rural pro-prohibition 
areas in the state legislatures both at the time the Eighteenth Amendment was ratified and at the time 
of its repeal). 
 262. Cashman, supra  note 253, at 20. 
 263. Id. at 19. 
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The history behind Hawke v. Smith264 further reinforces the point that the 
Eighteenth Amendment was ratified by state legislatures that overly 
represented rural pro-prohibition areas.265 Hawke challenged a provision of 
the Ohio constitution that was adopted by a statewide referendum and which 
required that proposed federal constitutional amendments be submitted to the 
People of Ohio via a referendum, and not the Ohio legislature.266 The Ohio 
legislature, however, disregarding the Ohio Constitution, approved the 
Eighteenth Amendment. The vote was not close—twenty to twelve in the 
Ohio Senate, and eighty-five to twenty-nine in the Ohio House, in favor of 
adoption.267 Shortly thereafter, however, in a state-wide referendum, the 
People of Ohio rejected the Eighteenth Amendment.268 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court invalidated the Ohio Constitution’s provision requiring that 
proposed amendments be submitted to the People via referendum as 
inconsistent with Artic le V.269 The episode, however, raises the question of 
whether the Ohio legislature in fact embodied the People of Ohio. If the 
People of Ohio rejected the Eighteenth Amendment in a referendum vote, 
how could the Ohio legislature have approved the Eighteenth Amendment by 
such a wide margin? Did the Ohio legislature malfunction as a conduit 
through which the People might act to pass judgment on a proposed 
constitutional amendment? Suspicion about the democratic legitimacy of the 
ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment by the state legislatures eventually 
factored into its repeal and resulted in the submission of the Twenty-first 
Amendment to conventions, rather than state legislatures.270  
Nor is the Eighteenth Amendment the most extreme case of breakdown in 
Article V’s principal-agent amendment ratification mechanism. The Twenty-
sixth Amendment,271 which lowered the voting age to eighteen, may be the 
most extreme false positive. Like prohibition, lowering the age of suffrage 
had been on the national agenda at various times throughout American 
 
 
 264. 253 U.S. 221 (1920).  
 265. Id. 
 266. Id. at 224-25. 
 267. KYVIG,  EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra note 133, at 242; KYVIG, PROHIBITION, 
supra  note 133, at  14. 
 268. KYVIG,  EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra note 133, at 242; KYVIG, PROHIBITION, 
supra  note 133, at  14. Kris W. Kobach, May “We the People” Speak?: The Forgotten Role of 
Constituent Instructions in Amending the Constitution, 33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1, 20-21 (1999) 
(recounting the history behind Hawke v. Smith , 253 U.S. 221 (1920)). 
 269. Hawke v. Smith, 253 U.S. 221, 231 (1920). 
 270. KYVIG, P ROHIBITION, supra  note 133, at 140, 171 (questionable democratic legitimacy of the 
Ohio legislature’s approval of Prohibition from Hawke v. Smith  and over-representation of rural pro-
prohibition areas in state legislatures prompted advocates of the Prohibition Repeal Amendment to 
insist on ratification via the convention method). 
 271. U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
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history, particularly in times of war, when young, disenfranchised Americans 
were sent into battle.272 The issue surfaced again during the Vietnam War.273 
In 1969 and 1970, prior to consideration of a federal constitutional 
amendment to lower the voting age, sixteen states submitted voting age 
reduction proposals to statewide referenda.274 At the federal level, the 
Twenty-sixth Amendment met rapid and overwhelming success.275 The 
Amendment found overwhelming bipartisan support in Congress and the 
state legislatures; the Senate voted ninety-four to zero and the House voted 
401 to 19 to propose the Amendment.276 It only took 101 days, the fastest 
ratification period ever, for three-fourths of the state legislatures to approve 
the Twenty-sixth Amendment.277 From the orthodox perspective, based on 
the Amendment’s rapid success in Congress and the state legislatures, the 
Amendment must have enjoyed widespread popular support. 
In fact, the Twenty-sixth Amendment was ratified by the state legislatures 
“despite clear evidence of considerable public opposition.”278 Several states 
had proposed to lower the voting age by state-wide referenda in the years 
leading up to the Twenty-sixth Amendment. By wide margins, the voters in 
ten of the sixteen state referenda in 1969 and 1970 rejected proposals for 
lowering the age of suffrage.279 In addition, the voters in seven other state 
referenda between 1966 and 1968 had rejected proposals to lower the voting 
age from twenty-one.280 In short, “voting age reduction appeared to lack 
majority support, much less a broad consensus.”281 As such, the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment appears to be a false positive ratification that is directly contrary 
to a deliberated popular consensus against lowering the minimum voting age.  
If at odds with the deliberated popular consensus, how did the Twenty-
sixth Amendment achieve such rapid and overwhelming success in both 
Congress and the state legislatures? The answer lies in time pressure and a 
desire to avoid an election-day nightmare. In 1970, Congress amended the 
 
 
 272. See KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra note 133, at 364 (“Lowering the voting 
age from twenty-one . . . had been discussed during every war in which the United States asked 
younger men to fight.”).  
 273. Id. 
 274. Id. at 363. 
 275. The proposed voting age reduction was first taken up by a congressional committee in 
February of 1970. Id. at 365. By the summer of 1971, the voting age was successfully lowered to age 
eighteen through enactment of the Twenty-sixth Amendment. Id. at 368. 
 276. Id. at 367. 
 277. Id. at 368. 
 278. Id. at 363. 
 279. Id. 
 280. Id. at 364 (rejected referenda in Michigan, New York, Hawaii, Maryland, Nebraska, North 
Dakota, and Tennessee). 
 281. Id. at 365. 
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Voting Rights Act to lower the age of suffrage to eighteen years of age.282 
The statutory amendments purportedly applied to elections for federal as well 
as state-level offices.283 In Oregon v. Mitchell, however, the Supreme Court 
partially invalidated the 1970 statutory amendments, holding that Congress 
lacked the legislative authority under Section Five of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to mandate the voting age in state, as opposed to federal, 
elections.284 The combined effect of the 1970 amendments to the Voting 
Rights Act and the holding in Oregon v. Mitchell was that the approaching 
1972 elections would have to be conducted with separate suffrage 
requirements. The amended Voting Rights Act made the voting age eighteen 
for federal offices while Oregon v. Mitchell left the voting age for most state 
officials at twenty-one.285 Faced with the expense and complication of 
running the elections with separate suffrage requirements, both Congress and 
the state legislatures rushed to ratify the Twenty-sixth Amendment, despite 
widespread popular disapproval.286  
My review of the Twenty-seventh,287 Twenty-sixth,288 Twenty-second,289 
and Eighteenth Amendments290 has been less than comprehensive. As with 
the original understanding of the original intent of Article V, a fuller analysis 
will have to wait until another day. Here, I merely seek to trace the outline of 
an argument casting doubt on the orthodoxy. Even a tentative analysis, 
however, raises deep skepticism about the orthodoxy’s unforgiving nature. 
The uncompromising claim that each and every constitutional amendment 
gaining the approval of three-fourths of the state legislatures is ipso facto 
tantamount to ratification by We the People is hard to square with the history 
of ratification of at least four of our amendments.  
In the case of the Eighteenth Amendment, we see that systematic 
distortions in the structure of representation may have caused the state 
legislatures to malfunction as a conduit through which We the People act to 
ratify constitutional amendments. Would the Eighteenth Amendment have 
been ratified by state legislatures more balanced in their representation of 
town and country? We will need a deeper study than what I have provided to 
 
 
 282. Id. at 366. 
 283. Id. (The amendment to the 1965 Voting Rights Act was thought to “invade the realm of state 
authority.”). 
 284. Oregon v. Mitchell, 400 U.S. 112, 134-35 (1970). 
 285. KYVIG, EXPLICIT AND AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra  note 133, at 367. 
 286. Id. (“Catalyzed as well by the specter of electoral confusion, [state] legislators rushed to 
ratify [the Twenty-sixth Amendment].”). 
 287. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVII. 
 288. U.S. CONST. amend. XXVI. 
 289. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII. 
 290. U.S. CONST. amend. XVIII. 
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answer that question. From what we do know, however, we can no longer 
unquestioningly accept the platitude that any amendment able to gain the 
assent of three-fourths of the state legislatures enjoys the considered 
consensus and sanction of We the People. Structural distortions in state 
legislatures may in some (perhaps isola ted) cases undermine the proposition 
that ordinary legislative bodies serve as true barometers of We the People’s 
deliberated consensus. Moreover, when those structural distortions replicate 
themselves throughout the state legislatures, amendments can be ratified by 
three-fourths of the state legislatures even when We the People are quite 
evenly or closely divided on an issue.  
The point is not that ratification of the Eighteenth Amendment necessarily 
went against a decisive popular consensus. Article V’s supermajority 
provisions minimize the risk of this sort of false positive agency problem. 
Popular opinion on prohibition may or may not have favored passage of the 
Eighteenth Amendment in 1919. That forty-six of forty-eight state 
legislatures ratified prohibition, does, however, represent a serious disconnect 
with closely contested public opinion on the Eighteenth Amendment.  
As suspicious as the Eighteenth Amendemnt is, the Twenty-sixth paints 
an even more troubling picture for the orthodoxy. Here it appears that 
passage of the Twenty-sixth Amendment by the state legislatures was 
contrary to a clear, deliberated, popular consensus. Like the Eighteenth 
Amendment, the Twenty-sixth Amendment had both penetrated the popular 
consciousness and been the subject of real popular discourse—through state 
referenda and as part of the nation’s ongoing internal debate over the 
Vietnam War. Unlike prohibition, however, lowering the voting age from 
twenty-one was not a closely divided issue. We the People, for better or for 
worse, had voiced strong opposition. Nonetheless, the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment sailed through the state legislatures with little resistance and 
achieved ratification faster than any other amendment in history.291  
Our look at the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-second Amendments raises a 
different, and perhaps more damaging, kind of false positive agency problem 
for the orthodoxy. The Eighteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments erode 
confidence in the belief that state legislatures act as accurate barometers of 
We the People’s deliberated consensus sanctioning ratification of new 
constitutional norms. In both cases the problem lies with the agent state 
legislatures that malfunctioned as conduits through which We the People act. 
The Twenty-seventh and Twenty-second Amendments, in contrast, 
demonstrate that the false positive agency problem, inherent in Article V, 
 
 
 291. KYVIG, EXPLICIT & AUTHENTIC ACTS, supra  note 133, at 368. 
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may sometimes stem from the principal, and not the agent. In both cases, We 
the People never even formed a deliberated consensus. How can we even 
begin to describe, as does the orthodoxy, the state legislatures as a 
personification and embodiment of We the People’s deliberated consensus 
when no deliberated consensus ever existed? How do legislatures embody a 
nonexistent popular consensus? How can We the People act through agent 
state legislatures to ratify an amendment codifying issues that We the People 
have not even considered? It would be far more accurate to describe the 
principal-agent relationship employed in the ratification of these amendments 
along more traditional lines. In the usual principal-agent relationship, the 
principal appoints an agent to act on behalf  of the principal, not to be the 
principal. Remember, on the orthodox view, the agent state legislatures do 
not make the ordinary claim that they act for We the People. They instead 
make the extraordinary claim that state legislatures act as an embodiment of 
We the People.  
The truth of the matter is that We the People only infrequently form a 
deliberated and decisive consensus sanctioning the creation of higher law 
norms. The public ignorance and lack of attention to the issues involved in 
the ratification of the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-second Amendments is 
the rule rather than the exception.292 Political scientists and legal scholars 
have long noted that American politics vacillates between long periods of 
uninformed and apathetic disengagement, and relatively brief periods of 
popular ferment and participation.293 The bulk of the scholarship on this 
phenomenon focuses on the brief periods of popular ferment.294 Bruce 
Ackerman’s work in this area, however, is particularly useful for present 
purposes because he devotes significant attention to periods of popular 
 
 
 292. Id. at 363 (stating that few amendments or proposed amendments “even achieve[] widespread 
public visibility”).  
 293. Professor Pope concisely summarizes the legal and political science scholarship that focuses 
on the variance of public interest in politics. See James Gray Pope, Republican Moments: The Role of 
Direct Popular Power in The American Constitutional Order, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 304-13 (1990) 
(reviewing Bruce Ackerman’s dualist theory of ordinary politics and constitutional moments, the 
political science on critical elections, Samuel Huntington’s description of American politics as 
vascillating between interest group and creedal politics, and Pope’s own theory of republican 
moments). 
 294. Political scientists have extensively analyzed critical elections and their effects on the normal 
pattern of political stasis. See DAVID W. BRADY, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND CONGRESSIONAL POLICY 
MAKING (1988); WALTER DEAN BURNHAM, CRITICAL ELECTIONS AND THE MAINSPRINGS OF 
AMERICAN POLITICS (1970); JEROME M. CLUBB ET AL., PARTISAN REALIGNMENT: VOTERS, PARTIES, 
AND GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY  (1990); Thomas P. Jahnige, Critical Elections & Social 
Change: Towards a Dynamic Explanation of National Party Competition in the United States, 3 
POLITY 465, 467-71 (1971); V.O. Key, Jr., A Theory of Critical Elections, 17 J. POL. 3 (1955). Among 
legal scholars, James Pope’s work focuses more on the relatively rare “republican moments” than the 
more common periods of interest group politics. See Pope, supra  note 293. 
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political disengagement, which he aptly labels “normal politics.”295 
Ackerman properly uses terms like “apathy,” “ignorance,” “limited 
engagement,” and “selfishness” to describe the characteristics of the private 
citizen in times of normal politics.296 Ackerman explains that in times of 
normal politics “the People themselves have retired from public life.”297 To 
the extent that the People might form opinions on political issues, they are 
not the product of considered judgment. The private citizen is too 
preoccupied with private life to devote sufficient time to considered 
judgment on the political themes of the  day.298  
The character of the public citizen in times of normal politics generates 
insurmountable difficulties for the Article V orthodoxy’s view of legislative 
representation. Contrary to the orthodox vision of state legislatures 
embodying We the People when ratifying constitutional amendments, 
“[d]uring normal politics, nobody represents the People . . . . [T]he People do 
not exist; they can only be represented by ‘stand-ins.’”299  
If “the absence of mobilized and politically self-conscious majority 
sentiment” characterizes periods of normal politics,300 how can constitutional 
amendments ratified via Article V during such times constitute creations of 
We the People? We the People cannot engage in acts of constitutional norm 
creation when disengaged, immobilized, and lacking any discernable 
deliberated consensus on political issues. Indeed, as Ackerman explains, the 
normal, versus constitutional politics periodization, helps “distinguish 
 
 
 295. Ackerman’s dualist theory of constitutional change posits that American politics vacillates 
between periods of constitutional politics and normal politics. During periods of normal politics, the 
sovereign People pay scant attention to political issues. Instead, they defer to the political choices 
adopted by their agent government. In contrast, during periods of special constitutional politics or 
“constitutional moments,” the sovereign people become highly attuned to political issues and assume 
a n  active participatory role in shaping the basic rules that define constitutional rights and 
responsibilities. Ackerman identifies the Founding Era, the Civil War Era, and the New Deal Era as 
periods of constitutional politics. See generally ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 121; 
ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 132; Bruce Ackerman, Revolution on a Human Scale, 
108 YALE L.J. 2279 (1999); Bruce A. Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the Constitution, 
93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984).  
 296. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 121, at 234-35. 
 297. Id. at 255 (emphasis omitted). 
 298. Id. at 240-42 (discussing the concept of the soft vote). 
 299. Id. at 263. See also  id. at 260. Addressing “the problematic character of the effort to speak for 
We the People during normal politics,” Ackerman writes:  
Who then really does speak for We the People? None of [the organs of government]. They are just 
stand-ins, that’s all. The mass of the private citizens are too busy right now to engage in the kind 
of sustained and mobilized debate and decision that would justify any of their stand-ins declaring 
that they have a decisive mandate for fundamental change . . . none of [the organs of government] 
should be allowed to pretend they stand for the People themselves. 
ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 121, at 263. 
 300. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 132, at 5. 
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between ordinary decisions made by government and considered judgments 
made by the People.”301 While the People may make law in periods of 
constitutional politics, government makes law in periods of normal politics. 
Ackerman’s entirely appropriate description of normal politics seems to 
eliminate the possibility that constitutional textual norms ratified via Article 
V during those periods could be sourced in We the People.302  
Herein lies the most intractable problem for the orthodoxy: In the 
orthodox view, the agent state legislatures embody We the People’s 
deliberated consensus. Yet most of the time, We the People have not formed 
a deliberated consensus, or even engaged in a process of public deliberation. 
Under such conditions, it is logically impossible for the agent state 
legislatures to embody We the People when ratifying amendments under 
Article V. To the contrary, when We the People are, for all intents and 
purposes, absent from the scene, state legislatures ratifying constitutional 
amendments are more accurately described as traditional agents—acting on 
behalf of the principal, rather than as the principal. This action on behalf of 
the principal is exactly what we see in the ratification of the Twenty-seventh 
and Twenty-second Amendments. We the People never formed a 
discernable, deliberated consensus sanctioning ratification of either 
amendment. Rather than embodying a nonexistent popular consensus, the 
state legislatures acted as ordinary government organs.  
The orthodoxy’s possible response that opinion polls show majoritarian 
support for the policies codified in the Twenty-seventh and Twenty-second 
 
 
 301. Id.  
 302. Ackerman’s definitions of constitutional and normal politics strongly imply that 
constitutional amendments created during times of normal politics in fact are not products of the 
popular sovereign, despite having overcome Article V hurdles. Ackerman states that “the normal 
lawmaking track is designed for countless decisions made in the absence of mobilized and politically 
self-conscious majority sentiment. The higher lawmaking system imposes specially rigorous tests upon 
political movements that hope to earn the heightened sense of democratic legitimacy awarded to 
spokesmen for We the People.” Id.  
 Generally speaking, Ackerman’s theory of dualist democracy is consistent with the notion that 
mere ratification by three-fourths of the state legislatures under Article V does not ipso facto constitute 
ratification by We the People. To begin, Ackerman argues that no formal rule can always correctly 
identify constitutional textual norms originating from the popular sovereign. Id. at 28-29. The 
orthodox view of Article V maintains that ratification under Article V signifies, in Ackerman’s words, 
“the existence of a mobilized and considered popular judgment.” Id. at 28. Ackerman, however, rightly 
recognizes that formal rules, by their nature, will produce false positives. Id. at 29. If Article V is 
treated as a formal rule for identifying constitutional textual norms sourced in the popular sovereign, in 
at least some instances, it will erroneously identify some constitutional textual norms as having 
secured the consent of the P eople. See id. at 29. 
 Moreover, Ackerman’s discussion of normal politics seems to commit him to much more. If we 
take Ackerman’s conception of normal politics seriously, then he, like Amar, must agree that 
ratification of a new constitutional textual norm via Article V does not signal the creation of a 
constitutional textual norm by We the People. 
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Amendments is insufficient. Mere majoritarian support expressed in snapshot 
opinion polls is not the equivalent of a discernable, deliberated popular 
consensus sanctioning agent state legislatures to ratify new constitutional 
textual norms in the name of We the People. Opinion polls are of little 
importance when, for whatever reason, an issue fails to generate meaningful 
and sustained public deliberation.  
A vast difference separates an agent doing what the principal would do if 
the principal had gone through the process of deep consideration of all the 
options and had reached a discernable judgment sanctioning an agent to act, 
as opposed to an agent doing what the principal has sanctioned the agent to 
do after actually having gone through the process of deeply considering all 
of the options and reaching a judgment. The orthodoxy claims that state 
legislatures do the latter. In reality, however, as we see from the Twenty-
seventh and Twenty-second Amendments, state legislatures sometimes only 
do the former. The mere fact that the principal People may express an 
undeliberated majoritarian preference favoring the amendment ratified by 
agent state legislatures does not mean that the agent is doing what the 
principal People sanctioned after actually having meaningfully deliberated, 
and reached a decisive judgment.  
None of this should surprise us. That amendments can overcome Article 
V’s hurdles despite a lack of a popular deliberated consensus, or even 
contrary to a popular deliberated consensus, is an artifact of Article V’s 
principal-agent mechanism for creating new constitutional textual norms. 
False positives exist in any principal-agent relationship.303 Sometimes state 
legislatures will ratify amendments when We the People have not engaged, 
deliberated, or arrived at a discernable consensus favoring the creation of 
new higher law norms. They sometimes will ratify amendments contrary to a 
deliberated popular consensus. Such amendments cannot with any level of 
honesty be described as emanating from We the People. Instead, they must 
 
 
 303. I am not suggesting that all constitutional norms ratified by state legislatures are necessarily 
creations of ordinary government institutions, or that all constitutional norms ratified by popular 
constituent conventions necessarily emanate from, and are ratified by, We the People. Given the clear 
distinction between the proper roles of legislatures and conventions in ratifying constitutional textual 
norms, I concede that this is a plausible construction of Article V. I need not resort to such a 
mechanical and extreme reading of Article V, however, to make my point. Instead, I only need to 
persuade you of a negative thesis—contrary to the orthodox reading, approval by three-fourths of the 
state legislative bodies is not necessarily the equivalent of ratification by We the People. Approval by 
the state legislatures, in other words, is insufficient to create a new constitutional textual norm 
emanating from We the People. Indeed, depending on the criteria, some, several, or even most 
amendments ratified via the state legislature route can honestly be described as products of We the 
People acting through agent state legislatures to ratify new constitutional textual norms. However, 
even under the most generous set of assumptions possible, there will remain some constitutional 
amendments that cannot reasonably be characterized as creations of We the People. 
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be characterized as creations of ordinary legislative bodies acting as agents 
on behalf of, rather than as, We the People.  
Reasonable minds may disagree over which constitutional amendments 
emanate from the popular sovereign and creations of state legislatures. Upon 
serious analysis, however, reasonable minds cannot differ on the following 
points: First, we cannot honestly and accurately describe all constitutional 
amendments as sourced in the popular sovereign; some constitutional 
amendments can be described as creations of We the People, while others 
must be described as creations of ordinary, standing, legislative bodies. 
Second, the presupposition that all amendments ratified by three-fourths of 
the state legislatures have ipso facto  secured the consent of the sovereign 
people lies beyond the credible.304 In short, the dual-source thesis more 
closely approximates the reality of the origins of constitutional amendments 
than the orthodoxy. 
D. The Impossibility of the Popular Sovereignty Skeptic’s Retort 
The dual-source thesis offers a novel description of the sources of 
constitutional textual norms. Although novel, the dual-source theory presents 
a middle ground between two polar opposites: At one end of the spectrum, 
the orthodoxy claims that all constitutional textual norms, including all 
amendments, emanate from We the People. At the other end of the spectrum, 
the popular sovereignty skeptic doubts the validity of claims that We the 
People can or do engage in anything resembling acts of constitutional norm-
creation, and argues that no constitutional textual norms can honestly and 
fairly be characterized as creations of the popular sovereign.305 The popular 
 
 
 304. With this reality in mind, the question becomes the following: Which constitutional textual 
norms may we fairly and honestly classify as creations of We the People, and which must be 
reclassified as creations of government norm-generating institutions that fail to capture or embody a 
popular norm-generating act? I have identified the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-second, and 
Eighteenth Amendments as the most obvious examples of Article V false positives. In so doing, 
however, I have not articulated a clear rule or set of rules for distinguishing the constitutional textual 
norms that emanate from We the People from those emanating from ordinary legislative bodies. For 
present purposes, however, I need not identify such a set of rules. It is sufficient at this stage to 
understand what could not, under any reasonable approach, constitute a constitutional textual norm 
emanating from We the People. Identification of at least some amendments that cannot honestly be 
described as emanating from We the People is sufficient to debunk the orthodoxy, which holds that all 
constitutional textual norms originate from the popular sovereign. Articulating the line between 
constitutional textual norms that originate from We the People and those that originate from ordinary 
legislatures is a project for another day.  
 305. For literature that either subscribes to or reports expressions of popular sovereignty 
skepticism, see ANDERSON, supra note 164, at xiv (claiming that the Constitution’s drafters “rejected 
the notion of popular sovereignty—as anything more than political rhetoric”); GRIFFIN, supra  note 
108, at 24-26 (claiming that popular sovereignty receded as an important constitutional idea after 
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sovereignty skeptic raises difficult questions. Who constitutes We the 
People? By what procedures do they (or it) generate norms? How can the 
Constitution qualify as a creation of We the People if only white, male, 
property owners were allowed to select delegates to the state ratifying 
conventions, and only white males were elected to those ratifying 
conventions? How do we know when the People have engaged in an act of 
constitutional norm-creation?306 The path of least resistance would be to 
avoid these and other difficult questions and simply treat the theory of 
popular sovereignty as a quaint fiction advanced by the Federalists in the pre-
ratification period for purposes of placating populist opposition to the 
proposed Constitution and, thus, as effectively null and void as an 
operational component of American constitutional theory.  
While the popular sovereignty skeptic admittedly raises serious and 
difficult questions, the easy path of reading popular sovereignty theory out of 
the American Constitution is utterly unavailable. The Constitution embodies 
a constellation of fundamental or core principles. Without a doubt, popular 
sovereignty belongs to that constellation of principles.307 Both Federalists 
and Anti-Federalists publicly claimed to embrace popular sovereignty theory 
and argued in favor of popular sovereignty principles.308 The Federalists 
 
 
ratification, and that the People have no practical institutional arrangement by which they might 
exercise sovereignty); PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY : SELF-GOVERNMENT IN 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY  62-64 (1992) [hereinafter KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY ] 
(discussing the “myth of popular sovereignty”); PAUL W. KAHN, THE REIGN OF LAW: MARBURY V. 
MADISON AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF AMERICA  228, 230 (1997) [hereinafter KAHN , REIGN OF LAW] 
(speaking of popular sovereignty as an illusion essential to maintaining the appearance of the rule of 
law); MORGAN, supra note 155, at 13-14 (referring to popular sovereignty as a necessary fiction); 
JULIE MOSTOV, POWER, PROCESS, AND POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY  6 (1992) (discussing democratic 
theorists who view popular sovereignty as a “fiction” or a “noble lie”); J. ALLEN SMITH, THE SPIRIT OF 
AMERICAN GOVERNMENT (Cushing Strout ed., 1965); Bernard Crick, Sovereignty , in THE 
INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL SCIENCES 80 (1968) (referring to “the almost meaningless 
rhetoric of popular sovereignty”); David R. Dow, When Words Mean What We Believe They Say: The 
Case of Article V, 76 IOWA L. REV. 1, 13, 35 (1990) (claiming that popular sovereignty is only 
important to academicians and “is an esoteric notion that is irrelevant to constitutional interpretation”); 
Monaghan, supra  note 186, at 167-73 (useful overview of popular sovereignty skepticism from 
historians and legal scholars).  
 306. See, e.g., Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60 B.U. L. 
REV. 204, 230 (1980) (questioning the moral authority of the Constitution-amending process given 
that the Civil War Amendments only embodied the interests of “white property-holders and not the 
population as a whole”). 
 307. GRIFFIN, supra  note 108, at 19 (“The sovereignty of the people is a key element of American 
constitutionalism.”); MORGAN, supra note 155, at 143 (“By the eighteenth century, the sovereignty of 
the people was taken for granted.”); LAURENCE H. TRIBE , AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 2 (2d ed. 
1988) (“That all lawful power derives from the people . . . is the oldest and most central tenet of 
American constitutionalism.”). 
 308. See, e.g., ELBRIDGE GERRY,  OBSERVATIONS ON THE NEW CONSTITUTION, AND ON THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONVENTIONS, reprinted in  PAMPHLETS ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
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were particularly vociferous in claiming that the proposed Constitution was 
built on popular sovereignty foundations.309 The proposed Constitution was 
advertised as permeated with popular sovereignty theory.310 Moreover, the 
state ratifying conventions approved the Constitution under the expectation 
that popular sovereignty represented an integral component in the 
constitution’s morphology. 311  
Even if one were to accept the Beardian thesis that popular sovereignty 
theory was an artifice aimed at assuaging agrarian Anti-Federalist opposition 
to the less democratically responsive and more centralized government under 
the proposed Constitution,312 popular sovereignty nonetheless stands 
amongst the Constitution’s core principles. That certain Federalist Founders 
privately may not have been enamored with popular sovereignty, or may 
have utilized it as a rhetorical device, is irrelevant to whether popular 
sovereignty theory belongs to the Constitution’s constellation of core values. 
In the first instance, the Beardian thesis has rightly fallen out of favor.313 
Even if the Federalists had been privately indifferent or even hostile to 
popular sovereignty (a hard to sustain claim), “what counts as text is the 
document as understood by the American People  who ratified and amended 
it, and what counts as history is accessible public meaning, not secret private 
intent.”314 Moreover, the argument that private Federalist indifference or 
 
 
STATES, PUBLISHED DURING ITS DISCUSSION BY THE PEOPLE, 1787-1788, at 6 (Paul Leicester Ford 
ed., 1888) (At the Massachusetts Ratifying Convention, Anti-Federalist Elbridge Gerry stated that “the 
origin of all power is in the people, and they have an incontestable right to check the creatures of their 
creation.”); JAMES WILSON, PENNSYLVANIA RATIFYING CONVENTION, 4 December 1787, reprinted in 
1 THE FOUNDERS’  CONSTITUTION 62 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987) (At the 
Pennsylvania Ratifying Convention, Federalist James Wilson stated that “[t]he truth is, that the 
supreme, absolute and uncontrollable authority, remains with the people . . . . [S]upreme power . . . 
resides in the PEOPLE, as the fountain of government.”).  
 309. JACK N. RAKOVE ,  ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION 18 (1996) (speaking of popular sovereignty as “one of the great rallying points of 
Federalist argument”). 
 310. The Federalist is littered with references to popular sovereignty legitimizing the Constitution. 
See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 152 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The 
fabric of American empire ought to rest on the solid basis of THE CONSENT OF THE PEOPLE . The 
streams of national power ought to flow immediately from that pure, original fountain of all legitimate 
authority.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 313-14 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[t]he 
people are the only legitimate fountain of power, and it is from them that the constitutional charter, 
under which the several branches of government hold their power, is derived . . . . ”). 
 311. See supra text accompanying note 113. 
 312. See CHARLES BEARD , AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE CONSTITUTION (1913). 
 313. See ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 121, at 201-02, 212-18 (explaining that the 
reappraisal and ultimate rejection of Beard’s thesis began in the 1950s and culminated with Gordon 
Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787); KELLY, supra  note 119, at 115 (“Beard’s 
thesis in its original formulation has long since been disproved.”).  
 314. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra  note 75, at 29. See also  ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra 
note 121, at 88 (“[I]t is the intentions of the People that count, not those of a small number of 
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hostility excludes popular sovereignty from the Constitution’s core principles 
proves too much. Even if certain Federalist Founders’ private motivations for 
advancing the popular sovereignty component of the Constitution may be 
suspect, the private motivations of certain Federalist Founders in 
emphasizing the Constitution’s democratic or federalist components are 
equally suspect. No one could argue that democracy and federalism do not 
have their respective places among the Constitution’s constellation of core 
principles.  
Nor can one argue that popular sovereignty is degraded as a core 
constitutional principle because, in retrospect, the Constitution does not 
appear to have been ratified in accordance with popular sovereignty ideals. It 
is certainly true that many people were excluded from participating in the 
election of delegates to state ratifying conventions, which, from the modern 
perspective, contradicts popular sovereignty theory.315 That modern 
standards for popular sovereignty may not have been broadly practiced in 
ratifying the Constitution, however, does not mean that the Constitution does 
not embrace popular sovereignty theory as one of its core values.316 Again, 
no one would argue that democratic elements fall outside the Constitution’s 
constellation of core values. However, in practice the Constitution has not 
always effectuated the minimum requirements of democratic elections—
open and widespread citizen participation in the process of electoral checks. 
Female citizens did not gain suffrage until 1919,317 and African Americans 
were denied equal voting rights until the 1960s.318 Did this lack of universal 
suffrage mean that the Constitution did not or does not embrace democracy 
as one of its core principles? Of course not. It merely means that for much of 
United States history, practice failed to conform to core constitutional values. 
 
 
‘Framers’ who proposed the Constitution or its early  amendments.”). 
 315. Beard concludes that less than one-fifth of the population enjoyed the right of suffrage. See 
BEARD, supra  note 312, at  239-52. On the other hand, Akhil Amar counters that the electorates who 
chose the delegates to the state ratifying conventions were the broadest and most inclusive in history, 
and that ratification of the Constitution can accurately be characterized as the largest scale democratic 
event in the history of the world. Akhil Reed Amar, A Few Thoughts on Constitutionalism, Textualism, 
and Populism , 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1657, 1657 (1997); Amar, The Supreme Court, supra  note 75, at 
35-36. Moreover, the evidence suggests that the representatives at the state-ratifying conventions who 
voted in favor of ratification represented a decisive majority of the electorate.  
 316. The theory and practice of popular sovereignty are separate phenomena. One may fully 
embrace popular sovereignty theory even if one’s practices do not live up to popular sovereignty 
ideals. As David Dow has written, “[w]e can say . . . that the framers held an impoverished notion of 
‘people’ without saying, necessarily, that their parochial notion of people belied their commitment to 
the idea of popular sovereignty.” Dow, supra  note 305, at 11.  
 317. U.S. CONST. amend. XIX. 
 318. The Fourteenth Amendment was not enforced to protect the voting rights of blacks until the 
Civil Rights movement. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV. 
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Rather than conclude that anti-democratic practices deleted democracy as a 
core constitutional value, Americans have sought to bring practices in line 
with core values. Seven of the Constitution’s twenty-seven formal 
amendments aim to fulfill the Constitution’s original promise of democratic 
values by broadening electoral participation rights.319 The same reasoning 
applies to popular sovereignty. Because at the time of ratification only white 
male property owners participated in the state ratifying conventions and in 
the selection of delegates to those conventions, the practice of constitutional 
ratification failed to conform to the ideals of popular sovereignty theory. This 
stain on the nation’s history, however, does not expunge popular sovereignty 
from the Constitution’s constellation of core values.320  
For better or for worse, popular sovereignty is part of our constitutional 
system. Partially because many scholars have overlooked popular 
sovereignty theory as one of the Constitution’s core values, however, we do 
not have readily available answers to the difficult questions posed by the 
popular sovereignty skeptic. It is admittedly difficult to pinpoint exactly what 
popular sovereignty entails in practice. At the very least, however, popular 
sovereignty theory posits We the People (1) as an entity, (2) superior to 
government, (3) which ratifies constitutional norms. Inescapably, the idea 
that the People are the font of constitutional norms is deeply rooted in our 
constitutional tradition.  
Yet as unavailable as the popular sovereignty skeptic’s route may be, the 
orthodox view of We the People as the source of all constitutional textual 
norms is equally unrealistic. Unless we are willing to concede the fable that 
successful navigation of the Article V maze constitutes ipso facto  ratification 
by We the People, we are forced to acknowledge that not all constitutional 
textual norms can honestly and accurately be characterized as creations of 
We the People. An honest and accurate descriptive characterization of 
constitutional textual norms requires a proper balance of two realities. On 
one side, because popular sovereignty belongs among the Constitution’s core 
values, it must make room for the creation of constitutional textual norms by 
We the People. On the other side, it must also acknowledge the reality that 
not every constitutional provision and not every constitutional amendment 
can rightfully claim a legitimate popular sovereignty pedigree. Some 
 
 
 319. See U.S. CONST. amends. XXVI, XXIV, XXIII, XIX, XV, XIV, V; 2 CHESTER JAMES 
ANTIEAU & W ILLIAM J. RICH , MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 29.01 (2d ed. 1997). 
 320. It may, however, impact our view regarding which constitutional provisions emanate from 
the popular sovereign and which do not. Thus, it is not unreasonable to argue that recent amendments, 
ratified by state legislatures, which were elected by broad and inclusive electorates, more legitimately 
reflect the popular sovereign than the body of the Constitution itself , which was ratified by 
conventions that did not include women, minorities, and the landless poor. 
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constitutional textual norms may be characterized as sourced in the popular 
sovereign. Others are more accurately described as creations of normal 
government law-making institutions acting pursuant to Article V. In spite of 
the false positive problems inherent in the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-sixth, 
Twenty-second, and Eighteenth Amendments, we must not forget the 
Progressive Era and Civil War Era Amendments. The amendments emerging 
from these periods probably can credibly claim an untarnished popular 
sovereignty pedigree.321 Exactly what separates constitutional textual norms 
sourced in the People from constitutional norms sourced in normal 
government institutions is a complicated issue not subject to a simple 
formula. That the two extremes exist, however, is rather evident. 
Part of the task of legal scholarship is to develop narratives that legitimize 
legal norms and the operation of legal systems.322 In creating legitimizing 
theories, a few loose ends must be ignored, some outlier data disregarded, 
and some rough edges smoothed out. The complexities of reality never 
exactly comport with a reductionist model. Simplification is part and parcel 
of theory construction.323 Yet the construction of reductionist legitimizing 
theories ought not perpetuate reality-defying mythologies. Legal scholars 
should seek to develop credible legitimizing theories, not improbable fables. 
Popular sovereignty theory serves the important function of legitimizing the 
constitutional system. The orthodox view that all constitutional norms 
emanate from We the People, however, crosses the line from reductionist 
legitimizing narrative to fantastic mythology. While the idea that We the 
People are the font of higher law norms can fit most of the data, the notion 
that each and every jot of the Constitution emanates from We the People is 
too absolute and unconditional to be credible.  
The dual-source thesis is a credible alternative to the extreme and 
overwrought orthodoxy. Popular sovereignty theory posits that We the 
 
 
 321. In citing the Civil War and Progressive Era Amendments, I am not endorsing them as 
necessarily emanating from We the People. Instead, I more narrowly assert that these amendments can 
make credible claims to a popular sovereignty pedigree. Bruce Ackerman’s theory of constitutional 
moments seeks to ground the Civil War Amendments in a creative process that culminates in popular 
consent. See ACKERMAN, TRANSFO RMATIONS, supra  note 132, at 99-252. James Pope’s theory of 
republican moments seeks to do the same for the Progressive Era Amendments. See Pope, supra  note 
293, at 325-29. More generally, at this point I do not take a position on precisely which constitutional 
amendments were generated by We the People. Instead, I argue that we can identify at least four 
amendments that are very hard to describe as emanating from We the People under any reasonable set 
of criteria that might be employed for distinguishing popular sovereign from government  institution-
generated constitutional norms.  
 322. Of course, this is not to deny that another equally important role for legal scholarship is, 
when deserved, to criticize the law. 
 323. HINICH & MUNGER, supra  note 31, at 4 (“ [S]implifying assumptions make[] analysis 
manageable and help[] us focus on the key components of a phenomenon.”). 
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People are authors of constitutional textual norms. The legitimacy of the 
Constitution depends upon the idea that it emanates from We the People. Its 
legitimacy, however, does not require that each and every provision emanate 
from We the People. A constitutional system based on the idea that some 
constitutional textual norms are generated by the popular sovereign, while 
others are generated by ordinary government institutions, is perfectly 
sustainable, especially if the provisions emanating from the popular 
sovereign are treated as higher order constitutional norms that trump lower 
order constitutional norms created by ordinary government. 
The best description, or more accurately, the only description consistent 
with both practical reality and foundational constitutional premises, 
maintains that We the People create some constitutional textual norms, while  
ordinary government norm-generating institutions create other constitutional 
textual norms. Although this description may contradict the orthodox 
mythology, it is hardly polemic. At the very least, it is less problematic and 
controvertible than its competing alternatives, the orthodoxy’s mythology 
and the popular sovereignty skeptic’s harangue.  
V. TREATING POPULAR SOVEREIGN AND GOVERNMENT GENERATED 
CONSTITUTIONAL NORMS AS DIFFERENT IN KIND 
What exactly would embracing the dual-source thesis and rejecting the 
extant orthodoxy mean for the adjudication of cases involving conflicts 
between constitutional provisions? As with many of the issues raised in this 
Article, this question deserves a separate and more complete treatment. At 
this juncture, however, I submit that embracing the dual-source thesis need 
not necessarily portend radical change in the constitutional landscape, and I 
suggest some tentative ideas for implementing the dual-source thesis where 
constitutional norms irreconcilably conflict. 
Return to the RFRA-like amendment example raised in the 
Introduction.324 Imagine that, like either the Eighteenth or Twenty-sixth 
Amendments, the hypothesized RFRA-like constitutional amendment 
overcomes Article V’s hurdles and becomes the Twenty-eighth Amendment 
to the Constitution, despite the lack of a discernable, deliberated popular 
consensus sanctioning its ratification by the state legislatures. Embracing the 
dual-source thesis clearly would not mean that such a Twenty-eighth 
Amendment would be a nullity. Artic le V unambiguously states that any 
amendment overcoming its supermajoritarian hurdles “shall be valid to all 
 
 
 324. See supra text accompanying notes 4-7. 
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Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution.”325 The fact that the 
Twenty-eighth Amendment might emanate from ordinary state legislatures, 
rather than from We the People, would not affect its status as a legitimate 
constitutional norm. As a formal matter, Article V manifestly empowers 
Congress to propose, and the state legislatures to ratify, new constitutional 
textual norms, with or without a discernable, deliberated popular consensus. 
The Twenty-eighth Amendment, therefore, would undeniably count as part 
of the Constitution. Moreover, all other things being equal, whenever some 
lower order norm—a statute, administrative regulation, or common law 
rule—would come into conflict with the Twenty-eighth Amendment, the 
latter would trump the former. Constitutional norms axiomatically trump 
sub-constitutional norms. Because it has overcome Article V’s 
supermajoritarian hurdles, it deserves to be treated as different in kind and 
hierarchically superior to ordinary statutes. Yet, because it does not bear the 
marks of a true popular sovereignty pedigree, it ought not be categorized as 
the highest form of law. We could call such an amendment a constitutional 
superstatute.326 
The real question, however, is the effect of the Twenty-eighth 
Amendment on other parts of the Constitution. Under the extant orthodoxy, 
the Twenty-eighth Amendment would trump the conflicting Free Exercise 
Clause. Acceptance of the dual-source thesis implies a different outcome. 
Return to the source, hierarchic, categoric, and chronologic meta-norms 
discussed in Part II. Under the source axiom, legal norms sourced in the same 
kinds of norm-generating institutions or entities belong to the same legal 
category, while legal norms sourced in different kinds of norm-generating 
institutions or entities belong to separate legal categories.327 Because the 
orthodoxy supposes that We the People have ratified both the Twenty-eighth 
Amendment and the Free Exercise Clause, both belong to the category 
“constitutional textual norms.” From the perspective of the dual-source 
thesis, however, if we assume that the Bill of Rights emanates from We the 
People, the source axiom demands that the Free Exercise Clause be treated as 
categorically distinct from the government institution-generated Twenty-
 
 
 325. U.S. CONST. art. V. 
 326. Others have used the term superstatute differently. Most recently, William Eskridge and John 
Ferejohn used the term superstatute to refer to statutes that “successfully penetrate public normative 
and institutional culture in a deep way.” William N. Eskridge, Jr. & John Ferejohn, Super-Statutes, 50 
DUKE L.J. 1215, 1215 (2001). Bruce Ackerman has used the term superstatute to refer to amendments 
that “do not try to revise any of the deeper principles organizing our higher law.” ACKERMAN, 
FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 121, at 91. My use of the term, in contrast, refers to any amendment that 
has overcome Article V hurdles, but which nonetheless lacks a popular sovereignty pedigree. 
 327. See supra text accompanying notes 75-81. 
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eighth Amendment. The former belongs to the legal category “government 
constitutional norms,” while the latter belongs to the legal category “popular 
constitutional norms.” Under the hierarchic axiom, legal categories populated 
by norms sourced in institutions and entities of comparatively superior 
democratic legitimacy are hierarchically superior to the legal categories 
populated by norms sourced in institutions and entities of comparatively 
inferior democratic legitimacy.328 A political system built on popular 
sovereignty, by definition, considers We the People to be the norm-
generating entity of highest democratic legitimacy. Legislative bodies, in 
contrast, are mere agents or “stand-ins” for We the People. If we embrace the 
dual-source thesis, consistency with the hierarchic axiom, therefore, demands 
that the legal system treat the popular sovereign-generated Free Exercise 
Clause as hierarchically superior to the government institution-generated 
Twenty-eighth Amendment. Finally, under the categoric axiom, whenever a 
norm belonging to a superordiante legal category irreconcilably conflicts 
with a norm belonging to a subordinate legal category, the former always 
unconditionally trumps the latter.329 Thus, the superordinate Free Exercise 
Clause would trump the newly minted subordinate Twenty-eighth 
Amendment.  
In short, acceptance of the dual-source thesis means that ratification of 
our hypothetical Twenty-eighth Amendment would not result in a complete 
or even partial repeal of the Free Exercise Clause. To the contrary, despite 
the newly minted Twenty-eighth Amendment, the Free Exercise Clause 
would remain fully intact and unaltered. Under the orthodox approach, 
because all constitutional textual norms, including all amendments, emanate 
from We the People, the chronologic axiom would govern any conflict 
between hierarchically equal constitutional provisions. The Twenty-eighth 
Amendment, being of more recent vintage, would trump the Free Exercise 
Clause. In contrast, if we accept the dual-source thesis as more accurately 
describing the sources of constitutional amendments, the opposite result is 
reached. Because the Twenty-eighth Amendment and Free Exercsie Clause 
emanate from different sources, the categoric axiom will govern the conflict. 
Assuming that the Bill of Rights emanates from We the People, consistency 
with the categoric axiom requires that the Free Exercise Clause remain 
completely untouched and unaltered by ratification of the Twenty-eighth 
Amendment, which lacks a legitimate popular sovereignty pedigree. The 
categoric axiom, rather than the chronologic axiom, will govern, and the Free 
 
 
 328. See supra text accompanying notes 82-85. 
 329. See supra text accompanying note 58. 
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Exercise Clause will trump a subordinate constitutional provision. 330  
This is a considerable departure from existing practices. For several 
reasons, however, it is in fact less radical than it might appear at first 
glance.331 First, recognizing that constitutional textual norms emanate from 
 
 
 330. At this juncture some may raise the objection that even if some constitutional amendments 
cannot accurately be described as emanating from We the People, all constitutional amendments 
nonetheless have the same hierarchical status as the provisions of the Constitution’s main body. The 
objection runs as follows: Some amendments cannot be described as emanating directly from We the 
People. Article V itself, however, does emanate from We the People. By ratifying Article V, We the 
People delegated to ordinary government institutions the power to create constitutional amendments. 
An amendment, by definition, must work a change. An amendment that effects no change is 
nonsensical. Thus, the RFRA-like amendment, whether or not it reflects a popular consensus, must, as 
do all constitutional amendments, change the Constitution.  
 The objection, however, is fatally flawed. Even if an amendment must necessarily change the 
Constitution, Article V does not address the way in which amendments change the Constitution. Using 
my dual-source thesis based approach, the RFRA-like amendment would change the Constitution by 
becoming a new legitimate constitutional textual norm. See infra  text accompanying notes 354-60. 
Nothing, however, compels us to find that a new amendment must change the Constitution by altering 
the contours of some preexisting constitutional provision. In short, even if the word “amendment” in 
the language of Article V means change, it is not necessarily limited to change that overrules, nullifies, 
reshapes, or in other words, partially or fully destroys some other preexisting constitutional provision. 
One may amend, change, alter, or modify without destroying. Think of a house. One may change a 
house by fully or partially tearing down a screened porch and replacing it with a new enclosed wing. 
This kind of change involves destruction. Some amendments may effect this kind of change. In the 
alternative, one may change a home by adding rain gutters. The rain gutters do not in anyway destroy a 
preexisting part of the home. They merely add a new feature. Other amendments, such as the RFRA-
like amendment, which lack a popular sovereignty pedigree, will effect this kind of change. In short, 
there is nothing in the meaning of the word “amendment” that necessarily means destructive 
nullification or reshaping. An amendment can also be the simple addition of some previously 
nonexistent element. Moreover, even if the word amendment often means change that involves the 
destruction of a previously existing feature, to read that meaning into Article V would be a mistake. As 
discussed above, Article V received very little attention in the ratification process. See supra text 
accompanying note 164. To presume that the drafters or ratifiers debated and decided the particular 
meaning of the word “amendment,” or even that they considered the meaning of the word in such 
detail, presumes too much. In the end, the meaning of “amendment” in Article V is open to 
interpretation. Article V simply does not tell us whether the word “amendment” is limited to changes 
that partially or fully destroy preexisting elements of the Constitution.  
 331. What about existing amendments? What would acceptance of the dual-source thesis mean for 
the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-second, and Eighteenth Amendments, all of which 
apparently lack a solid popular sovereignty pedigree? First, the Eighteenth Amendment has been 
repealed. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXI. Second, the Twenty-seventh, Twenty-sixth, and Twenty-
second Amendments add something new to the Constitution. None of them contradict preexisting 
constitutional provisions. Therefore, acceptance of the dual-source thesis and finding that these 
amendments emanate not from We the People, but instead from ordinary state legislatures, would have 
no effect on their validity.  
 I must candidly admit, however, that amendments such as the Thirteenth (slavery 
unconstitutional), Fourteenth (equal protection), and Sixteenth (direct taxation without apportionment) 
present harder questions. See U.S. CONST. amends. XIII, XIV, XVI. At this juncture, the reader may 
rightly wonder whether my thesis will ultimately eviscerate these amendments. More to the point, do 
these amendments lack a popular sovereignty pedigree, and if so, are they trumped by the preexisting 
popular sovereign -generated constitutional provisions that they were supposed to nullify? The short 
answer is no. I believe that ultimately, we can devise a rational and attractive set of principles for 
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two different sources, and that we therefore have two different kinds of 
constitutional textual norms, is not all that novel. The effect of embracing the 
dual-source thesis would be to make the constitutional provisions emanating 
from We the People harder to amend than those emanating from ordinary 
government. The former could only be amended by We the People. The 
latter, in contrast, could be amended either by We the People or by ordinary 
government via Article V. Though not currently a part of federal 
constitutional practice in the United States, many nations follow variations 
on this strategy. The French and German Constitutions, for example, create 
two tiers of constitutional norms by explicitly making certain provisions 
unamendable.332 The Indian constitutional system creates two tiers of 
constitutional norms by utilizing two separate tracks for the amendment 
process. Most provisions may be amended by a two-thirds vote of the 
Parliament, plus the consent of the President.333 However, for amendments 
seeking to alter constitutional provisions reflecting fundamental rights, “not 
less than one-half of the state legislatures must ratify [the amendment].”334 
The Spanish Constitution creates two classes of constitutional provisions, one 
more firmly entrenched than the other. Most provisions may be amended by 
the legislatures or, if requested by one-tenth of the legislature, by popular 
referendum.335 Certain core provisions regarding democratic principles and 
certain rights, however, may be amended only by supermajorities of both 
houses of two consecutive national legislatures.336 Closer to home, some 
states have effectively adopted two levels of constitutional norms. California, 
for example, has effectively created two tiers of constitutional provisions by 
placing changes in provisions that would amount to a “far-reaching change in 
[the] governmental framework” beyond the reach of the voter initiative 
 
 
distinguishing popular sovereign from government institution-generated amendments. Bruce 
Ackerman’s theory of constitutional moments and James Pope’s theory of republican moments, to give 
two examples, offer ways of categorizing the Civil War Amendments as emanating from the popular 
sovereign. See Ackerman, supra  note 121, at 99-252. Pope, supra note 293, at 305-06. While I take no 
position on either approach, Ackerman’s and Pope’s attempts to develop theories for the nonformal 
popular sanction of constitutional change show that my dual-source thesis does not necessarily spell 
constitutional chaos. The Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments can be categorized as emanating 
from We the People. The challenge going forward will be to devise a set of principles that more 
honestly and accurately categorizes constitutional provisions than the one-size-fits-all approach of the 
extant orthodoxy and that will not disrupt well-settled constitutional law. I will take up this challenge 
in future work.  
 332. Katz, supra note 132, at 265-67. 
 333. Id. at 270. 
 334. Id.  
 335. Id. at 284. 
 336. Id. at 284-85. 
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amendment process.337 Embracing the dual-source thesis would simply make 
the American Constitution one of the many constitutions that create two tiers 
of constitutional norms by making some provisions harder to amend than 
others.  
Moreover, embracing the idea that not all constitutional textual norms can 
honestly and accurately be described as emanating from We the People 
would not be the first time that a myth regarding the sources of constitutional 
norms has been dismantled. The dual-source thesis merely builds on past 
learning on the sources of constitutional norms. Post-World War II legal 
scholars jettisoned the then-orthodox mythology that all constitutional norms, 
including constitutional doctrine, are sourced in We the People. The 
orthodox view, as expounded by Alexander Hamilton in Federalist No. 78338 
and adopted by Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison,339 maintained that 
constitutional doctrine merely declares We the People’s constitutional textual 
norms. Based on the Hamiltonian-Marshallian view, therefore, judicial 
review is the popular sovereign speaking though the Supreme Court (rather 
than the Court speaking with its own voice), which trumps the acts of 
legislatures and executive branch officials.340 Nonetheless, post-World War 
II Supreme Court practice rendered the Hamiltonian-Marshallian view 
untenable. The Warren Court’s increased appetite for judicial review and the 
Court’s propensity to find novel and amplified constitutional rights 
underscored a theretofore underappreciated reality: While constitutional texts 
may be sourced in the popular sovereign, doctrinal elaborations are more 
accurately portrayed as creations of the Supreme Court. Though cognizable 
even in early stages of American constitutional development, from the 1950s 
forward the distinction between constitutional textual norms and 
constitutional doctrinal norms stands front and center in the minds of 
 
 
 337. Id. at 281-84 (quoting Raven v. Deukmejian, 801 P.2d 1077, 1080 (Cal. 1990), reh’g denied 
(Feb. 14, 1991)). 
 338. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 339. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176, 177 (1803) (stating that “the people have 
an original right to establish, for their future government, [fundamental] principles,” which, when 
“attached to a written constitution” defeat legislative acts repugnant to it). 
 340. The Hamiltonian-Marshallian orthodoxy deftly shifted the focus from the democratic 
legitimacy of the institution responsible for determining constitutionality (electorally legitimized 
legislatures versus electorally unaccountable courts) to the democratic legitimacy of entities that create 
the conflicting norms (the People’s constitutional norms versus the statutes created by legislatures). It 
is not so much the unelected third branch’s constitutional doctrine that trumps the electorally 
accountable first branch’s statute, but rather the constitutional norms that originate from We the People 
that trump the st atutory norms created by the People’s legislative agents. The Supreme Court just 
happens to be the institution which, by virtue of its adjudicatory function, referees conflicts between 
the People’s constitutional norms and their legislative agents’ statutory norms.  
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constitutional scholars.341 Against this landscape, embracing the dual-source 
thesis represents not a break from the past, but rather a continuation of past 
learning. Whereas post-World War II counter-majoritarian difficulty scholars 
rejected the idea that constitutional doctrinal norms emanate from the 
popular sovereign, the dual-source thesis furthers the analysis by asserting 
that not all constitutional textual norms emanate from the popular sovereign.  
The dual-source thesis also extends recent learning on the sources of 
constitutional norms. The work of the counter-majoritarian difficulty 
theorists focused on constitutional doctrine. Recent scholarship, in contrast, 
has begun to focus on the sources of constitutional amendments and the 
nature of constitutional change in general.342 Rather than a bolt from the blue, 
the dual-source thesis merely pushes ideas developed in this newer body of 
work in a new direction. Consider Akhil Amar’s popular sovereignty-
informed reading of Article V. The conventional wisdom views Article V as 
the exclusive means for creating new constitutional textual norms. Amar, 
however, argues that Article V merely sets forth the methods by which 
ordinary government institutions may create new constitutional norms.343 We 
 
 
 341. By the 1950s, constitutional scholars, no longer able to swallow the Hamiltonian-Marshallain 
view that all constitutional norms are creations of the popular sovereign, began to frame judicial 
review in an anti-democratic light. Under the Hamiltonian-Marshallian orthodoxy, judicial review is 
We the People (constitutional norms) versus their legislative agents (statutes). That the People should 
trump their agents is altogether uncontroversial and perfectly compatible with democratic values. Once 
scholars proclaim that the Supreme Court acts as an author of constitutional doctrinal norms, however, 
judicial review becomes a question not of the People versus their legislative agents, but rather of the 
unelected Supreme Court versus the electorally accountable Congress and Chief Executive. Framed in 
these terms, constitutional scholars began to wonder how a democratic system can countenance such 
an institutional arrangement. Judge Learned Hand, Herbert Wechsler, Alexander Bickel, and John Ely 
each struggled to resolve or dissolve what had come to be characterized as the counter-majoritarian 
difficulty in their own unique way. See KAHN, Legitimacy and History, supra note 305, at 134-51 
(providing an overview of the counter-majoritarian theorists’ ideas regarding the legitimacy of judicial 
review). All, however, explicitly or implicitly recognized that the Supreme Court (as opposed to the 
popular sovereign alone) operates as a creator of constitutional norms, and that the court’s function as 
a norm-generating institution gives rise to the counter-majoritarian difficulty. See id. Scholars today 
openly confess that although the Constitution’s passages may have been ratified by the People, at least 
where open-textured constitutional passages are involved (e.g., equal protection, substantive due 
process, and privacy rights), the Supreme Court functions as the immediate author of constitutional 
doctrinal norms. See, e.g., Strauss, supra  note 75, at 883, 887 (arguing that Supreme Court precedent is 
of greater import than constitutional text when deciding cases and that a common law model better 
describes Supreme Court elaboration of constitutional doctrine than does the idea that constitutional 
doctrine must be connected to the Framers or popular sovereign). See also  Amar, The Supreme Court, 
supra  note 75, at 27 (identifying scholars associated with the “doctrinalist” school of thought, under 
which Supreme Court-developed constitutional doctrine “displaces” constitutional text).  
 342. For an overview of this body of scholarship, see RESPONDING TO IMPERFECTION: THE 
THEORY AND PRACTICE OF CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT (Sanford Levinson ed., 1995). 
 343. Amar explicitly regards Article V as a process by which government alone can amend the 
Constitution. See Amar, The Consent of the Governed , supra  note 111, at 459 (“[Article V] merely 
specifies how ordinary Government can amend the Constitution without recurring to the People 
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the People, in contrast, may amend the Constitution through a national 
referendum on a proposed constitutional amendment.344 Amar’s Article V 
interpretation quite openly accepts dual-source-oriented thinking by arguing 
that constitutional amendments emanate from normal government norm-
creating institutions operating through Article V on the one hand, and We the 
People operating through national referenda on the other hand.345  
As we have already seen, Bruce Ackerman’s much discussed theory of 
dualist democracy and extra-Article V constitutional amendment also seems 
to presuppose the dual-source thesis thinking, though in a less explicit way. 
Ackerman rightly recognizes that formal rules will, by nature, produce false 
positives.346 If Article V is considered a formal rule for identifying 
constitutional textual norms sourced in the popular sovereign (as mentioned 
previously), in at least some instances, it will erroneously identify some 
constitutional amendments ratified by the state legislatures as having secured 
We the People’s deliberated sanction. As previously argued, these false 
positives can only be honestly and accurately described as constitutional 
textual norms emanating from ordinary government institutions that have 
malfunctioned as an embodiment of We the People.347 
 
 
themselves, the true and sovereign source of all lawful power.”). See also  Amar, Philadelphia 
Revisited , supra note 163, at 1054 (“Article V makes constitutional amendment by ordinary 
governmental entities possible and thus eliminates the necessity of future appeals to the People 
themselves.”). Recently, however, Amar has implied that We the People, as well as ordinary 
government, may amend the Constitution via Article V mechanisms. See Amar, The Supreme Court, 
supra  note 75, at 29, 36, 38, 43, 49, 84-85 (referring to several amendments ratified via Article V and 
referring to the main body of the Constitution as emanating from We the People). Either way, the 
Amarian interpretation of Article V clearly comprehends that constitutional amendments may emanate 
from both We the People and ordinary government.  
 344. See Amar, The Consent of the Governed , supra note 111, at 457 (“We the People of the 
United Stat es have a legal right to alter our Government—to change our Constitution—via a 
majoritarian and populist mechanism akin to a national referendum, even though that mechanism is not 
explicitly specified in Article V.”).  
 345. The Amarian interpretation of Art icle V resembles the dual-source interpretation of Article V 
that I advanced for rhetorical purposes in Part IV.B. See Amar, Popular Sovereignty, supra note 163. 
Amar’s reading of Article V has come under serious attack. See, e.g., Dow, supra note 305 (arguing 
the plain meaning of Article V and Constitution’s commitment to majority rule); Monaghan, supra 
note 186 (arguing that the Amarian reading of Article V is “historically groundless” and ignores the 
federalism aspect of Article V and the desire of the Framers to eliminate unmediated direct popular 
lawmaking); John R. Vile, Legally Amending the United States Constitution: The Exclusivity of Article 
V’s Mechanisms, 21 CUMB. L. REV. 271 (1991). The critics, however, seem to assume that there is 
only one correct reading of Article V—the orthodoxy’s reading. In reality, there are several plausible 
readings of Article V’s text and original understandings, and Amar has provided an interpretation of 
Article V at least as plausible as the orthodox reading. Reasonable minds, however, may conclude that 
the weight of the evidence does not support the Amarian reading of Article V. Nonetheless, Amar has 
undeniably gathered a substantial body of evidence to support his unorthodox Article V interpretation.  
 346. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra note 121, at 278-80; ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, 
supra  note 132, at 28-29. 
 347. See supra text accompanying notes 210, 303-04. 
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We have also seen how some of Ackerman’s most basic premises imply 
(though probably unintentionally) dual-source-oriented thinking. In 
constructing his theory of extra-Article V constitutional amendment, 
Ackerman uses the oscillation of the American body politic between periods 
of normal and constitutional politics to great effect. He clearly posits that We 
the People are ratifiers of constitutional textual norms.348 During periods of 
constitutional politics, Ackerman claims that We the People ratify 
amendments via a special four phase extra-Article V process developed 
during the Founding, Civil War, and New Deal Eras.349 He also suggests that 
We the People may ratify new constitutional textual norms through the 
“classical” Article V system.350 Ackerman’s characterization of We the 
People in periods of normal politics as apathetic, ignorant, and of limited 
attention span, however, seems to suggest that during such times, We the 
People are incapable of ratifying constitutional amendments, not only via the 
four-phase process, but also via the classical Article V mechanism. As 
argued earlier, We the People cannot generate a deliberated popular 
consensus sanctioning new constitutional norms if, for all intents and 
purposes, We the People are absent from the political stage.351 Ackerman all 
but explicitly asserts this argument with his Federalist-inspired notion that in 
periods of normal politics, government institutions (legislatures) stand in 
place of, rather than stand for, We the People.352 As stand-ins state 
legislatures ratify constitutional amendments in their own name, and on 
 
 
 348. Ackerman describes American politics as alternating between periods of “normal” and 
“constitutional” politics. ACKERMAN, FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 121, at 266-94. See also supra note 
295. During periods of normal politics, the sovereign people pay scant attention to political issues and 
instead defer to the political choices adopted by their agent government. See id. During periods of 
special “constitutional politics” or “constitutional moments,” in contrast, the sovereign people become 
highly attuned to political issues and take up an active participatory role in shaping the basic rules that 
define constitutional rights and responsibilities. See id. Constitutional norms, however, may be 
amended during periods of both normal and constitutional politics. See id. In periods of normal 
politics, the Constitution has been amended via formal Article V methodologies. See id. In periods of 
special constitutional politics, however, the People have “ratified” transformative constitutional 
alterations via creative extra-Article V methods. Id. Ackerman identifies the Founding Era, the Civil 
War Amendments, and the New Deal Era reconceptualization of the Commerce Clause as special 
constitutional moments resulting in transformative constitutional change. Id. at 206-12. In each of 
these periods, transformative constitutional change followed from a set four-stage pattern, which 
ultimately culminated in what amounts to informal non-Article V popular ratification of transformative 
constitutional modification. Id. at 266-90. 
 349. Id. at 266-90 (breaking down the extra-Article V amendment process into signaling, 
proposal, deliberation, and codification phases). 
 350. ACKERMAN, TRANSFORMATIONS, supra note 132, at 15 (stating that under Article V, a 
proposal by two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the state legislatures authorizes constitutional 
reform in the name of We the People). 
 351. See supra text accompanying notes 295-99. 
 352. See supra text accompanying note 299. 
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behalf of, rather than as an embodiment of, We the People. In short, crucial 
Ackermaniacal premises leave little room to conclude that constitutional 
amendments emanate from We the People in times of ordinary politics. To 
the contrary, Ackerman’s premises suggest tha t in times of ordinary politics, 
constitutional amendments are creations of ordinary government.  
In short, the dual-source thesis neatly complements the current literature 
on Article V and the sources of constitutional amendments. The Amarian 
reading of Article V explicitly embraces the idea that some constitutional 
amendments are ratified by ordinary government institutions (amendments 
ratified by Article V), while others are ratified by We the People (via 
majoritarian referenda). Though less explicit than Amar, Ackerman’s 
premises also seem to imply that both We the People and ordinary 
government may ratify constitutional amendments. In fairness to Amar and 
Ackerman, neither has focused directly on the dual-source thesis. Both argue 
that Article V is not a necessary condition to We the People amending the 
Constitution. The dual-source thesis, in contrast, argues that Article V is not a 
sufficient condition to We the People amending the Constitution. Thus, the 
dual-source thesis pushes the line traced by Amar and Ackerman in a new 
direction. 
Another important reason that the dual-source thesis ought not be thought 
too radical is that embracing it need not necessitate a wholesale 
reconfiguration of the constitutional landscape. One might imagine that 
treating popular sovereign and government-sourced constitutional textual 
norms as different in kind and hierarchically ordered would require the 
federal courts to revisit and revise vast bodies of constitutional law. The 
degree of change in the constitutional landscape, however, would depend 
upon exactly which constitutional provisions count as sourced in We the 
People and which count as sourced in ordinary government institutions. At 
this point it is unclear exactly where that line should be drawn.  
In the first instance, prudential interpretive doctrines could conceivably 
minimize alterations in the constitutional landscape. For example, the federal 
courts could apply a rebuttable presumption favoring the categorization of all 
constitutional clauses ratified pursuant to Article VII or Article V as 
emanating from We the People.353 Only compelling evidence that a particular 
 
 
 353. I am assuming that such issues would be justiciable. Current Supreme Court doctrine places 
questions on the meaning of Article V in the hands of the electorally accountable branches of 
government. See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433 (1939). See also  Dellinger, supra note 108, at 386 
(criticizing non-justiciability of the meaning of Article V). Even if not justiciable, the political 
branches could, at least in theory, implement the dual-source thesis. I say in theory, because Congress, 
which by a two-thirds vote has proposed an amendment, may often have little incentive to later find 
that the amendment, once ratified, lacks a pure popular sovereignty pedigree. 
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constitutional textual norm was ratified absent substantial popular 
deliberation (like the Twenty-seventh Amendment) or contrary to a 
deliberated popular consensus (like the Twenty-sixth Amendment) would 
rebut the presumption of a pure popular sovereignty pedigree. By admitting 
that not all constitutional textual norms can rightfully claim a popular 
sovereignty pedigree, this approach avoids the Achilles heel of the orthodox 
mythology—that all constitutional amendments emanate from We the 
People. Moreover, at the practical level, a rebuttable presumption minimizes 
disruptions in the constitutional landscape by reducing the number of current 
and future amendments classified as subordinate government-generated 
constitutional textual norms. I do not necessarily mean to endorse this kind of 
interpretive presumption for differentiating between popular sovereign and 
government institution-sourced constitutional textual norms. My point is 
simply that strategies are available for minimizing the practical impact of 
embracing the dual-source thesis, and avoiding the reevaluation of vast 
bodies of settled constitutional case law decided under orthodox 
assumptions.  
Consider yet another reason why embracing the dual-source thesis and its 
resulting consequences need not necessarily work a wholesale 
reconfiguration of the extant constitutional landscape. So far I have argued 
that under a dual-source oriented paradigm, ratification of a RFRA-like 
Twenty-eighth Amendment lacking a popular sovereignty pedigree would 
leave the contours of the popular sovereign-generated Free Exercise Clause 
completely unaltered. The implications of the dual-source thesis for 
constitutional doctrinal norms, however, are less clear. Recall that a 
constitutional textual norm, such as the Free Exercise Clause, usually 
embraces a range of plausible meanings. A valid constitutional doctrinal 
norm, in contrast, is a particular judicially chosen meaning from within that 
range.354 The dual-source thesis implies that a government institution-
generated constitutional amendment ought not trump a constitutional 
provision bearing a valid popular sovereignty pedigree. It is entirely 
plausible, however, that a government institution-generated constitutional 
amendment would trump judicially created constitutional doctrine.  
In concrete terms, our hypothetical Twenty-eighth Amendment should 
not trump the Free Exercise Clause textual norm. It may, however, trump the 
Free Exercise Clause-based doctrinal rule of Employment Division, 
Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith.355 One reasonable 
 
 
 354. See supra text accompanying notes 47-54. 
 355. 494 U.S. 872 (1990). The Supreme Court uses a rational basis test to articulate Free Exercise 
Clause-based constitutional doctrine. See supra  note 4 and accompanying text. 
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interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause textual norm is that the clause 
prohibits government action impinging on facially neutral religious practices 
only when government fails to provide a rational reason for impinging on 
particular religious practice.356 This is the doctrinal interpretation adopted in 
Smith . An alternative plausible reading of the Free Exercise Clause is that it 
prohibits government action impinging on religious practices unless the 
government provides a compelling reason. This was the doctrinal 
interpretation maintained prior to Smith.357 Our hypothetical Twenty-eighth 
Amendment seeks to impose the latter strict scrutiny standard. Because the 
Amendment lacks a popular sovereignty pedigree, it should neither repeal 
nor alter the contours of the popular sovereign-sourced Free Exercise Clause 
textual norm. More precisely, it should not narrow the range of plausible 
meanings attributable to the Free Exercise Clause and eliminate the rational 
basis test as one of multiple plausible meanings. On the other hand, the 
Twenty-eighth Amendment could  alter the contours of the Court-created 
constitutional doctrinal interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. In the 
same way that Supreme Court-developed doctrine does not alter the range of 
plausible meanings attributable to a constitutional provision, a government-
generated constitutional amendment would not alter the contours of a 
constitutional provision. Such an amendment would merely select one 
particular meaning attributable to a preexisting constitutional textual norm, 
much as the Supreme Court selects one plausible interpretation from a range 
of plausible meanings attributable to a constitutional textual norm when the 
Court develops constitutional doctrinal norms. 
Constitutional doctrine may be based on a constitutional provision 
emanating from We the People. Constitutional doctrine itself, however, 
emanates from the Supreme Court. Constitutional doctrinal norms, in other 
words, like the hypothetical Twenty-eighth Amendment, lack a valid popular 
sovereignty pedigree. It is therefore entirely reasonable that a RFRA-like 
Twenty-eighth Amendment should trump and nullify the Supreme Court-
created constitutional doctrinal rule articulated in Smith. Though lacking the 
sanction of a discernable, deliberated popular consensus—a valid popular 
sovereignty pedigree—our hypothetical Twenty-eighth Amendment has 
gained the assent of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths of the states.358 
 
 
 356. See id. at 876-82. 
 357. For nearly three decades prior to Smith, the Supreme Court used a strict scrutiny analysis of 
the Free Exercise Clause. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 4, 
at 1021 (“For the next 27 years [after Sherbert], the Court usually purported to apply strict scrutiny to 
religion clause claims . . . .”). 
 358. However, our hypothetical Twenty-eighth Amendment could neither entirely repeal the Free 
Exercise Clause nor impose some interpretation falling outside the range of plausible meanings of the 
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Congress cannot, by passing a statute, overrule a Supreme Court doctrinal 
interpretation of a constitutional provision. 359 On the other hand, a 
constitutional superstatute (lacking the sanction of a de liberated popular 
consensus, but gaining the assent of two-thirds of Congress and three-fourths 
of the state legislatures) should, perhaps, overrule conflicting Supreme 
Court-created constitutional doctrine.360  
As with the interpretive presumption of a popular sovereignty pedigree, I 
do not necessarily endorse the above-mentioned argument. A separate and 
thorough exploration of the dual-source thesis’s implications on 
constitutional doctrine will be needed before endorsing such an idea. I raise 
the issue here, however, merely to reinforce the point that embracing the 
dual-source thesis does not necessarily imply a far-reaching reconfiguration 
of the Constitution. It is entirely possible that allowing a constitutional 
superstatute amendment to trump Supreme Court-created doctrine—but not 
popular sovereign-generated constitutional textual norms—would minimize 
any necessary reconfiguration.  
Despite the foregoing analysis, many commentators will still object on 
pragmatic grounds. Many will argue that it is simply too late in our 
jurisprudential and constitutional history to so abruptly change course. Since 
the founding of the republic, the federal courts have treated all constitutional 
provisions as similar in kind, as hierarchically indistinguishable, and as 
ratified by We the People, regardless of their true origins. Despite any efforts 
to minimize the effects of such an abrupt change, differentiating between 
popular sovereign and government institution-created constitutional textual 
norms would disrupt stable, longstanding practices, and interfere with 
tradition and continuity.  
Admittedly, I advance a counter-intuitive break with traditional practices. 
In resolving cases in which two constitutional provisions irreconcilably 
conflict, the federal courts have never treated a sub-class of constitutional 
 
 
Free Exercise Clause. Such an amendment would seek to either obliterate or alter the contours of the 
Free Exercise Clause.  
 359. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that Congress may not by statute 
alter the scope of its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement legislative powers as defined by Supreme 
Court precedent). 
 360. Bruce Ackerman has advanced a similar argument in connection with the Twenty-sixth 
Amendment. See ACKERMAN,  FOUNDATIONS, supra  note 121, at 91. Ackerman argues that a 
superstatute constitutional amendment may overrule Supreme Court-created doctrinal norms. I agree 
with Ackerman on this point. I, however, am arguing for something beyond Ackerman’s point. I am 
arguing that a superstatute constitutional amendment cannot overrule a popular sovereign-generated 
constitutional amendment. Although Ackerman has argued that overcoming Article V hurdles is not a 
necessary condition to a legitimate constitutional amendment, I argue that it also might not be a 
sufficient condition to legitimate constitutional amendment.  
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textual norms as different in kind and hierarchically superior to all other 
constitutional textual norms. Judicial recognition of two categories of 
constitutional textual norms may entail considerable reconfigurations of the 
constitutional landscape. Yet despite the pragmatic concern for stability, 
tradition, and continuity, the legal system ought not ignore the difference 
between constitutional textual norms emanating from We the People and 
constitutional textual norms sourced in government institutions. In briefest 
terms, maintaining the status quo violates foundational meta-norms, and 
damages the legitimacy of the constitutional system. Prudential concerns for 
stability, tradition, and continuity ought not triumph over foundational meta-
norms and the legitimacy of the constitutional system.   
Let me expand this argument a bit further. Treatment of all constitutional 
textual norms as similar in kind violates the consistency principle meta-norm, 
the global dictate to treat like cases in a like manner.361 From Equal 
Protection Clause reasoning to the rationale of stare decisis, the consistency 
principle pervades the legal system. Every day, lawyers build arguments and 
courts decide cases on the principle that a given case is similar to some 
previously decided case, and therefore should be treated in the same manner 
as that previously decided case. The rule of law requires consistent adherence 
to norms even when adherence produces problematic results in particular 
cases. A legal system that fails to apply norms when their application would 
give rise to pragmatic problems is not a system governed by rules. In such a 
system, the “rules” do not determine outcomes, but instead merely serve to 
prop-up and rationalize outcomes arrived at by pragmatic judgments. By 
treating constitutional textual norms emanating from different sources as 
similar in kind, courts fail to treat constitutional textual norms as courts treat 
norms in general—in accordance with the source, hierarchic, and categoric 
axioms—and thereby violate the global dictate to treat like cases alike.  
Violation of the consistency principle alone, however, cannot override the 
pragmatic concerns for stability, tradition, and continuity favoring the status 
quo. Although a failure to treat like cases alike should always raise eyebrows, 
no legal system could hope for complete consistency. Both the frailties of the 
human mind and the decentralization of the judicial system render some 
degree of inconsistency inevitable. Invariably, norms will sometimes be 
applied in a given set of cases, but will be ignored in another set of 
essentially indistinguishable cases. Moreover, pragmatic concerns for 
stability, tradition, and continuity, as opposed to mere inadvertence or error, 
may often motivate (and even justify) such consistency principle violations. 
 
 
 361. See supra text accompanying notes 26-30. 
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Blindly adhering to the consistency principle, without any consideration for 
pragmatic concerns, is just as problematic as ignoring the consistency 
principle whenever adherence would bring about undesirable outcomes. Why 
then should we seek to eradicate the particular inconsistency that I highlight? 
Why is inconsistent treatment of constitutional textual norms more 
distressing than inconsistency in other areas where courts treat like cases in a 
dissimilar manner?  
To begin, treating constitutional textual norms differently violates deeply-
ingrained and fundamental meta-norms. The failure to follow rules, or decide 
cases consistent with extant norms, becomes deeply problematic, even 
corrosive, when the rules or norms in question are the deeply-ingrained, 
irrefutable building blocks of our legal system. Undercutting the source, 
hierarchic, and categoric axioms damages foundations on which the legal 
system rests. Moreover, ignoring the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms 
when dealing with constitutional textual norms undercuts their democratic 
legitimacy-reinforcing power.362 To put the matter bluntly, to allow a 
government-generated amendment to trump a popular sovereign generated 
constitutional provision is to allow ordinary government to overrule We the 
People. This violation of the consistency principle strikes at the very core of  
the popular sovereignty values underlying our constitutional system.363  
The pragmatic concerns for stability, tradition, and continuity militating 
in favor of the status quo are considerable. Yet, should the legal system 
perpetuate a practice that is incompatible with foundational deeply-ingrained, 
incontrovertable, democracy-reinforcing meta-norms? Should tradition, 
inertia, and a past failure to perceive the incongruity between those meta-
norms and long-standing practices override democracy reinforcing meta-
norms? Maintaining the status quo requires the creation of an ad hoc 
exception to the source, hierarchic, and categoric axioms simply because the 
principled and consistent approach yields an unsettling, nontraditional, and 
unorthodox conclusion. Surely, where democracy-reinforcing building block 
meta-norms are concerned, we must demand more than ad hoc exceptions 
designed to shoehorn extant practices into axiomatic principles. A 
premeditated, inconsistent application of norms constituting the legal 
system’s major popular sovereignty premises simply works too much 
damage to the rule of law. In sum, the argument in favor of the dual-source 
thesis, and in favor of recognizing two separate classes of constitutional 
 
 
 362. See supra text accompanying notes 92-93. 
 363. This is somewhat ironic, given that the orthodox mythology sourcing all constitutional 
textual norms in We the People seeks to legitimize the constitutional system. Ultimately, however, a 
legitimizing theory that is merely a fiction does not serve its legitimizing function.  
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textual norms, does not grow out of some peculiar fetish for consistency. To 
the contrary, the consistency principle violation caused by the status quo 
treatment of all constitutional textual norms as similar in kind, regardless of 
their true source, is uniquely problematic. Violation of the consistency 
principle here is particularly disturbing because it allows constitutional 
provisions generated by ordinary government to trump constitutional 
provisions emanating from the popular sovereign.  
Of course the confection of some principled, rather than merely 
pragmatic, rationale for treating constitutional textual norms differently than 
all other norms would provide a convenient way to preserve the practice of 
treating all constitutional textual norms as similar in kind, and avoid a major 
violation of the consistency principle. The problem, however, is that no such 
principled rationale exists, except as a post hoc distinction created 
specifically for the purpose of propping up the otherwise incongruous 
classification of all constitutional textual norms that emanate from two 
distinct sources as similar in kind. After all, under the orthodox mythology 
locating the source of all constitutional textual norms in We the People, the 
notion that constitutional norms emanate from a different source than 
statutory, administrative, or common law norms justifies the separate 
categorization of constitutional norms separate and apart from the various 
sub-constitutional norms. If the differences in sources serves to categorically 
separate constitutional norms from sub-constitutional norms, then on what 
principled grounds can the legal system ignore source differences when 
looking at constitutional norms alone?  
In the final analysis, government utilizes legal norms as instruments for 
asserting authority and as warrants for exercising power. Authority and 
power demand that individuals subsume their will, judgment, best interests, 
values, and beliefs to that which the authority or power-wielding figure 
requires, permits, or prohibits. Because authority and power displace 
individual will, the exercise of authority and power must be justified and 
legitimized. The authority asserted and the power warranted under an 
internally inconsistent legal system will treat similar cases in an unlike 
manner and dissimilar cases alike. Authority and power applied in such an 
inconsistent manner, especially when the inconsistency involves the 
application of democracy-reinforcing building block meta-norms, degrades 
its own legitimacy.364 While no complex, modern legal system can aspire to 
 
 
 364. My reason for insisting on internal consistency in this area parallels the reason that Jules 
Coleman has identified for seeking out the internally coherent set of principles underlying tort law. See 
Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 IND. L.J. 349 (1992) (stating 
that legal norms must be coherent and consistent because they constrain individual liberty). 
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complete internal consistency, a legal system should at least seek a 
congruous alignment between its practices and its foundational, democracy-
reinforcing meta-norms. At the very least, exposure of the popular 
sovereignty-eroding practice of treating all constitutional textual norms as 
sourced in We the People and as similar in kind—a practice which allows 
government-generated constitutional textual norms to trump constitutional 
textual norms bearing a valid popular sovereignty pedigree—shifts the 
burden of persuasion onto those who might advocate maintaining the status 
quo.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
To be sure, I have not covered all of the bases. At the very least, however, 
I have outlined an argument demonstrating that the dual-source thesis better 
describes the true sources of constitutional textual norms than the orthodoxy. 
If the dual-source thesis is correct, then consistent application of the source, 
hierarchic, and categoric axiomatic meta-norms prohibits the repeal of a 
constitutional provision emanating from the popular sovereign by a newly-
minted and conflicting government institution-generated constitutional 
amendment. Yet many questions remain. First and foremost, what does it 
mean for constitutional textual norms to emanate from We the People? I have 
only begun to answer this question with a negative thesis—a constitutional 
textual norm cannot be characterized as emanating from We the People if We 
the People never deliberated over the norm, never arrived at a discernable 
and deliberated consensus, or if the constitutional textual norm contradicts a 
discernable and deliberated popular consensus. This working thesis is 
sufficient to question the popular sovereignty pedigree of the Twenty-
seventh, Twenty-sixth, Twenty-second, and Eighteenth Amendments. But 
what about the remaining amendments? What about the clauses in the body 
of the Constitution? I have assumed herein that the Bill of Rights and main 
body of the Constitution emanate from We the People. Until we have 
developed a comprehensive positive theory for separating popular sovereign-
generated from government-generated constitutional textual norms, however, 
we will not be able to turn this assumption into a confident conclusion. 
Nothing in the evidence of the original understanding behind Article V 
sustains the orthodox reading. There is no evidence confirming the idea that 
Article V provided two mechanisms through which We the People may ratify 
new constitutional textual norms. There is no evidence demonstrating that the 
popular constituent convention method of this binary system was intended as 
a safety valve available when the state legislature route produces a false 
negative. Moreover, the original understanding of Article VII makes it 
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unlikely that this could have been the original intent behind Article V. And 
even if this had been the original intent, the orthodoxy still must confront the 
possibility of false positives—instances where state legislatures ratify 
amendments over which We the People have not yet reached a decisive and 
deliberated choice to create new higher law—which are not, in any way, 
classifiable as emanating from the popular sovereign.  
Does a constitutional amendment alter truly conflicting preexisting 
constitutional provisions? The conventional response is that such a 
constitutional amendment would undoubtedly have that effect. This Article, 
however, argues that such an amendment might not have such an effect. So 
long as we accept the dual-source thesis, this conclusion follows from a 
consistent application of the source, hierarchic, and categoric meta-norms 
governing the adjudicating of all cases in which legal norms conflict. Thus, 
returning to the hypothetical that began this Article, despite ratification by 
Congress and the state legislatures in compliance with Article V of a RFRA-
like amendment, the contours of the Free Exercise Clause might remain 
completely undisturbed. Of course, this conclusion rests on the convenient 
assumption that the Free Exercise Clause emanates from We the People, 
while the RFRA-like Twenty-eighth Amendment does not. The assumption 
has been useful for the purpose of advancing the dual-source thesis. The next 
major step, however, involves the more complex world without such 
simplifying assumptions. To be precise, the next major step involves 
devising a workable set of principles for separating constitutional provisions 
emanating from We the People from constitutional provisions emanating 
from ordinary state legislatures. The easy part—establishing that 
constitutional textual norms emanate from two sources—is behind us. Ahead 
lies the real challenge: Precise line drawing between popular sovereign-
generated and government institutions-generated constitutional provisions. 
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